Wednesday, November 28, 2012

氏の創設は自由

氏の創設は自由 1940,3.6 朝日 中鮮版 http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=427873000600719&set=a.182386961815992.53668.100001340677305&type=1&relevant_count=1

Friday, November 09, 2012

Comfort women, Yes we remember the facts

日米交渉

yankdownunder
yankdownunder In an effort to aid the Nationalist government of China and to put pressure on Japan, President Franklin Roosevelt in April 1941 authorized the creation of a clandestine "Special Air Unit" consisting of three combat groups equipped with American aircraft and staffed by aviators and technicians to be recruited from the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps for service in China. The 1st American Volunteer Group were recruited starting on 15 April 1941, when an unpublished executive order was signed by President Roosevelt.[2]A total of 100 P-40Bs were obtained from Curtiss-Wright by convincing the British Government to take a later batch of more advanced P-40s in exchange In the fall of 1941, the 2nd American Volunteer Group was equipped with 33 Lockheed Hudson (A-28) and 33 Douglas DB-7 (A-20) bombers originally built for Britain but acquired by the U.S. Army as part of the Lend-Lease program passed earlier in the year. These are wiki sources but seem to be fairly accurate(from checking other sources). I believe this is what happened and for me yes it is a secret war(not all out,,not declared). Maybe you think it was just strong diplomacy or foreign aid or whatever. I guess we should just agree to disagree. http://archive.org/details/fdr... Telephone conversation between Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Only Roosevelt's side of the conversation is recorded. The men discuss the growing foreign policy conflict with Japan. - 1940. Reviewer xanax2 says It is rather boring hearing only one side of the conversation and all the uh-huhs, but hearing Roosevelt tell about Japan's conditions for peace (US leaving Guam, Midway, Pearl Harbor...) makes this an important historical "document." All FDR had to do was leave Guam, Midway, Pearl Harbor. It's all his fault.

休戦申し出

上岡 龍次 11月1日、東京都周辺
日米による太平洋戦争は1944年のマリアナ沖海戦で日本の敗北が決定したと言えます。マリアナ沖海戦以後の日本軍は組織的な戦闘力が失われ、「いつまでもつか?」の戦いに移行します。 当時の指導部は責任を放棄したのではなく、決定的な敗北から連合国側に休戦を申し入れています。つまり、マリアナ沖海戦以後の戦闘は、日本側の休戦を無視した連合国側に責任が有ります。 フィリピン戦・沖縄戦は、マッカーサー元帥の政治介入で発生したとも言えます。アメリカ海軍はフィリピン戦・沖縄戦は想定しておらず、マッカーサー元帥のワガママに付き合わされたことになります。 ですが、アメリカ海軍は国民が飢餓に陥ることを前提とした飢餓作戦を実行しましたが。 戦後は反日が正当化されていますが、日本側から休戦を申し出たことが無視されています。アメリカが休戦を受け入れたならば沖縄戦など発生しません。 アメリカは国内戦の考え方で国外戦を行うので、相手政権の消滅まで戦争します。これは2600年の戦史では異例で、アメリカだけが実行する戦争スタイルです。20世紀から戦争を学ぶと誤認するので、基本的には17世紀から学ばなければなりません。 沖縄や中国大陸の国民は国に無視されたのではありません。当時の日本国が「守る能力を失っていたから守れなかった」と言えます。守れないと判断したから休戦を申し出たことは、松村閣下が著書で記述しています。 ですが、メディアで扱わないので日本では知らない人が多いようです。それに生前に何度も自民党に呼ばれて話をしているのですが・・・・変化が無いのが現実です

