Wednesday, November 28, 2012
氏の創設は自由
Friday, November 09, 2012
日米交渉
yankdownunder
yankdownunder In an effort to aid the Nationalist government of China and to put pressure on Japan, President Franklin Roosevelt in April 1941 authorized the creation of a clandestine "Special Air Unit" consisting of three combat groups equipped with American aircraft and staffed by aviators and technicians to be recruited from the U.S. Army, Navy and Marine Corps for service in China. The 1st American Volunteer Group were recruited starting on 15 April 1941, when an unpublished executive order was signed by President Roosevelt.[2]A total of 100 P-40Bs were obtained from Curtiss-Wright by convincing the British Government to take a later batch of more advanced P-40s in exchange In the fall of 1941, the 2nd American Volunteer Group was equipped with 33 Lockheed Hudson (A-28) and 33 Douglas DB-7 (A-20) bombers originally built for Britain but acquired by the U.S. Army as part of the Lend-Lease program passed earlier in the year. These are wiki sources but seem to be fairly accurate(from checking other sources). I believe this is what happened and for me yes it is a secret war(not all out,,not declared). Maybe you think it was just strong diplomacy or foreign aid or whatever. I guess we should just agree to disagree. http://archive.org/details/fdr... Telephone conversation between Roosevelt and his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. Only Roosevelt's side of the conversation is recorded. The men discuss the growing foreign policy conflict with Japan. - 1940. Reviewer xanax2 says It is rather boring hearing only one side of the conversation and all the uh-huhs, but hearing Roosevelt tell about Japan's conditions for peace (US leaving Guam, Midway, Pearl Harbor...) makes this an important historical "document." All FDR had to do was leave Guam, Midway, Pearl Harbor. It's all his fault.
休戦申し出
上岡 龍次
11月1日、東京都周辺
日米による太平洋戦争は１９４４年のマリアナ沖海戦で日本の敗北が決定したと言えます。マリアナ沖海戦以後の日本軍は組織的な戦闘力が失われ、「いつまでもつか？」の戦いに移行します。 当時の指導部は責任を放棄したのではなく、決定的な敗北から連合国側に休戦を申し入れています。つまり、マリアナ沖海戦以後の戦闘は、日本側の休戦を無視した連合国側に責任が有ります。 フィリピン戦・沖縄戦は、マッカーサー元帥の政治介入で発生したとも言えます。アメリカ海軍はフィリピン戦・沖縄戦は想定しておらず、マッカーサー元帥のワガママに付き合わされたことになります。 ですが、アメリカ海軍は国民が飢餓に陥ることを前提とした飢餓作戦を実行しましたが。 戦後は反日が正当化されていますが、日本側から休戦を申し出たことが無視されています。アメリカが休戦を受け入れたならば沖縄戦など発生しません。 アメリカは国内戦の考え方で国外戦を行うので、相手政権の消滅まで戦争します。これは２６００年の戦史では異例で、アメリカだけが実行する戦争スタイルです。２０世紀から戦争を学ぶと誤認するので、基本的には１７世紀から学ばなければなりません。 沖縄や中国大陸の国民は国に無視されたのではありません。当時の日本国が「守る能力を失っていたから守れなかった」と言えます。守れないと判断したから休戦を申し出たことは、松村閣下が著書で記述しています。 ですが、メディアで扱わないので日本では知らない人が多いようです。それに生前に何度も自民党に呼ばれて話をしているのですが・・・・変化が無いのが現実です
Sunday, August 26, 2012
中国政府は釣魚島（尖閣諸島）を日本の領土と認めていた
【上海＝河崎真澄】中国広東省の民間企業幹部が２４日、中国版ツイッター「微博」で「１９４９年から７１年まで中国政府は釣魚島（尖閣諸島）を日本の領土と認めていた」と異例の発言をした。日本領有を示す５３年１月の中国共産党機関紙、人民日報の記事や、複数の公式地図など根拠を挙げている。微博では中国国内からの感情的な反論に加え、「知識のない大衆が中国共産党に踊らされたことが分かった」などと賛同する見方も広がっている。 発言をしたのは同省広州の電子サービス企業、広東捷盈電子科技の取締役会副主席との肩書を持つ女性の林凡氏。林氏は微博の運営会社、新浪微博から「実名」の認証を受けており、１０万人以上の読者をもつ。 林氏の資料によると、人民日報は５３年１月８日付の紙面に掲載した記事で「琉球群島（沖縄）は台湾の東北に点在し、尖閣諸島や先島諸島、沖縄諸島など７組の島嶼からなる」と表記していた。中国当局が監修した５３年、５８年、６０年、６７年に発行した地図の画像も示したが、その多くが「尖閣群島」「魚釣島」などと表記。日中境界線も明らかに日本領土を示している。 林氏は冷静に証拠を積み重ねた上で「中国政府はこれでも釣魚島はわれわれの領土だといえるのか」と疑問を投げかけた。中国国内からの反応には、「資料をみて（尖閣諸島が）日本領だったことが明白に分かった」「（当局に）タダで使われて反日デモを行う連中には困る」などと、林氏支持の発言が出ている。 一方、２５、２６の両日も、尖閣諸島の問題を巡る反日デモが、四川省南充や浙江省諸曁、広東省東莞、海南省海口など、地方都市で呼びかけられており、混乱は今後も続きそうだ。
1953年に、中国の「人民日報」は「尖閣諸島は日本領」と報道していたようです。これも動かぬ証拠？？ ただし、私には中国語は読めませんので、どなたか読める方がいらしゃると、自信を持って拡散できそうですね。 http://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=346985588719357&set=a.111900215561230.25333.100002237561633&type=1&theaterhttp://ampontan.wordpress.com/2012/08/27/evil-lin-fan-is-on-the-loose/
Saturday, August 25, 2012
FedFlix
yankdownunder • 6 hours ago −
This website has many interesting videos about Japan.
http://archive.org/details/Fed...
You in Japan.http://archive.org/details/gov.archiv...
http://archive.org/details/gov...
AIR FORCE STORY, THE -- AIR WAR AGAINST JAPAN, 1944-1945 (1953).
narration starting around (9.50) is noteworthy
... b29s burned out industrial heart of Japan ... 66 principal cities received their devastating bath of fire until Japan's military situation was hopeless ...they could not have held out ...they lost control of the air there capacity to wage war was destroyed ...the fire raids had even killed much of their fanatical resistance(ie.mass killings of civilians)
http://archive.org/details/Our...
Our Enemy: The Japanese (1943).
Stridently anti-Japanese film that attempts to convey an understanding of Japanese life and philosophy so that the U.S. may more readily defeat its enemy. Depicts the Japanese as "primitive, murderous and fanatical." With many images of 1930s and 1940s Japan, and a portentious and highly negative narration by Joseph C. Grew, former U.S. ambassador to Japan.
http://archive.org/details/Pre...
Why We Fight: Prelude to War.
....the ultimate goal of the Axis powers is to enslave the
nations of the "free world," a desire made manifest in the Japanese
invasion of Manchuria....
http://archive.org/details/gov...
My Japan (1945).
This a complex and disturbing anti-Japanese propaganda film produced to spur the sale of U.S. war bonds. The film pretends to be a Japanese film. The Japanese powerful commitment to the war is compared to the "lazy, easy living" American commitment. American successes are denigrated and Japanese losses are minimized. The devotion of the Japanese is compared to the immoral Americans. CONTENT ADVISORY: Explicit racism and extreme violence.
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Saturday, August 18, 2012
American Holocaust
From time to time during the past half-century Americans have edged across that line, if only temporarily, under conditions of foreign war. Thus, as John W. Dower has demonstrated, the eruption of war in the Pacific in the 1940s caused a crucial shift in American perceptions of the Japanese from a prewar attitude of racial disdain and dismissiveness (the curator of the Smithsonian Institution's Division of Anthropology had advised the President that the Japanese skull was "some 2,000 years less developed than ours, ' while it was widely believed by Western military experts that the Japanese were incompetent pilots who "could not shoot straight because their eyes were slanted") to a wartime view of them as super-competent warriors, but morally subhuman beasts. This transformation became a license for American military men to torture and mutilate Japanese troops with impunity-just as the Japanese did to Americans, but in their own ways, following the cultural reshaping of their own racial images of Americans. As one American war correspondent in the Pacific recalled in an Atlantic Monthly article: We shot prisoners in cold blood, wiped out hospitals, strafed lifeboats, killed or mistreated enemy civilians, finished off the enemy wounded, tossed the dying into a hole with the dead, and in the Pacific boiled the flesh off enemy skulls to make table ornaments for sweethearts, or carved their bones into letter openers. Dower provides other examples of what he calls the "fetish" of "collecting grisly battlefield trophies from the Japanese dead or near dead, in the form of gold teeth, ears, bones, scalps, and skulls"-practices receiving sufficient approval on the home front that in 1944 Life magazine published a "human interest" story along with "a full-page photograph of an attractive blonde posing with a Japanese skull she had been sent by her fiancée in the Pacific." (Following the Battle of Horse Shoe Bend in 1814, Andrew Jackson oversaw not only the stripping away of dead Indians' flesh for manufacture into bridle reins, but he saw to it that souvenirs from the corpses were distributed "to the ladies of Tennessee.")
