McCloy Diary, Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshal and the Secretary of War, May 29, 1945
General Marshall said he thought these weapon might first be used against straight objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave---telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers....Every effort should be made to keep our record of waning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 53.(note pg. 678)
Stimson
July 2, 1945
I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis o a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment.
My own opinion is in her favor on the two points involved in this question:
a. I think the Japanese national has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender; and
b. I think she has within her population enough liberal leaders...to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of national
On the other hand, I think that the attempt to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidity and antipathy which had no analogy in the case of Germany.
McCloy Diary, Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshal and the Secretary of War, May 29, 1945General Marshall said he thought these weapon might first be used against straight objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave---telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers....Every effort should be made to keep our record of waning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 77(note p.g.680 HLS to HST July 2. 1945, enclosure; Proposed Program for Japan. "White House Correspondence." Box 15 Stimson Safe File, Entry 74A, RG 107. NA 678)
(The text of the proposed draft declaration which Stimson gave to the president stated explicitly that a post war Japanese government could include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty....)
General George C. Marshall,
Marshall June 18
If a surrender were to occur prior to complete military defeat, it would be because Japan was face by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by
(1)destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the enemy or threat of Russia into the war
An important point of Russia participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land them.
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An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan. McCloy Diary, Memorandum of Conversation with General Marshal and the Secretary of War, May 29, 1945
General Marshall said he thought these weapon might first be used against straight objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave---telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers....Every effort should be made to keep our record of waning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 53.(note pg. 678)
Marshall's top intelligence adviser in the memorandum to General John E. Hull, May 15, 1945
The Japanese are gravely concerned about the future attitude of Russia. If they are convinced that Russia will enter the war against them, as some of their leaders are, the present moment will be an excellent one for an unconditional surrender demand upon Japan when she can be assured that surrender would be bade to the Anglo-Americans only.quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, p.g.115
The Frank Committee June 11 1945
If the United States were to be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world , precipitate the race for armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons. quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 187 notes pg 697 memorandum on "Political and Social Problems,
JA petition to the President of the United States. July 17
[W]e , the undersigned , respectfully petition; first, that your exercise your power as Commander-in-Chief, to rule that the United States shall not resort to the use of atomic bombs in this war unless terms which will be imposed upon Japan have been made public in detail and Japan knowing these terms has refused to surrender; second, that in such an event the question whether or not to use the atomic bombs be decided by you in the light of the consideration presented in this petition as well as all other responsibilities which are involved. quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 190
The Chief of intelligence in Mountbatten's SouthEast Asia allied Headquarters
(Report of the director of Intelligence.)
April 12, 1945
in view of Japan's fear of Russia's military might and of communism , the denunciation of the Pact is likely to hasten Japan's preparations for a peace move. It would be to Japan's advantage to capitulate before Russia is ready to join in the war, which may not be until the Autumn of 1945.quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 101 53.(notes pg. 683)
New York Times April 6 1945
A double blows as staggering as any military defeat she has suffered and in its cumulative effect perhaps even more devastating to her hopes, has been inflicted on Japan by Moscow's curt denunciation of the Russo-Japanese neutrality pact, and the resignation of the Koiso Cabinet....{T}hese two events... tell the Japanese people beyond all prevarication of propaganda that they have lost the war. quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 101
Henry Luce, the publisher of Time and Life magazines. the spring of 1945
A few months before Hiroshima, I was with Admiral Halsey's Navy as it assaulted the coast of Japan . Two things seemed clear to me---as they did to many of the top fighting men I talked to ; first that Japan was beaten; second, that the Japanese knew it and were every day showing signs of increasing willingness to quit. quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 328.
Militarily it was clear for Japan and the U.S. that Japan was beaten. For both Japan and the U.S.the rest was how to end it . There was a strong push from military leaders and Japan experts and sceienists to make it easy for Japan to surrender, but there was another thing to consider
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, diary, May 15, 1945.
{I}t may be necessary to have it out with Russia on her relations to Manchuria and various other parts of North China, and also the relations of China to us. Over any such tangled wave of problems the S-1 secret would dominant and yet we will not know until after that time probably , until after that meeting, whether this is a weapon in our hands or not We think it will be shortly afterwards , but it seems a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in diplomacy without having your master card in your hand. quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 173
Notes of Interim Committee meeting. Jun 1, 1945
Mr. Byrnes recommended, and the Committee agreed, that the Secretary of War should be advised that , while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers homes; and that it be used without prior warning. quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 155
Einstein
It still surprises many Americans to think there might be a relationship between the bombing of Hiroshima and diplomatic strategy towards the Soviet Union. Few , for instance , have heard of Albert Einstein's 1946 judgement that the bombing flowed from "a desire to end the war in the Pacific by any means before Russia's participation"(nor, of course do many know that of Einstein's feeling that "if President Roosevelt had still been there, none of that would been possible. he would have forbidden such act."
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Truman
If expectation were to be realized, [Stimson] told me, the atomic bomb would be certain to have a decisive influence on our relation with other countries.....{Byrnes had already told me} that in his belief the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war.(Harry S, Truman, year of Decision)
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Hasegawa presents the most exciting story on that. We'll look at it on the next post.
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