oppekepe高宗の主張は、「交渉妥協」五大臣上疏文は、乙巳五賊が高宗に書いたものですが？日本は感知しておりません
第2次日韓協約は日露戦争の講和条約（ポーツマス条約、1905．9．5）締結後の1905年11月17日に、林権介全権公使と朴斉純外部大臣との間で締結された。この第2次日韓協約は大韓帝国（以下、韓国と略す、1897-1910）の外交権を日本に移管することと韓国に日本人の統監を置くことを主な内容とするもので、1910年の日韓併合に関わる重要な条約であった。
この条約に対するこれまでの評価は、当時の皇帝高宗が米人H.B.Hulbertを用いて対外的に反対運動を展開した事などから、皇帝高宗はこの条約に一貫して反対したとするものである。
この通説に対して、私は李完用らの「五大臣上疏文」を再評価して、皇帝高宗が率先して日本の条約案を修正して受け入れたことを「第二次日韓協約調印と大韓帝国皇帝」（『青丘学術論集』24、韓国文化振興財団、東京、2004年4月）において明らかにした。
このたびの報告においては、これまで等閑視されてきた皇帝高宗の君主外交に視点を置いて、日本案を修正して締結することに動いた皇帝高宗が、条約締結後は一転して反対運動を煽動する過程と、これに対応する韓国国内の反対運動の展開について取り上げる。
１．第2次日韓協約の締結
まず、大韓帝国政策の決定システムについて触れておく。朝鮮は1895年の日清講和条約（1895）によって清の冊封体制の下から独立すると、1897年に国号を大韓帝国に改め、さらに1899年に「大韓国国制」（全9条）を制定し、大韓帝国の存立の正統性を旧来の清の冊封ではなく万国公法にあることを主張した。
この「大韓国国制」によれば、大韓帝国の皇帝は外交権を含めて「無限」の君権を有していた。皇帝の下には議政大臣以下9名の大臣からなる議政府が置かれ、「軍国重要事項」は議政府で審議した後、中枢院の諮詢協議を経て皇帝に上奏し、皇帝の裁可を得て御押御璽の後、官報で告示することになっていた。要するに官報で告示された事項は皇帝の裁可を得たものであった。
日露戦争期以降の韓国を取り巻く国際環境を見ると、当時の勢力均衡論に基づく国際安全保障の考えに基づいて、桂・タフト協定（1905.7）、第2次日英同盟協約（1905.8）、日露講和条約（1905．9）によって韓国に対する日本の権益が国際的に承認された。
こうした状況の下で、1905年11月、第2次日韓協約の締結交渉が行なわれた。皇帝高宗は、韓国を取り巻く国際環境を踏まえて、日本の第2次日韓協約締結要求を全面的に拒否するのではなく、交渉によって韓国にとって有利なように修正した上で受け入れようとした（「交渉妥協」「協商妥?）。ただこの時、皇帝高宗にとって韓国の利益とは、即ち韓国皇室の利益であった。したがって11月17日午後の御前会議、同日夜から夜半にかけての締結交渉においては、韓国側は皇帝高宗を先頭にしてもっぱら皇室の利益保全の観点から日本案の修正を求めた。
この結果、皇帝高宗を前にした議政府の御前会議で日本案（全4条）に対して4箇所の修正が議論された。この内2箇所は皇帝高宗自身が提起したものであった。この会議の後、韓国の外部大臣朴斉純と日本の林権介公使とを中心にした締結交渉に伊藤博文大使も加わり、韓国側が求めた4箇所の修正要求をすべてを伊藤大使が受け入れて調印に至った。
条約調印文書では締結日は11月17日となっているが、実際は18日未明に調印された。調印された第2次日韓協約は全5条からなり、第5条に日本政府が韓国皇室の安寧と尊厳の維持を保証することがうたわれている。かくして、皇帝高宗の要求は条約に反映された。link
原田教授は、『五大臣上疏文』などのテキストを中心に高宗皇帝の言動を検討し、「実際の高宗は老練な宮廷政治家であり、韓国の外交権を日本に委譲することには反対であったが、第二次日韓協約の締結に際しては、日本の協約案を修正して調印する方向に韓国政府の大臣達を動かしている」と述べる。
記者なりの理解でそのポイントを整理すれば、明治三十八年十一月十五日に伊藤博文が内謁見した際、皇帝は最初は形式的な外交権だけは韓国に残すという提案をするのだが、伊藤がこれを断固拒否すると、「交渉妥協」、つまり日本側の協約案を修正して受け入れるという基本的な立場を表明し、さらに外部大臣に日本側と交渉するよう命じる。
その二日後の十七日には、皇帝と大臣達の御前会議が行われ、ここで皇帝は「交渉妥協」を命じる。当時の韓国は皇帝専制であり（大韓国国制第二条）、これで韓国の方針は決定される。この御前会議で、大臣達は最初は全員が反対だったが、皇帝の勅諚が下ったために、皇帝と大臣によって修正案の検討が始まり、三点の修正意見が出る。ところが、韓参政大臣と朴外部大臣が受け入れそのものに反対したため、韓国側は対日交渉の基本姿勢は決定できなかった。とはいえ、皇帝は自ら「交渉妥協」の方針を表明し、大臣とともに修正案を検討していたという事実は重要である。
こうして十七日夜、伊藤と韓国側大臣との協議が行われるのだが、絶対反対は参政大臣と度支部大臣の二人だけで、外部大臣は個人的には反対だが勅命があれば賛成といい、残りの五人は、情勢からしてやむを得ないと答えた。ここで、参政大臣が退席。その後、協約案の修正が行われ、それが上奏されると、高宗がさらなる修正を提案し、伊藤が受け入れ、皇帝が裁可したので、最終案が確定し、調印の運びとなった。
こうした事実経過を踏まえて、原田教授は「これまでの研究では、第二次日韓協約締結において、皇帝高宗は伊藤特派大使の受け身の立場としてのみ位置づけられてきたが、『五大臣上疏文』によれば、むしろ皇帝高宗は韓国内部で締結推進のリーダーシップを発揮し、主体的に関わっていたのである」と結論づけている。link
http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=4&q=http://www.mofat.go.kr/pdffiles/01-1jjy.pdf&e=9797