Wednesday, May 02, 2012
日米開戦 アメリカ最大のタブー
The secret plan that would have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor. By: Alan
JB NO 355
III. FACTS IGNORED BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT President Roosevelt withheld or omitted the following material facts from his address before Congress: (1) In order to circumvent the American Neutrality Laws, the United States had "loaned" China One Hundred Million Dollars to support the regime of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek then engaged in a brutal conflict with Japan, the Sino-Japanese War. (2) In November of 1940, more than one year before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Chiang Kai-shek dispatched a secret message to President Roosevelt asking for the forma-tion of a "special air unit" in China composed of American planes and pilots. He requested 350 fighters and 150 bombers and indicated this "Chinese Air Force" (in name only) could be employed to bomb Tokyo and other centers of Japanese population and industry. (3) On December 8, 1940, almost one year to the day before the Japanese surprise attack, Roosevelt luncheoned with Dr. T.V. Song, China's Foreign Minister and Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau at the White House. Writing later of that meeting, Morgenthau noted the President had indicated to him that "it would be a nice thing if China bombed Japan." (4) On Monday, December 9, 1940, Dr. Soong delivered a hand-written note to Morgenthau which included a map of secret air bases in China within flying distance to key Japanese cities. (5) On Tuesday, December 10, 1940, at 8:40 a.m. Morgenthau met with Secretary of State Cordell Hull when Hull declared: "What we have to do, Henry, is to get 500 American planes to start from the Aleutian Islands and fly over Japan just once. That will teach them a lesson. If we could only find a way to have them (the Chinese) drop some bombs on Tokyo?" (6) Morgenthau, Hull, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox (known as the "Plus Four") met with President Roosevelt on December 19, 1940, when the President expressed delight at the idea of having ostensible Chinese aircraft bomb Japan. The President directed the "Plus Four" to work it out. (7) On Friday, December 20, 1940, when Morgenthau had two meetings with Dr. Soong, Morgenthau also received a phone call from Knox at 5:13 p.m. The topic of conversation related to was the "hush, hush thing" and included discussions set for the following Monday about 300 P-40 fighter planes that could still be built by Curtiss Aircraft Corporation. During the phone conversation Knox declared: "Well, by God, we ought to grab some of those for the Chinese." (8) On Saturday, December 21, 1940, at 5:00 p.m. Morgenthau met with, among others, Dr. Soong, General Mow and Captain Claire Lee Chennault. Chennault had been Air Corps pilot and instructor in fighter tactics at the Air Tactical School at Maxwell Field. His disagreement with Air Corps doctrine of bomber supremacy had forced his early retirement ostensibly for medical reasons. Chennault had found employment as a mercenary pilot in the service of the Chinese Government. With the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Chennault continued to fly in combat despite directives from the American Ambassador that Chennault and other mercenaries should leave China. Chennault presented Morgenthau with a plan to bomb Tokyo and other key Japanese cities employing either B-17 Flying Fortress bombers or Lockheed Hudson bombers. Incendiary bombs would be deployed to set the Japanese cities on fire and save weight so the bombers could carry more fuel. (9) On Sunday, December 22, 1940, the Plus Four met with General Marshal who maintained Britain needed Flying Fortresses more than China. As a consolation prize, China would be allowed to purchase 100 Curtiss P-40 fighters (10) On or before April 14, 1941, President Roosevelt gave an oral directive to Navy Secretary Frank Knox to allow American military pilots and technicians to resign from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps to serve in China. (11) On April 14, 1941, Captain Frank Beatty, Aide to Secretary Knox wrote letters of introduction to commanders of Navy and Marine air bases on behalf of Chennault and Commander Rutledge Irvine (USN ret.) to visit those bases and recruit men to serve in the employ of the Central Aircraft Manufacturing Company (CAMCO), since CAMCO was used as a cover by the United States government which took the official position that these men were involved in a "commercial venture without any direct participation by the United States Government." Of Chennault and other confederates involved in this enterprise records of the United States Navy relate: "They realize the necessity for keeping the thing quiet and will take due precautions." (12) On May 12, 1941, Chennault's plan to firebomb Japanese cities was resurrected with Dr. Lauchlin Currie as it champion. Dr. Currie had received his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University and studied at the London School of Economics and was serving as Aide to President Roosevelt. The plan was now officially Joint (Army/Navy) Board 355, Serial 691 ("JB 355"). JB 355 envisioned 500 military aircraft being operational in China by October 31, 1941, including 350 fighters and 150 bombers. The fourth strategic objective of JB 355 was: “Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple pro-duction of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure of Japan." Cities selected for firebombing included: Nagasaki, Kobe, Osaka and Tokyo. (13) JB 355 was an ambitious project. It would be accomplished in three stages. The first stage was the 100 P-40 fighters the Plus Four had allocated to China and which sailed for Rangoon, Burma in the spring of 1941. These planes would be used to provide air cover to keep the Burma Road, China's only lifeline of supplies to the outside world, open. They were to be operational by July of 1941. The second stage included 100 bombers for offensive operations and 200 additional fighters. The bombers were to be shipped to Burma by May of 1941. The third stage included another 50 bombers and 150 fighters to keep a full force, anticipating a loss rate of 15%. The third stage was to be completed by November of 1941. (14) The first 100 P-40 fighters [actually, only 99 reached Rangoon] were unloaded on the docks of Rangoon, Burma. The Japanese maintained a diplomatic office in Rangoon. Mingaladon Airfield where the P-40 fighters were assembled and test-flown was only 12 miles north of Rangoon. It is difficult to believe the Japanese were unaware of the American "guerilla air corps" being assembled and training in Burma where they were safe from attacks by Japanese bombers in French Indo-China, unless Japan wanted to provoke an incident with Great Britain, since Burma was a British Colony. (15) On July 23, 1941, President Roosevelt authorized JB 355 by affixing his signature to the recommendation from American military commanders. On the same day Dr. Currie dispatched a top secret telegram to Madame Chiang Kai-shek in care of the American Embassy in Chungking relating: "I am happy to be able to report today the President directed that sixty-six bombers be made available to China this year with twentyfour to be delivered immediately." What was unknown to Dr. Currie and to Madame Chiang was the existence of a Japanese collaborator in or closely connected to the Chinese Nationalist Government who was feeding this very secret information to the Japanese. American initiatives to serve as a non-belligerent ally to China were not unknown to Tokyo. Further, if the Roosevelt administration was going to sponsor the operation of an American guerilla air force in China, would not Japan be well-advised to seize the initiative and attack America first? (16) Through the summer of 1941, Dr. Currie struggled to get bombers released for service in China.(17) On July 9, 1941, an American reporter filed a news dispatch that American technicians and pilots were sailing from San Francisco for service in China. En route to Rangoon, the Japanese broadcast a radio message declaring that the ship transporting the American Volunteers would be sunk. (18) On September 30, 1941, wrote a secret memorandum to Knox and Stimson declaring that in addition to the 100 P-40 fighters already in Burma, the United States was sending China 66 bombers and 269 additional fighters. America's buildup of air power was a subject of discussion between President Roosevelt and Japanese Ambassador Nomura. Again, the Japanese could not have been unaware of America's intentions in Southeast Asia. (19) On October 31, 1941, The United States News carried a two page story entitled: "Bomber Lanes to Japan--Flying Time from Strategic Points." The story included an illustration depicting bases in Chunking, Hong Kong, Singapore, Cavite, Vladivostok, Guam and Dutch Harbor from which American bombers might be launched to bomb Japan. (20) On November 15, 1941, General Marshall gave a secret briefing to the New York Times, New York Tribune, Newsweek and the Associated Press asserting that bombing operations would be initiated against Japan in the first ten days of December. (21) On November 21, 1941, Army Air Corps strategists were selecting targets in Japan to be attacked by heavy bombers. On the same day, the Second American Volunteer Group [the men that would man and service the "Chinese" bombers] sailed from San Francisco. The Lockheed Hudson bombers were sitting on the tarmac in Burbank, California waiting to be flown across the pacific.
Sunday, January 31, 2010
【日中歴史研究】南京
Difference in perception of modern history a hurdle to Japanese-Chinese review panel
While a joint Japanese-Chinese panel comprised of academics released a report on the history of the two countries on Sunday, a section addressing the post-war period has not been disclosed due to strong objections from the Chinese members. This turn of events has exposed the limitations and complexities of a project meant to bridge the rift between Japan and China. Meanwhile, portions penned by Chinese academics have shown signs that Chinese academia is moving away from the interpretation of revolutionary history as dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, to a more positivist approach.
Release of the report came over a year later than the initial plan of 2008, which marked the 30-year anniversary of the peace and friendship treaty signed between Japan and China. "The delay was caused by a difference in perception of modern history," one Japanese panel member said. "The Chinese side feared addressing issues that could challenge the legitimacy of the party leadership, such as the Tiananmen incident."
Plans to release notes on the debates held throughout the writing of the report have also been shelved. Some observers see the repeated failures to reach an agreement as the result of pressure applied to panel members from the Chinese government, which considers historical research an important pillar of its "patriotic education."
Both sides agreed that they would undertake the second phase of the joint project, but it has yet to be seen how the Japanese and Chinese public will respond to the latest report. "Stable public sentiment on both sides is imperative to continuing this project," says a diplomat involved in Japan-China relations.
Popular Chinese sentiment toward Japan has improved since the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, which was the catalyst behind the project. It is impossible, however, to include anything in the report that would suggest that China made concessions to Japan regarding the Nanjing Massacre, especially when surviving family members of those who were killed in the incident still live in China.
The section on the Nanjing Massacre includes not only the number of victims, but also a detailed description of the killing, rapes, and pillaging that took place. The extensive explanation of the massacre -- which is in stark contrast to the perfunctory depiction of Unit 731, which carried out germ warfare attacks -- is believed to have been written in response to the existence of Nanjing Massacre deniers in Japan.
Hints of Chinese historians' departure from the "Chinese Communist Party as revolutionary history" line are evident in the report's description of the relationship between the Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the war against Japan. "There was friction between the two parties, but the more important objective of cooperation in the fight against Japan remained consistent."
In China, there has been a trend to re-evaluate the role of the KMT in the war against Japan as China's relations with Taiwan improve. The joint report, too, dedicates a significant number of words to the negotiations the KMT conducted with major powers on behalf of China and an elaboration on the global state of affairs at the time, and captures the Sino-Japanese War from a broader perspective.
In addition, the report refers to Japan's defeat in the war as "a turning point in history," and that Japan began taking "a step toward peace and development." Such an interpretation clashes with the view held by Chinese "patriots" comprised primarily of youth, who accuse Japan of increasing militarization.
There is a possibility that such historical interpretations will arouse great controversy, and it is likely to be some time before they are reflected in history textbooks and television dramas.