Sunday, August 26, 2012

中国政府は釣魚島(尖閣諸島)を日本の領土と認めていた

広東の企業幹部が「尖閣諸島は日本領土」、中国版ツイッターで発言、人民日報記事など証拠挙げ、賛同広がる 2012.8.25 01:14 [中国]
【上海=河崎真澄】中国広東省の民間企業幹部が24日、中国版ツイッター「微博」で「1949年から71年まで中国政府は釣魚島(尖閣諸島)を日本の領土と認めていた」と異例の発言をした。日本領有を示す53年1月の中国共産党機関紙、人民日報の記事や、複数の公式地図など根拠を挙げている。微博では中国国内からの感情的な反論に加え、「知識のない大衆が中国共産党に踊らされたことが分かった」などと賛同する見方も広がっている。  発言をしたのは同省広州の電子サービス企業、広東捷盈電子科技の取締役会副主席との肩書を持つ女性の林凡氏。林氏は微博の運営会社、新浪微博から「実名」の認証を受けており、10万人以上の読者をもつ。  林氏の資料によると、人民日報は53年1月8日付の紙面に掲載した記事で「琉球群島(沖縄)は台湾の東北に点在し、尖閣諸島や先島諸島、沖縄諸島など7組の島嶼からなる」と表記していた。中国当局が監修した53年、58年、60年、67年に発行した地図の画像も示したが、その多くが「尖閣群島」「魚釣島」などと表記。日中境界線も明らかに日本領土を示している。  林氏は冷静に証拠を積み重ねた上で「中国政府はこれでも釣魚島はわれわれの領土だといえるのか」と疑問を投げかけた。中国国内からの反応には、「資料をみて(尖閣諸島が)日本領だったことが明白に分かった」「(当局に)タダで使われて反日デモを行う連中には困る」などと、林氏支持の発言が出ている。  一方、25、26の両日も、尖閣諸島の問題を巡る反日デモが、四川省南充や浙江省諸曁、広東省東莞、海南省海口など、地方都市で呼びかけられており、混乱は今後も続きそうだ。
1953年に、中国の「人民日報」は「尖閣諸島は日本領」と報道していたようです。これも動かぬ証拠?? ただし、私には中国語は読めませんので、どなたか読める方がいらしゃると、自信を持って拡散できそうですね。 http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=346985588719357&set=a.111900215561230.25333.100002237561633&type=1&theater
http://ampontan.wordpress.com/2012/08/27/evil-lin-fan-is-on-the-loose/

Saturday, August 25, 2012

FedFlix

yankdownunder • 6 hours ago − This website has many interesting videos about Japan. http://archive.org/details/Fed... You in Japan.http://archive.org/details/gov.archiv... http://archive.org/details/gov... AIR FORCE STORY, THE -- AIR WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1944-1945 (1953). narration starting around (9.50) is noteworthy ... b29s burned out industrial heart of Japan ... 66 principal cities received their devastating bath of fire until Japan's military situation was hopeless ...they could not have held out ...they lost control of the air there capacity to wage war was destroyed ...the fire raids had even killed much of their fanatical resistance(ie.mass killings of civilians) http://archive.org/details/Our... Our Enemy: The Japanese (1943). Stridently anti-Japanese film that attempts to convey an understanding of Japanese life and philosophy so that the U.S. may more readily defeat its enemy. Depicts the Japanese as "primitive, murderous and fanatical." With many images of 1930s and 1940s Japan, and a portentious and highly negative narration by Joseph C. Grew, former U.S. ambassador to Japan. http://archive.org/details/Pre... Why We Fight: Prelude to War. ....the ultimate goal of the Axis powers is to enslave the nations of the "free world," a desire made manifest in the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.... http://archive.org/details/gov... My Japan (1945). This a complex and disturbing anti-Japanese propaganda film produced to spur the sale of U.S. war bonds. The film pretends to be a Japanese film. The Japanese powerful commitment to the war is compared to the "lazy, easy living" American commitment. American successes are denigrated and Japanese losses are minimized. The devotion of the Japanese is compared to the immoral Americans. CONTENT ADVISORY: Explicit racism and extreme violence. 0 •Reply•Share ›

Saturday, August 18, 2012

American Holocaust

http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=10151148230206368&set=a.330776471367.196302.327603401367&type=1 excerpts from the book American Holocaust by David Stannard Oxford University Press, 1992 Epilogue excerpted from the book American Holocaust by David Stannard Oxford University Press, 1992
From time to time during the past half-century Americans have edged across that line, if only temporarily, under conditions of foreign war. Thus, as John W. Dower has demonstrated, the eruption of war in the Pacific in the 1940s caused a crucial shift in American perceptions of the Japanese from a prewar attitude of racial disdain and dismissiveness (the curator of the Smithsonian Institution's Division of Anthropology had advised the President that the Japanese skull was "some 2,000 years less developed than ours, ' while it was widely believed by Western military experts that the Japanese were incompetent pilots who "could not shoot straight because their eyes were slanted") to a wartime view of them as super-competent warriors, but morally subhuman beasts. This transformation became a license for American military men to torture and mutilate Japanese troops with impunity-just as the Japanese did to Americans, but in their own ways, following the cultural reshaping of their own racial images of Americans. As one American war correspondent in the Pacific recalled in an Atlantic Monthly article: We shot prisoners in cold blood, wiped out hospitals, strafed lifeboats, killed or mistreated enemy civilians, finished off the enemy wounded, tossed the dying into a hole with the dead, and in the Pacific boiled the flesh off enemy skulls to make table ornaments for sweethearts, or carved their bones into letter openers. Dower provides other examples of what he calls the "fetish" of "collecting grisly battlefield trophies from the Japanese dead or near dead, in the form of gold teeth, ears, bones, scalps, and skulls"-practices receiving sufficient approval on the home front that in 1944 Life magazine published a "human interest" story along with "a full-page photograph of an attractive blonde posing with a Japanese skull she had been sent by her fiancée in the Pacific." (Following the Battle of Horse Shoe Bend in 1814, Andrew Jackson oversaw not only the stripping away of dead Indians' flesh for manufacture into bridle reins, but he saw to it that souvenirs from the corpses were distributed "to the ladies of Tennessee.")

