日米開戦　アメリカ最大のタブー The secret plan that would have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor. By: Alan JB NO 355

III. FACTS IGNORED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT President Roosevelt withheld or omitted the following material facts from his address before Congress: (1) In order to circumvent the American Neutrality Laws, the United States had "loaned" China One Hundred Million Dollars to support the regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek then engaged in a brutal conflict with Japan, the Sino-Japanese War. (2) In November of 1940, more than one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched a secret message to President Roosevelt asking for the forma-tion of a "special air unit" in China composed of American planes and pilots. He requested 350 fighters and 150 bombers and indicated this "Chinese Air Force" (in name only) could be employed to bomb Tokyo and other centers of Japanese population and industry. (3) On December 8, 1940, almost one year to the day before the Japanese surprise attack, Roosevelt luncheoned with Dr. T.V. Song, China's Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau at the White House. Writing later of that meeting, Morgenthau noted the President had indicated to him that "it would be a nice thing if China bombed Japan." (4) On Monday, December 9, 1940, Dr. Soong delivered a hand-written note to Morgenthau which included a map of secret air bases in China within flying distance to key Japanese cities. (5) On Tuesday, December 10, 1940, at 8:40 a.m. Morgenthau met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull when Hull declared: "What we have to do, Henry, is to get 500 American planes to start from the Aleutian Islands and fly over Japan just once. That will teach them a lesson. If we could only find a way to have them (the Chinese) drop some bombs on Tokyo?" (6) Morgenthau, Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (known as the "Plus Four") met with President Roosevelt on December 19, 1940, when the President expressed delight at the idea of having ostensible Chinese aircraft bomb Japan. The President directed the "Plus Four" to work it out. (7) On Friday, December 20, 1940, when Morgenthau had two meetings with Dr. Soong, Morgenthau also received a phone call from Knox at 5:13 p.m. The topic of conversation related to was the "hush, hush thing" and included discussions set for the following Monday about 300 P-40 fighter planes that could still be built by Curtiss Aircraft Corporation. During the phone conversation Knox declared: "Well, by God, we ought to grab some of those for the Chinese." (8) On Saturday, December 21, 1940, at 5:00 p.m. Morgenthau met with, among others, Dr. Soong, General Mow and Captain Claire Lee Chennault. Chennault had been Air Corps pilot and instructor in fighter tactics at the Air Tactical School at Maxwell Field. His disagreement with Air Corps doctrine of bomber supremacy had forced his early retirement ostensibly for medical reasons. Chennault had found employment as a mercenary pilot in the service of the Chinese Government. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Chennault continued to fly in combat despite directives from the American Ambassador that Chennault and other mercenaries should leave China. Chennault presented Morgenthau with a plan to bomb Tokyo and other key Japanese cities employing either B-17 Flying Fortress bombers or Lockheed Hudson bombers. Incendiary bombs would be deployed to set the Japanese cities on fire and save weight so the bombers could carry more fuel. (9) On Sunday, December 22, 1940, the Plus Four met with General Marshal who maintained Britain needed Flying Fortresses more than China. As a consolation prize, China would be allowed to purchase 100 Curtiss P-40 fighters (10) On or before April 14, 1941, President Roosevelt gave an oral directive to Navy Secretary Frank Knox to allow American military pilots and technicians to resign from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps to serve in China. (11) On April 14, 1941, Captain Frank Beatty, Aide to Secretary Knox wrote letters of introduction to commanders of Navy and Marine air bases on behalf of Chennault and Commander Rutledge Irvine (USN ret.) to visit those bases and recruit men to serve in the employ of the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO), since CAMCO was used as a cover by the United States government which took the official position that these men were involved in a "commercial venture without any direct participation by the United States Government." Of Chennault and other confederates involved in this enterprise records of the United States Navy relate: "They realize the necessity for keeping the thing quiet and will take due precautions." (12) On