日中歴史共同研究：中国側に変化の兆し 世論への浸透未知数
３１日に公表された初の日中歴史共同研究報告書は、中国側の強い要請で戦後史部分が非公表となり、両国の歴史認識の溝を埋めるために始めた事業の限界と複雑さを露呈する結果となった。一方で、中国側の論文には、中国共産党の役割を軸とする革命史観から脱却して実証主義的に記述する試みもみられ、宣伝色の強かった歴史研究の変化の兆しもみられた。【中澤雄大、北京・浦松丈二】
研究成果は当初、日中平和友好条約締結３０周年に当たる０８年中の発表を目指したが、１年以上遅れた。ある日本側研究者は「現代史部分の認識の差が原因。天安門事件の評価など、共産党指導部の正当性を揺るがす問題に触れることを中国側が恐れた」と指摘する。
論文執筆過程の討議要旨の公表も見送られた。再三の合意不履行は、歴史研究を「愛国教育」の重要な柱と位置づける中国政府が委員に圧力をかけているとの見方も出ている。
両国は第２期共同研究として継続することで一致したが、両国の国内世論が今回の報告内容をどう受け取るかは未知数だ。日中外交当局者は「継続には双方の国民感情の安定が不可欠」と指摘する。
中国国内の対日世論は、共同研究のきっかけとなった反日デモ（０５年）当時よりは好転している。だが、国内に遺族が生存する南京虐殺事件で日本に譲歩したと受け取られかねない記述は不可能だ。
南京虐殺については、犠牲者数の根拠だけでなく、虐殺や強姦（ごうかん）、略奪の実態を詳細に描いた。細菌戦を展開した７３１部隊について簡単に触れた程度なのとは対照的で、日本国内に虐殺自体を否定する意見が存在することを念頭に置いたものとみられる。
中国側の革命史観にとらわれない記述で注目されるのは、抗日戦争での共産党と国民党との関係性だ。「国共両党の間にいろいろ摩擦が起きているが、両党が協力して日本に抗戦する大局は一貫して変わらなかった」と記述した。
中国では中台関係改善の流れを受け、抗日戦争での国民党の役割を見直す動きが進んでいる。報告書は、国民党が中国を代表して行った列強との交渉や当時の国際情勢にも多くの紙幅を割き、日中戦争をより広い視野からとらえている。
日本の敗戦についても「歴史の転換点」と指摘し、「平和発展の道を歩み出した」と評価した。これは日本の「軍国主義化」を警戒する中国の若者を中心とした「愛国世論」とは異なっている。
だが、こうした歴史研究は国内で論議を呼ぶ可能性もあり、革命史観に基づく歴史教科書や大衆向けドラマに反映されるには相当な時間がかかりそうだ。
【日中歴史研究】南京事件の日本側論文（要旨）
2010.1.31 22:59
昭和１２年１２月１０日、日本軍は南京総攻撃を開始し、翌１３日、南京を占領した。
この間、中国政府高官は次々に南京を離れ、住民の多くも戦禍を逃れ市内に設置された南京国際安全区（「難民区」）に避難し、日本軍に利用されないために多くの建物が中国軍によって焼き払われた。
中支那方面軍は、上海戦以来の不軍紀行為の頻発から、南京陥落後における城内進入部隊を想定して「軍紀風紀を特に厳粛にし」という厳格な規制策（「南京攻略要領」）を通達していた。しかし日本軍による捕虜、敗残兵、便衣兵、市民に対して集団的、個別的な虐殺事件が発生し、強姦（ごうかん）、略奪や放火も頻発した。日本軍による虐殺行為の犠牲者数は、極東国際軍事裁判における判決では２０万人以上（松井石根司令官に対する判決文では１０万人以上）、１９４７年の南京戦犯裁判軍事法廷では３０万人以上とされ、中国の見解は後者の判決に依拠している。一方、日本側の研究では２０万人を上限として、４万人、２万人などさまざまな推計がなされている。犠牲者数に諸説がある背景には「虐殺」（不法殺害）の定義、対象とする地域・期間、埋葬記録、人口統計など資料に対する検証の相違が存在している。
日本軍による暴行は外国のメディアによって報道されるとともに、南京国際安全区委員会の日本大使館に対する抗議を通して外務省にもたらされ、陸軍中央部にも伝えらた。３８年１月４日には、閑院宮参謀総長名で、松井司令官あてに「軍紀・風紀ノ振作ニ関シテ切ニ要望ス」との異例の要望が発せられた。
宣戦布告がなされず「事変」にとどまっていたため、日本側に、俘虜（ふりよ）（捕虜）の取り扱いに関する指針や占領後の住民保護を含む軍政計画が欠けており、また軍紀を取り締まる憲兵の数が少なかった点、食糧や物資補給を無視して南京攻略を敢行した結果、略奪行為が生起し、軍紀弛緩（しかん）をもたらし不法行為を誘発した点などが指摘されている。戦後、極東国際軍事裁判で松井司令官が、南京戦犯軍事法廷で谷寿夫第６師団長が、それぞれ責任を問われ、死刑に処せられた。一方、犠牲が拡大した副次的要因としては、中国軍の南京防衛作戦の誤りと、それにともなう指揮統制の放棄・民衆保護対策の欠如があった。（筆者は、波多野澄雄筑波大教授、庄司潤一郎防衛研究所第一戦史研究室長）
【日中歴史研究】南京事件の中国側論文（要旨） (1/2ページ)
2010.1.31 22:53
日本軍が上海を占領した後、３つのルートから南京攻略を開始し、１２月１３日、南京は陥落した。敗退した中国軍の大半は捕虜となり、集団で日本軍に殺害された。第１６師団の中島今朝吾師団長は１２月１３日の日記で、数千人の捕虜を処理したと記述した。日本軍の南京における戦闘の報告は敵の数の羅列が多く、捕虜数はほとんど触れていない。日本軍は上から下まで徹底的に捕虜を殺害する方針を実施したことがうかがえる。
多くの中国兵士が軍服を脱ぎ難民区に隠れたが、日本軍は顔だけで敗残兵を随意に判断し、多くの平民が軍人として殺害された。１２月２４日、金陵大学の難民所のテニスコートから、一日だけで２００～３００人が五台山と漢西門外に連れて行かれ、殺害された。
日本軍が南京郊外の農村部でも市民への虐殺を実施した。金陵大学教授が１９３８年に行った調査では、南京郊外の一部地域では、被害者総数は３万９５０人。平均して住民の千人のうち２９人が死亡し、７世帯に１人が殺害されている。
捕虜と平民に対する虐殺以外に日本軍の中国女性に対するレイプも大量に行われ、国際安全区にいた米国人宣教師の記述によれば「私のドイツ人同僚の推測では２万件のレイプ事件があった。私は少なくとも８千件はあると思う。金陵大学周辺だけで１００以上の例を詳しく知っている」。その後、性病が軍内で流行することを恐れた日本軍は南京で慰安所を設立し、強制的に多くの中国人女性を日本軍の性の奴隷にした。
南京市内での暴行を見た米国人記者が欧米新聞で報道し、国際社会に大きな衝撃を与えた。１９３８年２月、華中方面軍司令官の松井石根大将が日本の参謀本部に呼び戻された。だが日本軍が南京占領した翌日、東京では４０万人が南京陥落を祝った。南京のニュースは日本では封印され、戦後の東京裁判で日本国民は初めて真相を知った。
戦後、同盟国と中国が東京と南京で南京大虐殺に関する裁判を行った。東京裁判の判決は「南京占領後の一カ月の間、南京市内と近郊で２万件のレイプ事件が発生。占領後６週間で、南京市内と近郊で殺害された平民と捕虜は２０万人以上」と認定した。南京で行われた中国国防省の軍事法廷では「南京大虐殺の中で、集団で殺害された人数は１９万人、個別で殺害されたのは１５万人余り、被害者総数は３０万人以上」と認定している。（筆者は栄維木・社会科学院近代史研究所「抗日戦争研究」編集長）
【日中歴史研究】私はこう読む 現代史家の秦郁彦氏 「日本弾劾色」に変化
2010.2.1 00:10
南京事件について、中国側の報告書は典拠を明らかにした事実関係の記述にほぼ終始しており、日本の弾劾から始まるプロパガンダ色が強かった従来の歴史論文と比べると、大きく変わったという印象を受ける。
事件の事実経過に限れば日本側とほぼ同じと言っていいが、大きく違うのは「３０万人以上」とする被害者総数だ。報告書では中国側の軍人参戦者を計１５万人とし、市民の被害者については、ほぼ唯一の推計である「スマイス報告」から約３万人とする数字を挙げている。しかし、これだと軍人が２７万人殺されたことになり、１５万人の参戦者をはるかに超えてしまう。
従来の「３０万人」を撤回しにくい中国側が、矛盾を承知で報告書を出したとするならば、中国における歴史研究と公開の自由度はかなり高まってきているといえるのではないか。（談
日中歴史共同研究の報告書要旨＜２＞…南京事件など
１月３１日発表された、日中歴史共同研究報告書要旨は次の通り（中国側要旨は読売新聞社訳）。
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【満州国の実態】
日本側 抗日ゲリラ活動がなかなか下火にならず、関東軍が徹底的弾圧を加えた。満州国は通貨統一の強力な実現を図り、経済の近代化を促した。鉄道や道路を整備し、石炭、電力、鉄鋼などの生産が大きく伸びたが、住民の生活水準向上を目指すものではなかった。「民族協和」もスローガンに終始し、日本人と満州国人の格差が拡大した。
中国側 （日本による）通貨改革は実質的には強行された金融略奪だった。日本は（日中戦争後に）満州に対する施政の重点を経済略奪の強化に変えた。満州国は鉱工業に対する統制を実行し、民族業者の参入を厳禁した。日本は太平洋戦争勃発（ぼっぱつ）後には東北地方の経済資源をほしいままに略奪した。
【日中戦争】
日本側 中国に深い傷跡をのこしたが、原因の大半は日本側が作った。（発端となった）盧溝橋における最初の発砲事件は「偶発的」であった。しかし、この事件を好機とみなした関東軍などは蒋介石政権の打倒と華北占領という構想を実行していく。現地軍の行動を抑制できなかった理由の一つは陸軍内の「拡大派」と「不拡大派」の対立にあった。近衛内閣も行き詰まっていた中国政策打開の好機ととらえて容認し、現地解決の努力を押し流した。
中国側 盧溝橋事件自体の発生は偶然性をもっているかもしれないが、事件はたちまちに日本の全面的な中国侵略戦争を引き起こした。歴史の推移からみれば、事件は必然性をも帯びている。日本には「拡大派」と「不拡大派」との論争があったが、内閣が「華北に対する派兵声明」を公布してから「不拡大派」の声は完全に「拡大派」の主張にかき消されてしまった。
【南京事件】
日本側 日本軍による捕虜、敗残兵、便衣兵（ゲリラ）、一部の市民に対する集団的、個別的な虐殺事件が発生し、強姦（ごうかん）、略奪や放火も頻発した。被害者数は日本側の研究では２０万人を上限として、４万人、２万人など様々な推計がなされている。原因について、日本側に捕虜の取り扱いに関する指針や占領後の住民保護を含む軍政計画が欠けており、軍紀を取り締まる憲兵の数が少なかった点などが指摘されている。副次的要因としては、中国軍の南京防衛作戦の誤りと、それに伴う指揮統制の放棄・民衆保護対策の欠如があった。
中国側 南京軍事裁判所は南京大虐殺で虐殺された人数は１９万人以上にも上り、ほかにも散発的に虐殺された者が１５万人以上おり、被害者総数は３０万人余りと認定した。極東軍事裁判（東京裁判）の判決書によれば、占領後１か月で、南京城内では２万件近い強姦事件が発生した。日本軍は捕虜の数が多すぎて安全面を憂慮し、大量の中国軍人が捕虜になった後、集団的に虐殺された。民間人虐殺の暴行も猛威をふるった。（ある地域の）サンプリング調査によると民間人１０００人あたり２９人が死亡し、７世帯あたり１人が殺害されている。
【毒ガス・化学兵器】
日本側 １９３８年の武漢・広東攻略戦を通じて毒ガスの効果が実証され、参謀本部は「特殊煙」（あか筒、あか弾、みどり筒）の使用を認めることを各軍に指示し、中国戦線での毒ガス使用が一般化したと言われる。
中国側 関東軍７３１部隊と第１００部隊は中国人を利用して人体実験を行い、生体解剖まで行った。関東軍はさらに、化学兵器の人体実験を行った。今日もなお東北地方の民衆は日本軍が遺棄した化学兵器の毒物の影響を受けている。１９４２年、日本軍部隊が金華一帯に出動して細菌を散布し、コレラの流行を引き起こした。
【中国の犠牲者数】
日本側 国民政府軍の死者は約１３２万人、負傷者は１８０万にのぼる。中国共産党軍の死傷者＝失踪（しっそう）者を含む＝は５８万人を超えると推定されている。
中国側 完全な統計ではないが、戦争期間中に中国の軍人、人民３５００万人余りが死亡、負傷した。
【終わりに】
日本側 日中全面戦争は、双方の軍人だけではなく、特に中国の非戦闘員に多くの犠牲を強いた。犠牲の多さや日本軍による様々な「非違行為」は、戦後の日中両国民に、新しい関係構築を妨げる深い傷跡をのこした。日本軍による戦争犯罪を問い、戦後補償を求める運動が世代を超えて展開され、日本政府を相手とした裁判が今日まで続いていることは、そのことを物語っている。
中国側 中国人民は粘り強く抵抗した。抗日戦争における中国人民の偉大な勝利は、中華民族の同胞全体が団結して奮闘した結果で、反ファシズムの世界とともに努力して同盟国の人民と戦った成果だ。戦争は日本の転換点でもあった。日本のファシストが徹底的な敗北を喫し、日本人民も軍国主義を排除し、平和発展の新たな道を歩み出した。戦争終結は、日中両国に真に新たな平等関係を形成する可能性を与えた。
（2010年1月31日23時40分 読売新聞）
While a joint Japanese-Chinese panel comprised of academics released a report on the history of the two countries on Sunday, a section addressing the post-war period has not been disclosed due to strong objections from the Chinese members. This turn of events has exposed the limitations and complexities of a project meant to bridge the rift between Japan and China. Meanwhile, portions penned by Chinese academics have shown signs that Chinese academia is moving away from the interpretation of revolutionary history as dominated by the Chinese Communist Party, to a more positivist approach.
Release of the report came over a year later than the initial plan of 2008, which marked the 30-year anniversary of the peace and friendship treaty signed between Japan and China. "The delay was caused by a difference in perception of modern history," one Japanese panel member said. "The Chinese side feared addressing issues that could challenge the legitimacy of the party leadership, such as the Tiananmen incident."
Plans to release notes on the debates held throughout the writing of the report have also been shelved. Some observers see the repeated failures to reach an agreement as the result of pressure applied to panel members from the Chinese government, which considers historical research an important pillar of its "patriotic education."