Wednesday, May 02, 2012

日米開戦 アメリカ最大のタブー The secret plan that would have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor. By: Alan JB NO 355
III. FACTS IGNORED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT President Roosevelt withheld or omitted the following material facts from his address before Congress: (1) In order to circumvent the American Neutrality Laws, the United States had "loaned" China One Hundred Million Dollars to support the regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek then engaged in a brutal conflict with Japan, the Sino-Japanese War. (2) In November of 1940, more than one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched a secret message to President Roosevelt asking for the forma-tion of a "special air unit" in China composed of American planes and pilots. He requested 350 fighters and 150 bombers and indicated this "Chinese Air Force" (in name only) could be employed to bomb Tokyo and other centers of Japanese population and industry. (3) On December 8, 1940, almost one year to the day before the Japanese surprise attack, Roosevelt luncheoned with Dr. T.V. Song, China's Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau at the White House. Writing later of that meeting, Morgenthau noted the President had indicated to him that "it would be a nice thing if China bombed Japan." (4) On Monday, December 9, 1940, Dr. Soong delivered a hand-written note to Morgenthau which included a map of secret air bases in China within flying distance to key Japanese cities. (5) On Tuesday, December 10, 1940, at 8:40 a.m. Morgenthau met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull when Hull declared: "What we have to do, Henry, is to get 500 American planes to start from the Aleutian Islands and fly over Japan just once. That will teach them a lesson. If we could only find a way to have them (the Chinese) drop some bombs on Tokyo?" (6) Morgenthau, Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (known as the "Plus Four") met with President Roosevelt on December 19, 1940, when the President expressed delight at the idea of having ostensible Chinese aircraft bomb Japan. The President directed the "Plus Four" to work it out. (7) On Friday, December 20, 1940, when Morgenthau had two meetings with Dr. Soong, Morgenthau also received a phone call from Knox at 5:13 p.m. The topic of conversation related to was the "hush, hush thing" and included discussions set for the following Monday about 300 P-40 fighter planes that could still be built by Curtiss Aircraft Corporation. During the phone conversation Knox declared: "Well, by God, we ought to grab some of those for the Chinese." (8) On Saturday, December 21, 1940, at 5:00 p.m. Morgenthau met with, among others, Dr. Soong, General Mow and Captain Claire Lee Chennault. Chennault had been Air Corps pilot and instructor in fighter tactics at the Air Tactical School at Maxwell Field. His disagreement with Air Corps doctrine of bomber supremacy had forced his early retirement ostensibly for medical reasons. Chennault had found employment as a mercenary pilot in the service of the Chinese Government. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Chennault continued to fly in combat despite directives from the American Ambassador that Chennault and other mercenaries should leave China. Chennault presented Morgenthau with a plan to bomb Tokyo and other key Japanese cities employing either B-17 Flying Fortress bombers or Lockheed Hudson bombers. Incendiary bombs would be deployed to set the Japanese cities on fire and save weight so the bombers could carry more fuel. (9) On Sunday, December 22, 1940, the Plus Four met with General Marshal who maintained Britain needed Flying Fortresses more than China. As a consolation prize, China would be allowed to purchase 100 Curtiss P-40 fighters (10) On or before April 14, 1941, President Roosevelt gave an oral directive to Navy Secretary Frank Knox to allow American military pilots and technicians to resign from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps to serve in China. (11) On April 14, 1941, Captain Frank Beatty, Aide to Secretary Knox wrote letters of introduction to commanders of Navy and Marine air bases on behalf of Chennault and Commander Rutledge Irvine (USN ret.) to visit those bases and recruit men to serve in the employ of the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO), since CAMCO was used as a cover by the United States government which took the official position that these men were involved in a "commercial venture without any direct participation by the United States Government." Of Chennault and other confederates involved in this enterprise records of the United States Navy relate: "They realize the necessity for keeping the thing quiet and will take due