Duus p189 “On November 17 the entire Korean cabinet was to be invited to lunch at the Japanese legation. If discussions went well at lunch and the ministers agreed to the treaty, an audience would be arranged with the monarch; if not, the ministers would solicit the emperor’s decision….Hayashi asked General Hasegawa Yoshimichi…to post troops along the route, ostensibly as a ‘protective guard.’ And since there was danger of popular demonstrations or disturbances…armed Japenese troops were to be posted around the palace…the king’s ministers were unable to reach a decision during lunch discussions. Deeply divided, they wanted the monarch to make the final decision. At about three in the afternoon, accompanied by Hayashi, the cabinet left the legation for the palace. Kojong, they discovered, was ‘ill.’”….Itō arrives and asks each minister their opinion: “Han Kyu-sol [sic] who appeared to Hayashi to be in a state of extreme agitation, was adamant in his opposition…Han rose from his seat and walked unsteadily in the direction of the royal quarters as if he personally intended to stop the monarch from agreeing to the treaty. A few moments later the group heard the sound of women’s screams and running feet in the palace interior…In his excited state Han had blundered into the women’s chambers…he fainted dead away. Hayashi learned the cause of the uproar, he muttered, ‘Throw some water on his face to calm him down.’ The discussion continued without the prime minister.”
Duus goes on to describe how the Pak Che-sun was opposed but would go along if Kojong did, Min Yŏng-gi also was generally opposed, while Yi Wan-yong, Yi Kun-t’aek, Yi Ha-yong, Kwon Chong-hyun, and Yi Chi-yong were all for the treaty (the “5 traitors”), it thus gaining majority support. Duus goes on to explain that it is unclear what happens next, the Japanese official account says the emperor finally went along with it, but also notes that there are two alternative accounts based on letters by other foreigners which may suggest otherwise. He also mentions that Lee Tai-jin has claimed that the original text of the treaty doesn’t have the king’s seal or signature on it..froginawel
Emperor Kojong’s Letter
Lew p240 “Kojong’s opposition to the Protectorate Treaty was made public in an imperial letter published on February 1, 1906, in the Korea Daily News (Taehan Maeil Sinbo), in which he stated that he had not consented to the treaty and appealed for the joint protection of the powers.”