Both sides agreed that they would undertake the second phase of the joint project, but it has yet to be seen how the Japanese and Chinese public will respond to the latest report. "Stable public sentiment on both sides is imperative to continuing this project," says a diplomat involved in Japan-China relations.
Popular Chinese sentiment toward Japan has improved since the 2005 anti-Japanese demonstrations, which was the catalyst behind the project. It is impossible, however, to include anything in the report that would suggest that China made concessions to Japan regarding the Nanjing Massacre, especially when surviving family members of those who were killed in the incident still live in China.
The section on the Nanjing Massacre includes not only the number of victims, but also a detailed description of the killing, rapes, and pillaging that took place. The extensive explanation of the massacre -- which is in stark contrast to the perfunctory depiction of Unit 731, which carried out germ warfare attacks -- is believed to have been written in response to the existence of Nanjing Massacre deniers in Japan.
Hints of Chinese historians' departure from the "Chinese Communist Party as revolutionary history" line are evident in the report's description of the relationship between the Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) in the war against Japan. "There was friction between the two parties, but the more important objective of cooperation in the fight against Japan remained consistent."
In China, there has been a trend to re-evaluate the role of the KMT in the war against Japan as China's relations with Taiwan improve. The joint report, too, dedicates a significant number of words to the negotiations the KMT conducted with major powers on behalf of China and an elaboration on the global state of affairs at the time, and captures the Sino-Japanese War from a broader perspective.
In addition, the report refers to Japan's defeat in the war as "a turning point in history," and that Japan began taking "a step toward peace and development." Such an interpretation clashes with the view held by Chinese "patriots" comprised primarily of youth, who accuse Japan of increasing militarization.
There is a possibility that such historical interpretations will arouse great controversy, and it is likely to be some time before they are reflected in history textbooks and television dramas.
日中歴史共同研究：中国側に変化の兆し 世論への浸透未知数
３１日に公表された初の日中歴史共同研究報告書は、中国側の強い要請で戦後史部分が非公表となり、両国の歴史認識の溝を埋めるために始めた事業の限界と複雑さを露呈する結果となった。一方で、中国側の論文には、中国共産党の役割を軸とする革命史観から脱却して実証主義的に記述する試みもみられ、宣伝色の強かった歴史研究の変化の兆しもみられた。【中澤雄大、北京・浦松丈二】
研究成果は当初、日中平和友好条約締結３０周年に当たる０８年中の発表を目指したが、１年以上遅れた。ある日本側研究者は「現代史部分の認識の差が原因。天安門事件の評価など、共産党指導部の正当性を揺るがす問題に触れることを中国側が恐れた」と指摘する。
論文執筆過程の討議要旨の公表も見送られた。再三の合意不履行は、歴史研究を「愛国教育」の重要な柱と位置づける中国政府が委員に圧力をかけているとの見方も出ている。
両国は第２期共同研究として継続することで一致したが、両国の国内世論が今回の報告内容をどう受け取るかは未知数だ。日中外交当局者は「継続には双方の国民感情の安定が不可欠」と指摘する。
中国国内の対日世論は、共同研究のきっかけとなった反日デモ（０５年）当時よりは好転している。だが、国内に遺族が生存する南京虐殺事件で日本に譲歩したと受け取られかねない記述は不可能だ。
南京虐殺については、犠牲者数の根拠だけでなく、虐殺や強姦（ごうかん）、略奪の実態を詳細に描いた。細菌戦を展開した７３１部隊について簡単に触れた程度なのとは対照的で、日本国内に虐殺自体を否定する意見が存在することを念頭に置いたものとみられる。
中国側の革命史観にとらわれない記述で注目されるのは、抗日戦争での共産党と国民党との関係性だ。「国共両党の間にいろいろ摩擦が起きているが、両党が協力して日本に抗戦する大局は一貫して変わらなかった」と記述した。
中国では中台関係改善の流れを受け、抗日戦争での国民党の役割を見直す動きが進んでいる。報告書は、国民党が中国を代表して行った列強との交渉や当時の国際情勢にも多くの紙幅を割き、日中戦争をより広い視野からとらえている。
日本の敗戦についても「歴史の転換点」と指摘し、「平和発展の道を歩み出した」と評価した。これは日本の「軍国主義化」を警戒する中国の若者を中心とした「愛国世論」とは異なっている。
だが、こうした歴史研究は国内で論議を呼ぶ可能性もあり、革命史観に基づく歴史教科書や大衆向けドラマに反映されるには相当な時間がかかりそうだ。
【日中歴史研究】南京事件の日本側論文（要旨）
2010.1.31 22:59
昭和１２年１２月１０日、日本軍は南京総攻撃を開始し、翌１３日、南京を占領した。
この間、中国政府高官は次々に南京を離れ、住民の多くも戦禍を逃れ市内に設置された南京国際安全区（「難民区」）に避難し、日本軍に利用されないために多くの建物が中国軍によって焼き払われた。
中支那方面軍は、上海戦以来の不軍紀行為の頻発から、南京陥落後における城内進入部隊を想定して「軍紀風紀を特に厳粛にし」という厳格な規制策（「南京攻略要領」）を通達していた。しかし日本軍による捕虜、敗残兵、便衣兵、市民に対して集団的、個別的な虐殺事件が発生し、強姦（ごうかん）、略奪や放火も頻発した。日本軍による虐殺行為の犠牲者数は、極東国際軍事裁判における判決では２０万人以上（松井石根司令官に対する判決文では１０万人以上）、１９４７年の南京戦犯裁判軍事法廷では３０万人以上とされ、中国の見解は後者の判決に依拠している。一方、日本側の研究では２０万人を上限として、４万人、２万人などさまざまな推計がなされている。犠牲者数に諸説がある背景には「虐殺」（不法殺害）の定義、対象とする地域・期間、埋葬記録、人口統計など資料に対する検証の相違が存在している。
日本軍による暴行は外国のメディアによって報道されるとともに、南京国際安全区委員会の日本大使館に対する抗議を通して外務省にもたらされ、陸軍中央部にも伝えらた。３８年１月４日には、閑院宮参謀総長名で、松井司令官あてに「軍紀・風紀ノ振作ニ関シテ切ニ要望ス」との異例の要望が発せられた。
宣戦布告がなされず「事変」にとどまっていたため、日本側に、俘虜（ふりよ）（捕虜）の取り扱いに関する指針や占領後の住民保護を含む軍政計画が欠けており、また軍紀を取り締まる憲兵の数が少なかった点、食糧や物資補給を無視して南京攻略を敢行した結果、略奪行為が生起し、軍紀弛緩（しかん）をもたらし不法行為を誘発した点などが指摘されている。戦後、極東国際軍事裁判で松井司令官が、南京戦犯軍事法廷で谷寿夫第６師団長が、それぞれ責任を問われ、死刑に処せられた。一方、犠牲が拡大した副次的要因としては、中国軍の南京防衛作戦の誤りと、それにともなう指揮統制の放棄・民衆保護対策の欠如があった。（筆者は、波多野澄雄筑波大教授、庄司潤一郎防衛研究所第一戦史研究室長）
【日中歴史研究】南京事件の中国側論文（要旨） (1/2ページ)
2010.1.31 22:53
日本軍が上海を占領した後、３つのルートから南京攻略を開始し、１２月１３日、南京は陥落した。敗退した中国軍の大半は捕虜となり、集団で日本軍に殺害された。第１６師団の中島今朝吾師団長は１２月１３日の日記で、数千人の捕虜を処理したと記述した。日本軍の南京における戦闘の報告は敵の数の羅列が多く、捕虜数はほとんど触れていない。日本軍は上から下まで徹底的に捕虜を殺害する方針を実施したことがうかがえる。
多くの中国兵士が軍服を脱ぎ難民区に隠れたが、日本軍は顔だけで敗残兵を随意に判断し、多くの平民が軍人として殺害された。１２月２４日、金陵大学の難民所のテニスコートから、一日だけで２００～３００人が五台山と漢西門外に連れて行かれ、殺害された。
日本軍が南京郊外の農村部でも市民への虐殺を実施した。金陵大学教授が１９３８年に行った調査では、南京郊外の一部地域では、被害者総数は３万９５０人。平均して住民の千人のうち２９人が死亡し、７世帯に１人が殺害されている。
捕虜と平民に対する虐殺以外に日本軍の中国女性に対するレイプも大量に行われ、国際安全区にいた米国人宣教師の記述によれば「私のドイツ人同僚の推測では２万件のレイプ事件があった。私は少なくとも８千件はあると思う。金陵大学周辺だけで１００以上の例を詳しく知っている」。その後、性病が軍内で流行することを恐れた日本軍は南京で慰安所を設立し、強制的に多くの中国人女性を日本軍の性の奴隷にした。
南京市内での暴行を見た米国人記者が欧米新聞で報道し、国際社会に大きな衝撃を与えた。１９３８年２月、華中方面軍司令官の松井石根大将が日本の参謀本部に呼び戻された。だが日本軍が南京占領した翌日、東京では４０万人が南京陥落を祝った。南京のニュースは日本では封印され、戦後の東京裁判で日本国民は初めて真相を知った。
戦後、同盟国と中国が東京と南京で南京大虐殺に関する裁判を行った。東京裁判の判決は「南京占領後の一カ月の間、南京市内と近郊で２万件のレイプ事件が発生。占領後６週間で、南京市内と近郊で殺害された平民と捕虜は２０万人以上」と認定した。南京で行われた中国国防省の軍事法廷では「南京大虐殺の中で、集団で殺害された人数は１９万人、個別で殺害されたのは１５万人余り、被害者総数は３０万人以上」と認定している。（筆者は栄維木・社会科学院近代史研究所「抗日戦争研究」編集長）
【日中歴史研究】私はこう読む 現代史家の秦郁彦氏 「日本弾劾色」に変化
2010.2.1 00:10
南京事件について、中国側の報告書は典拠を明らかにした事実関係の記述にほぼ終始しており、日本の弾劾から始まるプロパガンダ色が強かった従来の歴史論文と比べると、大きく変わったという印象を受ける。
事件の事実経過に限れば日本側とほぼ同じと言っていいが、大きく違うのは「３０万人以上」とする被害者総数だ。報告書では中国側の軍人参戦者を計１５万人とし、市民の被害者については、ほぼ唯一の推計である「スマイス報告」から約３万人とする数字を挙げている。しかし、これだと軍人が２７万人殺されたことになり、１５万人の参戦者をはるかに超えてしまう。
従来の「３０万人」を撤回しにくい中国側が、矛盾を承知で報告書を出したとするならば、中国における歴史研究と公開の自由度はかなり高まってきているといえるのではないか。（談
日中歴史共同研究の報告書要旨＜２＞…南京事件など
１月３１日発表された、日中歴史共同研究報告書要旨は次の通り（中国側要旨は読売新聞社訳）。
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【満州国の実態】
日本側 抗日ゲリラ活動がなかなか下火にならず、関東軍が徹底的弾圧を加えた。満州国は通貨統一の強力な実現を図り、経済の近代化を促した。鉄道や道路を整備し、石炭、電力、鉄鋼などの生産が大きく伸びたが、住民の生活水準向上を目指すものではなかった。「民族協和」もスローガンに終始し、日本人と満州国人の格差が拡大した。
中国側 （日本による）通貨改革は実質的には強行された金融略奪だった。日本は（日中戦争後に）満州に対する施政の重点を経済略奪の強化に変えた。満州国は鉱工業に対する統制を実行し、民族業者の参入を厳禁した。日本は太平洋戦争勃発（ぼっぱつ）後には東北地方の経済資源をほしいままに略奪した。
【日中戦争】
日本側 中国に深い傷跡をのこしたが、原因の大半は日本側が作った。（発端となった）盧溝橋における最初の発砲事件は「偶発的」であった。しかし、この事件を好機とみなした関東軍などは蒋介石政権の打倒と華北占領という構想を実行していく。現地軍の行動を抑制できなかった理由の一つは陸軍内の「拡大派」と「不拡大派」の対立にあった。近衛内閣も行き詰まっていた中国政策打開の好機ととらえて容認し、現地解決の努力を押し流した。
中国側 盧溝橋事件自体の発生は偶然性をもっているかもしれないが、事件はたちまちに日本の全面的な中国侵略戦争を引き起こした。歴史の推移からみれば、事件は必然性をも帯びている。日本には「拡大派」と「不拡大派」との論争があったが、内閣が「華北に対する派兵声明」を公布してから「不拡大派」の声は完全に「拡大派」の主張にかき消されてしまった。
【南京事件】
日本側 日本軍による捕虜、敗残兵、便衣兵（ゲリラ）、一部の市民に対する集団的、個別的な虐殺事件が発生し、強姦（ごうかん）、略奪や放火も頻発した。被害者数は日本側の研究では２０万人を上限として、４万人、２万人など様々な推計がなされている。原因について、日本側に捕虜の取り扱いに関する指針や占領後の住民保護を含む軍政計画が欠けており、軍紀を取り締まる憲兵の数が少なかった点などが指摘されている。副次的要因としては、中国軍の南京防衛作戦の誤りと、それに伴う指揮統制の放棄・民衆保護対策の欠如があった。
中国側 南京軍事裁判所は南京大虐殺で虐殺された人数は１９万人以上にも上り、ほかにも散発的に虐殺された者が１５万人以上おり、被害者総数は３０万人余りと認定した。極東軍事裁判（東京裁判）の判決書によれば、占領後１か月で、南京城内では２万件近い強姦事件が発生した。日本軍は捕虜の数が多すぎて安全面を憂慮し、大量の中国軍人が捕虜になった後、集団的に虐殺された。民間人虐殺の暴行も猛威をふるった。（ある地域の）サンプリング調査によると民間人１０００人あたり２９人が死亡し、７世帯あたり１人が殺害されている。
【毒ガス・化学兵器】
日本側 １９３８年の武漢・広東攻略戦を通じて毒ガスの効果が実証され、参謀本部は「特殊煙」（あか筒、あか弾、みどり筒）の使用を認めることを各軍に指示し、中国戦線での毒ガス使用が一般化したと言われる。
中国側 関東軍７３１部隊と第１００部隊は中国人を利用して人体実験を行い、生体解剖まで行った。関東軍はさらに、化学兵器の人体実験を行った。今日もなお東北地方の民衆は日本軍が遺棄した化学兵器の毒物の影響を受けている。１９４２年、日本軍部隊が金華一帯に出動して細菌を散布し、コレラの流行を引き起こした。
【中国の犠牲者数】
日本側 国民政府軍の死者は約１３２万人、負傷者は１８０万にのぼる。中国共産党軍の死傷者＝失踪（しっそう）者を含む＝は５８万人を超えると推定されている。
中国側 完全な統計ではないが、戦争期間中に中国の軍人、人民３５００万人余りが死亡、負傷した。
【終わりに】
日本側 日中全面戦争は、双方の軍人だけではなく、特に中国の非戦闘員に多くの犠牲を強いた。犠牲の多さや日本軍による様々な「非違行為」は、戦後の日中両国民に、新しい関係構築を妨げる深い傷跡をのこした。日本軍による戦争犯罪を問い、戦後補償を求める運動が世代を超えて展開され、日本政府を相手とした裁判が今日まで続いていることは、そのことを物語っている。
中国側 中国人民は粘り強く抵抗した。抗日戦争における中国人民の偉大な勝利は、中華民族の同胞全体が団結して奮闘した結果で、反ファシズムの世界とともに努力して同盟国の人民と戦った成果だ。戦争は日本の転換点でもあった。日本のファシストが徹底的な敗北を喫し、日本人民も軍国主義を排除し、平和発展の新たな道を歩み出した。戦争終結は、日中両国に真に新たな平等関係を形成する可能性を与えた。
（2010年1月31日23時40分 読売新聞）
Friday, January 22, 2010
Korea's Historical Amnesia
The Korea Times
01-21-2010 18:33
Korea’s Historical Amnesia
Korea's Historical Amnesia
By Lee Cheun-heui
I couldn't help but laugh at the historical inaccuracies in the opinion piece ``Promoting Historical Amnesia" regarding the ongoing and futile effort of former so-called ``comfort women" to extract compensation from the Japanese government over their alleged ``hellish situation" during the Japanese army's colonization of Korea up until the end of World War II.
First, let me mention that my grandmother, who now lives in Japan, used to be a ``comfort woman," and she says the Japanese army never coerced anybody into having sex with the soldiers.
Sure, a few rogue soldiers did indeed rape some of the women of the territories it occupied, but my grandmother says the Japanese army never collectively forced women into performing sexual acts.