precautions." (12) On May 12, 1941, Chennault's plan to firebomb Japanese cities was resurrected with Dr. Lauchlin Currie as it champion. Dr. Currie had received his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University and studied at the London School of Economics and was serving as Aide to President Roosevelt. The plan was now officially Joint (Army/Navy) Board 355, Serial 691 ("JB 355"). JB 355 envisioned 500 military aircraft being operational in China by October 31, 1941, including 350 fighters and 150 bombers. The fourth strategic objective of JB 355 was: “Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple pro-duction of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure of Japan." Cities selected for firebombing included: Nagasaki, Kobe, Osaka and Tokyo. (13) JB 355 was an ambitious project. It would be accomplished in three stages. The first stage was the 100 P-40 fighters the Plus Four had allocated to China and which sailed for Rangoon, Burma in the spring of 1941. These planes would be used to provide air cover to keep the Burma Road, China's only lifeline of supplies to the outside world, open. They were to be operational by July of 1941. The second stage included 100 bombers for offensive operations and 200 additional fighters. The bombers were to be shipped to Burma by May of 1941. The third stage included another 50 bombers and 150 fighters to keep a full force, anticipating a loss rate of 15%. The third stage was to be completed by November of 1941. (14) The first 100 P-40 fighters [actually, only 99 reached Rangoon] were unloaded on the docks of Rangoon, Burma. The Japanese maintained a diplomatic office in Rangoon. Mingaladon Airfield where the P-40 fighters were assembled and test-flown was only 12 miles north of Rangoon. It is difficult to believe the Japanese were unaware of the American "guerilla air corps" being assembled and training in Burma where they were safe from attacks by Japanese bombers in French Indo-China, unless Japan wanted to provoke an incident with Great Britain, since Burma was a British Colony. (15) On July 23, 1941, President Roosevelt authorized JB 355 by affixing his signature to the recommendation from American military commanders. On the same day Dr. Currie dispatched a top secret telegram to Madame Chiang Kai-shek in care of the American Embassy in Chungking relating: "I am happy to be able to report today the President directed that sixty-six bombers be made available to China this year with twentyfour to be delivered immediately." What was unknown to Dr. Currie and to Madame Chiang was the existence of a Japanese collaborator in or closely connected to the Chinese Nationalist Government who was feeding this very secret information to the Japanese. American initiatives to serve as a non-belligerent ally to China were not unknown to Tokyo. Further, if the Roosevelt administration was going to sponsor the operation of an American guerilla air force in China, would not Japan be well-advised to seize the initiative and attack America first? (16) Through the summer of 1941, Dr. Currie struggled to get bombers released for service in China.(17) On July 9, 1941, an American reporter filed a news dispatch that American technicians and pilots were sailing from San Francisco for service in China. En route to Rangoon, the Japanese broadcast a radio message declaring that the ship transporting the American Volunteers would be sunk. (18) On September 30, 1941, wrote a secret memorandum to Knox and Stimson declaring that in addition to the 100 P-40 fighters already in Burma, the United States was sending China 66 bombers and 269 additional fighters. America's buildup of air power was a subject of discussion between President Roosevelt and Japanese Ambassador Nomura. Again, the Japanese could not have been unaware of America's intentions in Southeast Asia. (19) On October 31, 1941, The United States News carried a two page story entitled: "Bomber Lanes to Japan--Flying Time from Strategic Points." The story included an illustration depicting bases in Chunking, Hong Kong, Singapore, Cavite, Vladivostok, Guam and Dutch Harbor from which American bombers might be launched to bomb Japan. (20) On November 15, 1941, General Marshall gave a secret briefing to the New York Times, New York Tribune, Newsweek and the Associated Press asserting that bombing operations would be initiated against Japan in the first ten days of December. (21) On November 21, 1941, Army Air Corps strategists were selecting targets in Japan to be attacked by heavy bombers. On the same day, the Second American Volunteer Group [the men that would man and service the "Chinese" bombers] sailed from San Francisco. The Lockheed Hudson bombers were sitting on the tarmac in Burbank, California waiting to be flown across the pacific.