Duus p207 “In early 1907 the Tahan maeil sinbo, a Korean-language newspaper edited by [Ernest J.] Bethell, published a letter from teh emperor claiming that the protectorate treaty had been signed under duress—a letter that the emperor then emphatically denied writing.”
The Hague Incident
Lew p240 “Kojong secretly dispatched a delegation to the [Second Hague Peace Conference] to expose the injustice done Korea and to seek redress. Although the conference refused to seat the Korean delegates or accept their petition, the world-wide publicity the Korean question consequently received created considerable international furor.”
Dudden p7 “…Emperor Kojong of Korea sent three representatives on his behalf to the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague…Although the three young men appealed to diplomats from countries that had long-standing relations with Korea, none except the Russian envoy gave them more than a passing notice. Not coincidentally, of course, Japan’s shocking military victory against Russia two years earlier made St. Petersburg eager to support any protest of Japan.” p9 “the international deaf ear to the Koreans—allowed Japanese officials to broaden control of the country…”
Duus p208 “After making their way across Russia to Europe, they arrived in teh Hague, only to be refused the right of diplomatic representation. Since Korea was a protectorate, they were told, it was not possible to recognize their credentials. The Japanese authorities…suspected that the mission was financed by ‘dividends’ paid into the royal treasury by the Korean-American Electric Company, a Bostwick and Collbran enterprise…”
After securing the US consent, Japan moved fast and made Korea a Japanese protectorate. Unaware of the secret Taft-Katsura agreement, King Kojong sent Homer Hulbert, an American friend and advisor to the Korean court, to Washington to seek US aid under the Chemulpo Treaty.
http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/1623.html
He was chosen by Emperor Kojong to try and persuade President Roosevelt to come to Korea’s assistance in 1905 - which he failed at, not because of his faults, but because the President had deemed Korea not worth saving because Korea could not or would not defend itself.
http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:0Rc_QtoNPuYJ:www.rjkoehler.com/2005/03/25/tsushima-controlled-by-ancient-korean-kingdom/+He+was+chosen+by+Emperor+Kojong+to+try+and+persuade+President+Roosevelt+to+come+to+Korea%E2%80%99s+assistance+in+1905&hl=ja&gl=jp&ct=clnk&cd=1
http://www.interq.or.jp/sheep/clarex/krjp/krjp15.html
dreamtale
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
The initial alliance had been concluded in 1902 and was to run for five years and be renewable. It was directed against the presumed menace posed to each power by Russia. Accordingly, it was renewed in 1905 to account for the changed conditions consequent upon Japan’s war with and defeat of Russia which had erupted in 1904. See, also, the Summary reference document:/FONT>
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902 (Main Points)
Article 1. The High Contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country. having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, whilst Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting parties recognize that it will be admissable for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting parties for the protection of the lives and properties of its subjects.
Article 2. Declaration of neutrality if either signatory becomes involved in war through Article 1.
Article 3. Promise of support if either signatory becomes involved in war with more than one Power.
Article 4. Signatories promise not to enter into separate agreements with other Powers to the prejudice of this alliance.
Article 5. The signatories promise to communicate frankly and fully with each other when any of the interests affected by this treaty are in jeopardy.
Article 6. Treaty to remain in force for five years and then at one years’ notice, unless notice was given at the end of the fourth year.
The Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905 (Main Points)
The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th of January 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object:
The consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India;
The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;
The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties [viz., Britain and Japan] in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:
Article I
It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement [i.e., items a, b, c above] are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and consider in common the measures whhich should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.
Article II
If, by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.
Article III
Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.
Article IV
Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.
Article V
The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.
Article VI
As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.
Article VII
The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the military and naval authorities of the Contracting Parties who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.
Article VIII
The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that dateThe Anglo-Japanese Alliance
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