What the Japanese army did was negotiate a deal with the owners of local brothels to have them bring a group of girls to the army barracks to perform sexual favors for the soldiers who were either lonely or in need of a morale boost.
The women were paid handsomely, and my grandmother says that any woman who felt any kind of aversion to sleeping with a Japanese soldier was not required to participate in any sexual junket, though that meant they were forfeiting any opportunity to earn money from the Japanese army.
Now let's shift the focus to the issue of compensation. If you read the Basic Treaty signed by the Japanese and South Korean governments in 1965, you will notice that the Japanese government did indeed offer to provide compensation to individuals who had legitimate claims, but the South Korean government refused and instead requested that the Japanese government pay a lump sum to the Korean government to completely resolve the issue.
What did the South Korean government do with the money? Instead of giving it to the so-called ``victims" as they were supposed to, they used it to kick-start the ``Miracle on the Han River."
Legally speaking, based on the Treaty of 1965, anybody who feels they deserve compensation from the Japanese government for any wrongdoing committed by that government doesn't have a case because in the Treaty of 1965 the Korean government absolved the Japanese government from any further liability.
So if these comfort women who spend day after day protesting in front of the Japanese embassy really are serious about receiving ``compensation," legally it is the Korean government that needs to answer to their claims.
Here's another thing. Korea was not the only country that Japan occupied during the Second World War. China, and most of Southeast Asia, from the Philippines in the West to Burma (now Myanmar) in the East were also occupied and women from these nations also provided sexual favors to the Japanese soldiers but these ``comfort women" don't seem to have any problem with the Japanese government now.
Only the people of Korea seem to be unable to come to grips with the reality that there never really was a ``hellish situation" for these women. My grandmother, who made lots of money from her work as a prostitute servicing Japanese soldiers, and her friends (yes, they are Koreans, too) all say they never were forced and they were all paid very well.
Here in Korea it's more fashionable to blame things on the Japanese instead of the Park Chung-hee government, where the real blame lies. The Japanese government does not need to wait until all the comfort women are dead.
The treaty of 1965 is evidence enough of their compensation. I remind everybody who is still under the silly impression that Japan still owes favors to Korean victims, that in the treaty of 1965 the Japanese government did indeed offer to deal with each and every individual who claimed compensation was owed to them, but that the South Korean government declined the offer.
Don't believe me? Read the treaty for yourself; it's available for public scrutiny since it's now an official public record.
So I say to the editorial staff at The Korea Times, read the treaty, and after having read and understood it, please be kind enough to tell the readers exactly who it is that has this so-called ``historical amnesia."
The writer is a financial advisor in Yongsan, Seoul.
01-21-2010 18:33
Korea’s Historical Amnesia
Korea's Historical Amnesia
By Lee Cheun-heui
I couldn't help but laugh at the historical inaccuracies in the opinion piece ``Promoting Historical Amnesia" regarding the ongoing and futile effort of former so-called ``comfort women" to extract compensation from the Japanese government over their alleged ``hellish situation" during the Japanese army's colonization of Korea up until the end of World War II.
First, let me mention that my grandmother, who now lives in Japan, used to be a ``comfort woman," and she says the Japanese army never coerced anybody into having sex with the soldiers.
Sure, a few rogue soldiers did indeed rape some of the women of the territories it occupied, but my grandmother says the Japanese army never collectively forced women into performing sexual acts.
What the Japanese army did was negotiate a deal with the owners of local brothels to have them bring a group of girls to the army barracks to perform sexual favors for the soldiers who were either lonely or in need of a morale boost.
The women were paid handsomely, and my grandmother says that any woman who felt any kind of aversion to sleeping with a Japanese soldier was not required to participate in any sexual junket, though that meant they were forfeiting any opportunity to earn money from the Japanese army.
Now let's shift the focus to the issue of compensation. If you read the Basic Treaty signed by the Japanese and South Korean governments in 1965, you will notice that the Japanese government did indeed offer to provide compensation to individuals who had legitimate claims, but the South Korean government refused and instead requested that the Japanese government pay a lump sum to the Korean government to completely resolve the issue.
What did the South Korean government do with the money? Instead of giving it to the so-called ``victims" as they were supposed to, they used it to kick-start the ``Miracle on the Han River."
Legally speaking, based on the Treaty of 1965, anybody who feels they deserve compensation from the Japanese government for any wrongdoing committed by that government doesn't have a case because in the Treaty of 1965 the Korean government absolved the Japanese government from any further liability.
So if these comfort women who spend day after day protesting in front of the Japanese embassy really are serious about receiving ``compensation," legally it is the Korean government that needs to answer to their claims.
Here's another thing. Korea was not the only country that Japan occupied during the Second World War. China, and most of Southeast Asia, from the Philippines in the West to Burma (now Myanmar) in the East were also occupied and women from these nations also provided sexual favors to the Japanese soldiers but these ``comfort women" don't seem to have any problem with the Japanese government now.
Only the people of Korea seem to be unable to come to grips with the reality that there never really was a ``hellish situation" for these women. My grandmother, who made lots of money from her work as a prostitute servicing Japanese soldiers, and her friends (yes, they are Koreans, too) all say they never were forced and they were all paid very well.
Here in Korea it's more fashionable to blame things on the Japanese instead of the Park Chung-hee government, where the real blame lies. The Japanese government does not need to wait until all the comfort women are dead.
The treaty of 1965 is evidence enough of their compensation. I remind everybody who is still under the silly impression that Japan still owes favors to Korean victims, that in the treaty of 1965 the Japanese government did indeed offer to deal with each and every individual who claimed compensation was owed to them, but that the South Korean government declined the offer.
Don't believe me? Read the treaty for yourself; it's available for public scrutiny since it's now an official public record.
So I say to the editorial staff at The Korea Times, read the treaty, and after having read and understood it, please be kind enough to tell the readers exactly who it is that has this so-called ``historical amnesia."
The writer is a financial advisor in Yongsan, Seoul.
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Interview with Enola Gay crew member
Interview with Enola Gay crew member Morris Jeppson (Pt 1)
Morris Jeppson is pictured in an interview with the Mainichi at his home in Las Vegas. (Mainichi)
The following are excerpts from a recent Mainichi interview with Morris Jeppson, 87, one of two surviving members of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress bomber that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. The interview, conducted at Jeppson's home in Las Vegas, also contains comments from Jeppson's wife, Molly. (Interviewed by Takayasu Ogura, Mainichi New York Correspondent)
Mainichi: How did you join the U.S. military?
Jeppson: I was about 19 years old. There was a world war going on, so I enlisted in the Air Force, hoping I could be a pilot.
Mainichi: You wanted to be a pilot?
J: Well yes. Actually that was not my career objective. I wanted to be a physicist. And I ended up becoming a physicist but flying in World War II was a small section of life so I enlisted in the Air Force to become a flyer, but I ended up becoming more of a physicist.