May 12, 1941, Chennault's plan to firebomb Japanese cities was resurrected with Dr. Lauchlin Currie as it champion. Dr. Currie had received his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University and studied at the London School of Economics and was serving as Aide to President Roosevelt. The plan was now officially Joint (Army/Navy) Board 355, Serial 691 ("JB 355"). JB 355 envisioned 500 military aircraft being operational in China by October 31, 1941, including 350 fighters and 150 bombers. The fourth strategic objective of JB 355 was: “Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple pro-duction of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure of Japan." Cities selected for firebombing included: Nagasaki, Kobe, Osaka and Tokyo. (13) JB 355 was an ambitious project. It would be accomplished in three stages. The first stage was the 100 P-40 fighters the Plus Four had allocated to China and which sailed for Rangoon, Burma in the spring of 1941. These planes would be used to provide air cover to keep the Burma Road, China's only lifeline of supplies to the outside world, open. They were to be operational by July of 1941. The second stage included 100 bombers for offensive operations and 200 additional fighters. The bombers were to be shipped to Burma by May of 1941. The third stage included another 50 bombers and 150 fighters to keep a full force, anticipating a loss rate of 15%. The third stage was to be completed by November of 1941. (14) The first 100 P-40 fighters [actually, only 99 reached Rangoon] were unloaded on the docks of Rangoon, Burma. The Japanese maintained a diplomatic office in Rangoon. Mingaladon Airfield where the P-40 fighters were assembled and test-flown was only 12 miles north of Rangoon. It is difficult to believe the Japanese were unaware of the American "guerilla air corps" being assembled and training in Burma where they were safe from attacks by Japanese bombers in French Indo-China, unless Japan wanted to provoke an incident with Great Britain, since Burma was a British Colony. (15) On July 23, 1941, President Roosevelt authorized JB 355 by affixing his signature to the recommendation from American military commanders. On the same day Dr. Currie dispatched a top secret telegram to Madame Chiang Kai-shek in care of the American Embassy in Chungking relating: "I am happy to be able to report today the President directed that sixty-six bombers be made available to China this year with twentyfour to be delivered immediately." What was unknown to Dr. Currie and to Madame Chiang was the existence of a Japanese collaborator in or closely connected to the Chinese Nationalist Government who was feeding this very secret information to the Japanese. American initiatives to serve as a non-belligerent ally to China were not unknown to Tokyo. Further, if the Roosevelt administration was going to sponsor the operation of an American guerilla air force in China, would not Japan be well-advised to seize the initiative and attack America first? (16) Through the summer of 1941, Dr. Currie struggled to get bombers released for service in China.(17) On July 9, 1941, an American reporter filed a news dispatch that American technicians and pilots were sailing from San Francisco for service in China. En route to Rangoon, the Japanese broadcast a radio message declaring that the ship transporting the American Volunteers would be sunk. (18) On September 30, 1941, wrote a secret memorandum to Knox and Stimson declaring that in addition to the 100 P-40 fighters already in Burma, the United States was sending China 66 bombers and 269 additional fighters. America's buildup of air power was a subject of discussion between President Roosevelt and Japanese Ambassador Nomura. Again, the Japanese could not have been unaware of America's intentions in Southeast Asia. (19) On October 31, 1941, The United States News carried a two page story entitled: "Bomber Lanes to Japan--Flying Time from Strategic Points." The story included an illustration depicting bases in Chunking, Hong Kong, Singapore, Cavite, Vladivostok, Guam and Dutch Harbor from which American bombers might be launched to bomb Japan. (20) On November 15, 1941, General Marshall gave a secret briefing to the New York Times, New York Tribune, Newsweek and the Associated Press asserting that bombing operations would be initiated against Japan in the first ten days of December. (21) On November 21, 1941, Army Air Corps strategists were selecting targets in Japan to be attacked by heavy bombers. On the same day, the Second American Volunteer Group [the men that would man and service the "Chinese" bombers] sailed from San Francisco. The Lockheed Hudson bombers were sitting on the tarmac in Burbank, California waiting to be flown across the pacific.