Mainichi: What kind of role did you take during the Hiroshima mission?
J: Well, I was trained for that role -- at Harvard and MIT in electronics, (and) at MIT in radar engineering -- and there were four small radars built into these bombs. There was an antenna for one of them, and there were four of them. They were very simple -- all they detected was firing an electronic signal to the ground which bounced back up and measured the time delay, and that measured the height of this bomb as it was falling above ground.
So my role -- six of us ended up from the Harvard and MIT electronic schools, Air Force schools. We were hired by Los Alamos to work with the Air Force on the fusing -- the radar fusing and all other stuff that was built in the bomb.
I was a weapon test officer and we worked with Los Alamos in the Air Force. I was in the Air Force during the evolution of the electronics fusing system of the bomb. And then I was chosen to fly the Hiroshima mission and it was still experimental, so I was to test the electronics on the bomb during the flight to Hiroshima. If there was a problem with the electronics, I reported the problem to this man (and) he told the pilot of the airplane to take the bomb back. In fact, I was instructed to tell him to take the bomb back to (the Pacific island of) Tinian if it wasn't working right.
Mainichi: When were you informed you would be assigned to be part of the Hiroshima mission?
J: Well, that's a very good question. There were six of us who went through this training program at Harvard and MIT. At that time, we didn't know we were going to be assigned this program. But the six of us -- when we got to this program and went over to the airbase in Utah -- we were all trained to do the same job.
Of those six -- I think it was the day before -- we had a lieutenant, the first lieutenant in the Air Force assigned to oversee our little group of six. It turns out he was a security man, and he was to monitor our group to make sure we didn't make any mistakes. He didn't know electronics or anything, but it was a security matter.
The day before the mission, this security man said OK, we've narrowed it down to two of you. We'll flip a coin and figure out which one of you is going to fly the Hiroshima mission. And so, he flipped a coin, and they said, "Jeppson, you're flying on a security mission."
Mainichi: Like that?
J: Yeah.
Molly: Just like that.
J: He said it's got to be one of you two people. Anyway I ended up on the airplane. Not that I wanted to be. August 5. The day before Hiroshima.
Mainichi: Just a day before Hiroshima?
J: Several of us were trained to do this job. But --
M: But you were chosen.
Mainichi: Just a day before the bombing.
J: Yes. Now if I'd been sick, the other guy would have got on.
M: It was just luck. He (Jeppson) took a separate flight with (J. Robert) Oppenheimer (Scientific Director of the "Manhattan Project" to develop the first atom bomb) one time down to Southern California and Los Alamos. On the plane, he talked to Oppenheimer about how he wanted to be a physicist and everything. So I think Oppenheimer had something to do with him being chosen for this particular flight.
J: Whether or not they flipped the coin, evidently --
M: That's what they told him -- that they flipped the coin -- but he doesn't know.
J: But four of the six people that were trained this way lived in this tent. They wanted us separate from the 509th (composite group), where there were 1,500 people, and we were not supposed to talk to the other crew members anywhere, anytime about what we were doing.
M: They were in the middle of the airfield, which was a long way out. There was barbwire around the whole thing, and they were in a building there and they were not allowed to talk to anybody else on the air base, because they were working on this. Nobody else knew about it.
J: This was in Utah.
Mainichi: When did you move to Tinian Island?
J: In June, 1945.
Mainichi: At that time you were trained?
J: We were all trained and ready to go. Yes. Flying missions just like Hiroshima.
Mainichi: During that time, did you want to be chosen as a crew member of Enola Gay?
J: I've never heard that question before; that's a good one. I knew this was to be a uranium bomb -- a super bomb.
M: Because he was a physicist and he looked in the library at Los Alamos and figured it out. But he didn't say a word to anybody because they would have gotten after him and kicked him out. So he just kept it in his head.
Mainichi: You knew that this would be a nuclear bomb?
J: Most people in the 509th knew it was going to be a super powerful weapon, but they weren't supposed to know it was uranium. I'd figured out that it was a uranium bomb. People have asked, "Didn't it make you nervous -- having worked with one of these on the Hiroshima flight?" The answer is, "No, it's just the same kind of flight we'd done before."
M: It was just a job.
Mainichi: So all of your crew members felt so, too -- that the Hiroshima mission would be just the same kind of mission?
J: No. (They knew) that it would be a super powerful explosive, but not that it would be a nuclear explosive. Nobody had heard about nuclear. But I knew it.
Mainichi: You knew it because you were a physicist?
J: Yes. This man certainly knew it -- (weaponeer William Sterling) Parsons, who flew on the mission. He was in charge of this bomb. And my boss, of course, knew it. And this man was an official historian of the Manhattan Project, so he was out there to kind of oversee it, and he had the exclusive right to the story.
M: But nobody told anybody else.
J: He didn't know it was a nuclear explosive. I don't believe he did. But I'm not sure.
Mainichi: In this tent, nobody talked about uranium bombings?
J: Not uranium. They talked about the bomb and the electronics. But remember we had this Air Force guy overseeing us and if we'd been talking about Uranium 235, even he wasn't supposed to know what it was, but he would have found out that we were not authorized to talk about it. Security was incredibly tight.
Mainichi: But of course (Enola Gay pilot) Mr. (Paul) Tibbets knew?
J: Tibbets knew.
Mainichi: How about Robert Lewis, co-pilot?
J: No, he didn't know.
Mainichi: He didn't know this was a uranium bomb?
J: No, he wouldn't know that.
M: Nobody knew, really.
J: He knew it was going to be a super powerful bomb, but he didn't know it was going to be nuclear.
Mainichi: How about the bombardier?
J: (Thomas) Ferebee? He didn't know. He knew it had to be a very powerful bomb; otherwise he wouldn't have detonated it up high above the ground. If it had been detonated -- let's say the plane was flying at a low altitude like all of these hundreds of B-29s -- it would have destroyed the B-29 because they normally flew at six or seven thousand feet. This one flew at 30,000 feet. So the blast was like a shockwave -- it was a shockwave, but it didn't damage the airplane.
If it had been lower down, where they normally flew missions like this, the plane would not have survived.
Mainichi: There was a very famous photo of a big mushroom cloud. Who took the photo from the Enola Gay?
J: There was one gunner on the plane, the tail gunner. Why they left a tail gunner and took all the rest of the guns off, I don't know. But somebody gave him a camera, and he took the picture that you see.
M: After they dropped the bomb, Colonel Tibbets said he turned the plane really fast because he had to turn around and get away.
J: He didn't want to be above the bomb when the cloud came up.
Mainichi: So he had to --
J: Yeah. Get out of the way. So by the time the explosion took place, I think the airplane was 11 miles away, but I don't know for sure.
Mainichi: So your mission to Hiroshima involved only one airplane, the Enola Gay, not several?
J: Well, actually there were three that went to Hiroshima. First of all, early in the morning, they sent three weather reconnaissance planes to check out three different targets -- Hiroshima being one, Kokura, was another one, and Nagasaki was the third one. The weather planes reported that Hiroshima was open for bombing and then there were three active planes that flew over Hiroshima.
They were flying alongside, together at 30,000 feet. The third one was a photo monitor. This is an interesting story. The man that had the gear -- a nice camera to take pictures of this event -- he forgot his parachute, and they wouldn't let him on the airplane. They wouldn't let him on the third airplane. So he just flew with no assignment.
M: And no pictures. There were no other pictures of the bomb going off.
J: Except the one the tail gunner took.
Mainichi: He (the photographer) failed to take photos?
M: He failed.
J: He failed. Yeah. His part of the mission didn't work. And he was very agitated because he said "I don't need a parachute; what good is a parachute when you're at 30,000 feet?" If the plane blew up at 30,000 feet, even with a parachute, you don't survive.
M: But you were the only one who put on a parachute in your plane; nobody else did.
J: All of the crew, when they got onboard the airplane, the nine members, and (radar specialist Jacob) Beser, dumped their parachutes in a pile -- they are nice comfortable things -- so Captain Parsons sat on the pile of the parachutes. He was right behind me, and I was monitoring the electronics, and I was to tell him if there was something wrong, but here is this big-time guy sitting on a pile of parachutes -- that's OK.
Mainichi: Who pushed the button of the bomb?
J: The bombardier over the bomb bay, Ferebee.
M: He's dead.
Mainichi: Just before the bombing, you were informed that you are going to be a member of Enola Gay. So you were told about the mission Aug. 4?
J: Probably either the 4th or 5th. I am not really sure.
Mainichi: How did you feel?
J: I've faced that question before, and I don't recall anything about it, other than it was to be a mission identical (to other missions) -- and I'd never flown on combat missions in Germany or in Japan or in any place.
Mainichi: Never?
J: No, I've never flown any combat missions. I only flew one. Only one.
Interview with Enola Gay crew member Morris Jeppson (Pt. 2)
Morris Jeppson is pictured in an interview with the Mainichi at his home in Las Vegas. (Mainichi)
The following are excerpts from a recent Mainichi interview with Morris Jeppson, 87, one of two surviving members of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress bomber that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. The interview was conducted at Jeppson's home in Las Vegas. (Interviewed by Takayasu Ogura, Mainichi New York Correspondent)
Mainichi: Just before the bombing, on Tinian Island, what were the crew members talking about?
Jeppson: There were a few of us that lived in this tent. There were special secure areas where we set up the test equipment so there could be more bombs if necessary. But we were not allowed to communicate with people. The rest of the Air Force had all these B-29s. We didn't communicate. The 509th had their own barracks.
However the crews and the people that worked in the 509th and that had the 15 airplanes, they were exposed to the people with the regular Air Force flying B-29s. So there was a lot of kind of bad publicity of "What are you guys doing here? We are doing the job of 400 B-29s here and 400 on Guam" "What are you guys up to?" And it was a kind of a bad feeling between the regular Air Force out there and the 509th group. But they were only there for a couple of months.
Mainichi: What kind of feeling did you have right after dropping the bomb?
J: Just after -- well, first of all -- [takes out pictures].
Col. Tibbets, who later became Gen., Col. Tibbets, the pilot, this fellow in the picture, came on the intercom and said, "You all know that we are supposed to be carrying a super bomb. But what you have just witnessed is the first atomic bomb used in warfare.
It was a few minutes after the bomb was dropped, he turned the airplane then headed for home.
Mainichi: Are these pictures inside the Enola Gay?
J: Yeah, we were still at 30,000 feet with 5 hours to go before we get back to Tinian.
He said that was the first atomic bomb.
Mainichi: What did you feel when you listened to that?
J: Well, I can tell you several feelings. On the trip to Hiroshima, the plane flew at a lower altitude like 7,000-8,000 feet. The reason for that is these bomb plugs here are significant. In the bomb when it was loaded into the B-29 back at Tinian Island, there were three green plugs. This is actually one of them that was in it. And I got to keep that one and later sold it. But anyway, I got to keep it. But there were three of those plugged into the skin of the Hiroshima bomb. The purpose of those three was to disconnect the thing that fired the explosive in this one from the fusing system. So that I can test the fusing system on the way to Hiroshima everything from batteries to time clocks and radar sets and so on.
So in order to do that, a very important point, so at a low altitude, I was able to test the circuit of the bomb, but the bomb has to be dropped from a high altitude at 30,000 feet. So about half an hour before Hiroshima, I climbed into the bomb bay and I put three of these red coated plugs, took out the green ones, which were for testing plugs, and these we call firing plugs, that hooked the fusing system to unable this to detonate when it's say 1,800 feet above the ground. So those plugs were critical -- it allowed you to test on the way to Hiroshima, but also allowed once you switched the plugs, the bomb to do what it was supposed to do.
J: We are all still inside of the Enola Gay, moving from let's say 7,000 feet. Okay, at 7,000 feet, if you ask me my impressions, one impression is when I pull out those plugs, and put in the firing plugs, this bomb is live. And I already know it's going to be equivalent of tens of thousands of tons of TNT and I have had my hand on this thing. Well, that's very interesting but not a fright or anything because it will blow us up? I don't know anyway. So I had a feeling -- well this thing, it's now armed, and supposed to work. And then flying over Hiroshima or toward Hiroshima, Ferebee announced he said he is on the bomb-run, he flips open the bomb bay doors and then at a right point, an aiming point, the plane jumps up because it's released five tones of weight. And it's gone ...
Mainichi: It was very heavy?
J: Five tons, 10,000 pounds. The plane jumps up because it lost -- I don't know -- 10 percent of its weight or something. Maybe more.
So the bomb is gone, and it's a freefall. And it only takes 43 seconds to go from 30,000 feet to the point where it supposed to explode high above Hiroshima. Okay. I count 43 seconds in my head, I didn't have a watch to count them with. So I count the 43, and the one point in this mission when I was scared -- at 43, nothing happened. There was supposed to be a flash at 43. Well, I counted too fast because 2 or 3 seconds later, the flash comes in through this window, I'm sitting back here. The flash comes through the window. I couldn't see the explosion because I'm back here with no window. The flash comes through the window, so I knew I fast-counted. But I also knew that it had detonated above ground. Well, I pretty much knew that. And then approximately a few minutes later, there is a shockwave. It shakes the plane. The crew, and most of them had been in combat missions, said "Flak" -- being the explosion nearby from an anti-aircraft. So everybody thought it was an anti-aircraft saying -- but I knew the shockwave had to come from the explosion.
But it's real proof for me and very important, I wanted a reassurance that this thing will work. So there came another shockwave. That surprised everybody. "What is that shockwave?" It was smaller, and being trained in physics I knew what it was. It was a reflection of the primary shockwave from the ground back to the airplane.
Mainichi: Agh like that.
J: Exactly. You know exactly what I'm talking about. So I could estimate the time between the shockwaves would tell me just about how high above ground the explosion had taken place. To me, that proved that the radar system had worked, the electronic fusing system had worked, my job had worked, therefore, I can relax -- my job was done. My job forever was done.
Mainichi: So at that moment, you felt very relaxed because you succeeded in your mission.
J: Yeah. Until I knew that the bomb had done what it was supposed to do -- exploded at the right altitude and it would look like it's big. My role was totally over from that point on -- getting home because these planes after dropping a big bomb like that, didn't have much reserve gas. So that's why they built a reserve, emergency station on Iwo Jima as a way back.
Mainichi: You went back to Iwo Jima?
J: No, we flew over Iwo Jima. They figured there is enough gas to get all the way back to Tinian. But if there had been a problem, we'd have stopped on Iwo Jima.
Mainichi: Were you able to imagine at that time how enormous the ...
J: Yes. That was, that was a difficult thing. And that's what I've written up in lots of places, how bad that was. Because we got to get a look at this window -- we can see -- I hate to talk about it to even somebody that grew up in Japan. You can see the cloud and the fire spreading out from what was obviously the target. And that meant lots of people are dying, lots of destruction. And that's not a happy thing. But the good thing about it is only two weeks later, Emperor Hirohito said let's end this, and it ended. That's the good thing.
Mainichi: When did you get the information on the result of Hiroshima?
J: Of course, reconnaissance planes went over immediately afterwards. It took more than a day before the clouds had cleared up enough you could even see Hiroshima. I am out of the picture. This was not the Air Force at work. There was even -- what they call -- some kind of mission after a mission. Everybody involved gets together and discusses it trying to evaluate how effective it was. And I wasn't invited to that, so I went back to my tent. And at this point, the work we did was still very classified. People would know I was on that airplane, but they didn't know what I did. And that didn't come out for 50 years.
Mainichi: Before dropping the bomb, did you imagine the extent of the damage was going to be enormous?
J: Yes.
Mainichi: You could imagine that?
J: Yes. And the reason I could is I had read in a book I discovered on the trip to Los Alamos -- we had to go to Los Alamos once in a while for technical conferences. The tech area where the fusing system was in a secure area of Los Alamos, was in the same tech area where the nuclear physics people were. And it turns out there was a library that was used by anybody in the tech area. So I had a badge, but couldn't go in where nuclear physics people were, but I can go to the library. I went into the library and found this physics book, a text book, which have been removed from all libraries by the FBI because it reported on the research done in Germany in 1938, the research work on the fusion of uranium, and the uranium splitting up into smaller pieces, and losing weight and the weight had been converted by Einstein's theory to energy. The speculation in that book says this energy could be used for weapons or for nuclear power someday, maybe. That's when I surmised.
Mainichi: You could imagine about 105,000 people can die?
J: Yeah. If this bomb was used on a city, I could imagine that there was going to be a lot of loss of life and a lot of destruction. But the destruction were these planes flying everyday from Marianas, the destruction everyday was bigger than that. The only reason for being sympathetic at all to this mission was the hope it would stop this. And it did.
Mainichi: You think your mission ...
J: Was to stop the war. And now you ask about "Did I realize it could be as big as it was?" I can do a little arithmetic and I had to do some guessing. But I guess that the efficiency of this type of weapon had to be very low. It could have been much more efficient and it could have been five times as big. But it wasn't. That's one of the reasons -- only one of these was ever used. It's not as efficient as the plutonium bomb, which was Nagasaki.
Mainichi: This year in April President Obama made a speech in the Czech Republic. That said that the U.S. has a moral responsibility to the fact that it used the atomic bomb.
J: I don't believe in Barack Obama. I think he ... is on the wrong track. The U.S. weapons, nuclear weapons, I think have forced all nuclear war. The fact that we had them in the U.S. and that enabled Japan not to have them. Now we have Japan under threat both from North Korea and China. And North Korea is a renegade state. You can't trust them. They are not going to do what Obama would like to have happened. And China is already there, so they are not going to do that ever in our life time. So I think it's naive what's going on in the world today. There's Iran and think of Pakistan, Pakistan already has the weapon. If they see people who wanted to use them, they would. They would have deterred enough, they wouldn't use them. Okay, so, it's not a safe world. And so Obama is moving against nuclear power and against nuclear weapons. Now if he succeeds, here is Japan, it's defenseless. All these years, depending on the U.S. to step in if there was a real problem that threatens Japan.
So I've always endorsed Japan's position of let's not go for nuclear weapons. But I don't believe that anymore. Japan is already -- I brought something I wanted to give to you, but I'll get it later.
As you can tell from something I wrote about -- a big dirty bomb. It's already out there -- they could be used -- the threat is there that they could be used and we don't know how to stop it. Obama is not going to stop it. The only thing that worked before now is deterrent. So if Obama gets us out of nuclear weapons, and Japan is sitting there with no nuclear weapons, Japan is at the mercy of North Korea and China, we are defenseless against North Korea and China and Iran. We already have a weapon and I trust they'll keep them under control. But Japan is heavily into the nuclear power industry, more than the biggest nuclear power in the whole world. When you generate nuclear power, I'm kind of on the fringe of that. You manufacture plutonium -- that's the Nagasaki-type bomb. So that's why North Korea wants it, Iran wants it, China has it, Pakistan has it. I think Japan with super technology could very, very quickly produce nuclear weapons and be prepared to use them if they had to.
Now that's what I am going to ask you -- that's my point of view for where Japan should go. Now I need to ask you -- how do you think Japan would be over the long range, of being a protectorate of nuclear weaponry? Would it not use it unless there is a good reason to use it? For me, I'd like to be reassured that Japan is a democracy and a world power and will protect what it has -- nuclear power and nuclear weapons if it can get nuclear weapons. Getting nuclear weapons would hold off North Korea for sure -- that would stop North Korea from ever using them -- that would involve Japan. I think it might be a deterrent to hold back China.
Mainichi: You said Obama's policy -- no nuclear weapons around the world, could be a little bit naive -- but this could be one of the dreams of human beings.
J: Yes.
Mainichi: But maybe we want to step forward and talk with North Korea, Beijing, Iran?
J: Yes. That would be a wonderful first step. And that would be a talk directed toward -- okay if you all are going to start cutting back, like Obama said he would like to do, and we've been trying to do that in this country all along against Russia. If those guys don't cut back, we have no choice but to get prepared to defend ourselves.
Mainichi: What do you think about this point? This is the first remark by the U.S. president -- using the atomic bomb -- the U.S. has a moral responsibility to act because only the U.S. has used the atomic bomb.
J: Yes.
Mainichi: What do you think about his remark, "moral responsibility"?
J: I think that is naive also. Suppose that question had been answered in 1945 -- in 1945, it's getting ready to the point where those weapons could be used. Okay. Here is President Truman sitting up here and he says we've got this weapon and already in the mill. Is this a giant invasion of Japan? You know, I don't know if you learned this in history, I hope you did. Japan is getting prepared to defend itself against this invasion. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are nothing compared to the loss of life and property -- not only American armed forces but Japanese military and civilians because the invasion was going to be larger than the invasion of Normandie. And the history book unearthed all this information -- the army, as I understand it, was being withdrawn from China to Japan for defensive purposes. And those armies were upwards of about a million -- well-experienced military people. So the invasion is going to be -- I'll tell you, this is a private opinion, I haven't heard it from anybody else, but I think the reason Truman made a decision to use these weapons and you can quote me on this -- I think it needs to be sent because I think it's partially an answer to what you have here.
Mainichi: So Obama's remark of "moral responsibility" ...
J: Is naive in today's world.
Mainichi: Maybe back then in 1945 Obama could not say such kind of things ...
J: No because I didn't finish what I was going to say. Truman faced this problem. I think his decision -- he had two choices. One is to hold off on the nuclear weapon and I'm sure it would do a lot of soul searching to do that. He said I'll do the invasion. And he had been briefed -- there was another invasion of Europe. I don't know what your history book told you, but it's called Dunkirk. Dunkirk failed. It was terrible in the news. You weren't even alive there. They had to withdraw all those armed forces from Dunkirk in Europe because the invasion failed. I think Truman saw, he got all the reports for the preparations to defend Japan. This is defending the homeland now. The Japanese are going to defend strongly. So I think Truman thought, well, if we go ahead with this invasion we are facing, the invasion will probably fail. So then he made a decision. I think.
Mainichi: So you think for the U.S. the only choice in order to stop the war was the bombing by using a new type of weapon.
J: Yes. To do it quickly. And it was going to cost a lot of lives and lots of destruction, a lot of heartache. But the invasion would have been far, far, worse.
Mainichi: Did you know the remark of "moral responsibility" before I met you today?
J: Yeah, but I discounted it. I discount everything Obama does.
Mainichi: What did you feel when you got the information that Obama said about moral responsibility -- just naive?
J: I've already concluded he is naive economically, also recognizing what the real world is out there. Everybody is struggling to get nuclear weapons. Everybody is needing nuclear power. If you get nuclear power with all that's been revealed about weapons, it's just a matter of dollars before you can make it (the weapon). And so to me, he is not going to be able to manage to do what he says he'd like to do.
Mainichi: I know many American people think just like what you said -- in order to stop wars immediately, quickly, they chose the atomic bomb.
J: Yes.
Mainichi: Just after that, the Japanese concurred. Hirohito decided the war is over. But on the Japanese side, there are lots of opinions. Back then, in 1944, the Japanese military lost battles all over the world in the Pacific and China and many other places. They were losing their power. They didn't have energy, oil, they didn't have anything. After the war, an American group that studied military strategy issued a report saying that Japan must have had to surrender in several months even without dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Do you think using the atomic bombs were necessary to end the war?
J: Yes.
Mainichi: These 64 years, your thoughts were --
J: Still convinced. Yes.
(To be continued)
Interview with Enola Gay crew member Morris Jeppson (Pt 3)
Morris Jeppson is pictured in an interview with the Mainichi at his home in Las Vegas. (Mainichi)
The following are excerpts from a recent Mainichi interview with Morris Jeppson, 87, one of two surviving crew members of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress bomber that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. The interview, conducted at Jeppson's home in Las Vegas, also contains comments from Jeppson's wife, Molly. (Interviewed by Takayasu Ogura, Mainichi New York Correspondent)
Mainichi: Since the U.S. used the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many countries have developed nuclear weapons -- Russia, China, now India, Pakistan, North Korea and elsewhere. What is your opinion of nuclear weapons? Should they be used in order to end wars?
Jeppson: Not anymore. ... But that doesn't mean it isn't going to happen. Go back to 1942 or '41. Then Germany was actively pursuing the development of atomic bombs. (In Germany's case), the leader of the country, Hitler, said 'we are going to go more conventional.' So, had he put a little more effort behind it, his scientists ... would have been there first. That was always the concern for Los Alamos.
Mainichi: That Germany would have nuclear weapons first?
J: Yes. Had they done that, the whole world would be different. Now if the rest of the world today says we are not going to have nuclear weapons ... then the rest of the world will sit at the mercy of some new dictator that is willing to use all the weapons he can. And if he finds out the rest of the world is disarmed, he gets a free hand.
Mainichi: What is your position on nuclear weapons now?
J: I would like to see a gradual withdrawal of nuclear weapons everywhere, and that's been under way. There's been a big effort to get Iran and North Korea to come along with (disarmament), but it hasn't happened. Pakistan is arming itself. I'm afraid that as much effort as is going in around the world to try to (reduce) them to lower and lower levels, there is going to be somebody that is going to say, "No, I'm not going along with it."
Mainichi: So you think people have to step forward and aim for a non-nuclear world gradually?
J: I don't think you can do it now because there are too many countries. France and England have them, Pakistan, India and I'm sure Brazil is coming along. Most of their programs are secret. If there can be a gradual pullback, I would certainly favor that. But I don't think they can be eliminated.
Mainichi: You said you don't think nuclear weapons should be used any more in order to stop wars. But you also said you never regretted using the atomic bomb to stop the war with Japan. Please explain that.
J: Well, I've just explained it. Your history apparently disagrees with it a bit, but if those two weapons hadn't been used, that war wouldn't have ended in two weeks (after they were dropped).
Hirohito stepped forth, but the military, as I understand it, was not ready. The military in Japan wanted to make an invasion costly enough that the Allies, the U.S. would leave Japan alone to make its own destiny. And I would like to believe the destiny that Japan has achieved has been assisted by the way the U.S. handled affairs after the war. So that's about all I can say.
Mainichi: I think what you said is an historic remark, since many in the bomber crews have passed away.
J: Well, of course from the Manhattan Project a lot of people are still alive, but they were manufacturing explosives. And I guess you know that there was apprehension about Los Alamos -- that's one of the reasons why when we as the Air Force went over to Los Alamos, we would stop along the way and change our insignia from the Air Force to Army ordinance, because they didn't want the scientific group at Los Alamos to know that the Air Force was seriously considering using their weapon. And there were a lot of scientists at Los Alamos who took that same opinion of "moral responsibility."
Mainichi: President Obama plans to visit Japan next November, and may visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How would you feel if he visits Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
J: Badly, probably.
Mainichi: Why?
J: Well, you could go visit any bombed-out city, of which there were many around the world, in Japan and in Germany. War is bad. It kills people. It destroys property. So it's a matter of saying: Was it necessary? What were the choices you had? If you had made these choices, how much worse would it have been, or better?
Mainichi: If you have a chance to meet Obama, would you advise him not to go to Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
J: I would say that's his business because he is going to do what he wants to do.
Mainichi: You understand what he said about the moral responsibility of using the atomic bombs. If he visits Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he may apologize to Hiroshima's citizens. If he apologizes, what would you feel?
J: I would be indignant.
M: Yes, because it saved a lot of Japanese lives, too. Because the invasion could have killed thousands and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of the Japanese and Americans, and dropping the bomb ended the war. That saved a lot of people. I think the Japanese should realize that, that it saved a lot of them. You know a lot more people were killed with firebombing ... than were killed at Hiroshima. So if you think about that, that bomb was really not so bad. It was just part of the war, right? I mean, that the way we feel about it.
J: No, I think the statement that you quoted from Obama's speech is ... saying that the U.S. is guilty of using those weapons.
Mainichi: Moral responsibility?
J: That's called guilt. Isn't that guilt?
Mainichi: You think the U.S. President should not make such remarks?
J: Definitely not, no.
Mainichi: If you are invited by the citizens groups in Hiroshima or other relevant people, would you like to visit Hiroshima?
J: No.
Mainichi: You've never been to Hiroshima? Will you ever go?
J: No, I'm too old. I wouldn't want to.
Mainichi: You said you have visited Japan.
J: Yes, several cities.
Mainichi: At that time, six years ago in 2003, did you think about visiting Hiroshima?
J: No.
Mainichi: Why not?
M: Why? Why should we go?
Mainichi: Because you have a relationship with Hiroshima from the bombing, so perhaps you would want to know the situation in Hiroshima now?
J: Well, I read about that, so I don't have to go there to see it. ... But I'm not interested in going to Normandy either. War is war. It's past. We don't like wars.
Mainichi: Do you want to forget?
J: I'm not really forgetting. You've listened to me talk.
Mainichi: If it was possible, would you want to forget the experience of the war?
J: I don't think that's exactly the way I'd put it. It's a part of history that was a war. It was uncomfortable, and it's in the past and there are other things to be done in the world; preventing war being a good example.
M: I don't think he really liked dropping the bomb. Any kind of bombs.
J: Gosh. Nobody does. Nobody likes to do that.
M: He's a peaceful man.
Mainichi: On Aug. 6, 1945 you thought that dropping an atomic bomb was the only choice to end the war?
J: Yes that's right. Well at that point, we knew there was an invasion underway.
M: Well the emperor didn't want to end the war, you know.
J: Well, he made the decision. It's like Truman making his decision. Truman felt he had to make it, and Hirohito obviously felt he had to make (his decision). As I understand it was against the advice of his military supporters. Is that right? Is that the way you understand it?
Mainichi: Even on Aug. 15, some groups inside the Army didn't want to surrender. But everyone at the ministerial level wanted to surrender.
J: But they couldn't make the decision. And I remember the history of this -- the Japanese leaders were warned strongly that major destruction was coming if (a surrender) wasn't signed. And they could have made the decision. So if there is any blame of moral responsibility, it would be with the inability of the Japanese leaders to make up their minds. Because they knew for sure the invasion was going to take place. That's really probably the most significant point here. The invasion was going to be very, very difficult for Japan and knowing that it was coming, the Japanese leaders should have been strong enough ... to have surrendered. Then (the bomb) wouldn't have been dropped.
Mainichi: Stopping the war was the most important thing?
J: The most important.
Let's ask this question: Suppose Truman had decided, "Oh we can't do this atomic bombing thing." (The bomb) was demonstrated down at Alamogordo, though, (so the world would know) it's possible to make big explosions even if there had been no Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So all of the world would be clamoring to make big nuclear weapons, probably more so than they are now. So what would the world be like -- with everybody be clamoring to get something like they tested down at Alamogordo. I don't like to sound that, either.
Mainichi: You knew it was an atomic bomb even though very few people knew about it. At that time, did you know about the effects of atomic radiation?
J: Radiation? I don't think I knew that there was such a problem. I was pretty young.
M: All these people were young. They really didn't realize what the radiation would do to people because I know for years afterwards, Dick said, "You know, it's just so sad." I mean, he was really sad about the Japanese people that the bombing had injured. He didn't know at that time. He didn't have any special knowledge.
J: For the most part, I don't think Los Alamos really had much of an understanding of the radiation effects.
Mainichi: You think most of the people didn't know?
J: That's right. That's right. ... I think in general, the people of who were working fairly close (to the bomb project) didn't know (radiation) could be a serious problem. And the American people didn't know anything about it, of course.
Mainichi: In Hiroshima, still now some elderly people and some of their descendants suffer from the effects of radiation. How did you feel about that?
J: The information came too late. I never heard (radiation) as a subject of discussion ... in 1945 as being a byproduct of nuclear weapons. I think everybody thought in terms of blasting fire; a typical weapon.
Mainichi: When did the physicists get information about the radiation in Hiroshima?
J: Well, when a study group from the U.S. went to Hiroshima. That's where they learned that there had been a radiation problem.
M: None of us knew (at the time). People on the plane didn't even know.
Mainichi: So even the American physicists were a little bit surprised with the effect of radiation?
J: Absolutely, yes. It was an unknown factor. I had no idea. Of course, the Hershey report and things like that came out and that was the first knowledge that the people who went in could see there had been radiation burns among survivors.
Mainichi: If President Truman had known about the effects of radiation, do you think his decision to drop the bomb would have been different?
J: That's an interesting question. I don't know how to answer that question.
Mainichi: What have you been doing since the end of the war?
J: Well, I went to graduate school at Berkeley. And then as a graduate student, I worked for the North American aviation on a classified program looking towards nuclear powered aircraft and rockets.
Mainichi: In the military?
J: No, I'm a civilian. I've gone to graduate school. I got out of military as fast as I can get out and then I had a career. ... I worked for a radiation laboratory for two or three years building accelerators for accelerating protons. And I started a company called Applied Radiation in 1954 I think. We built linear accelerators which are used to make radiation for cancer therapy.
M: So he turned to healing.
J: Another aspect of nuclear physics.
Mainichi: I searched Japanese media sources, but I found very few interviews with the bomber crew members. Why? Did the bomber crews hesitate to speak with the Japanese media?
J: Some of them died of course. As far as Paul Tibbets is concerned, he wouldn't spend much time with you because he was strictly military and he had a job to do. He said we did a job and that's it.
Mainichi: In thirty or forty years, when those who experienced World War II have passed away, if the American President or many ordinary Americans decide the U.S. should apologize for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how would you feel about that?
J: I think that one's easy to answer. If it's done once for an apology for something like that, think of all of the other things over history that should be apologized for, applying the same rule. It's just not necessary. War is war. There was a good reason for it, put it into history books or whatever. But nobody down the road has any right to apologize for something that happened in the past.
This question comes up in the U.S. all the time. ... (Like slavery,) it's history. It's all laid out. Why should anybody today apologize for anything that happened 150 years ago? It isn't necessary. It's giving somebody 150 years later a right to make this apology. No, they don't have a right to make an apology.
Mainichi: So you think that even in the future, American presidents should not apologize.
J: No. Never.
Mainichi: But if any American president apologized in the future, you would not like it?
J: I would be indignant. It's a matter of what right does he have to (apologize) for something that all these people fought for and died for on both sides. The Japanese thought (the war) was the right thing and doing good for them. It wasn't the right thing for anybody. But it happened, and you don't apologize for history.
Morris Jeppson is pictured in an interview with the Mainichi at his home in Las Vegas. (Mainichi)
The following are excerpts from a recent Mainichi interview with Morris Jeppson, 87, one of two surviving members of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress bomber that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. The interview, conducted at Jeppson's home in Las Vegas, also contains comments from Jeppson's wife, Molly. (Interviewed by Takayasu Ogura, Mainichi New York Correspondent)
Mainichi: How did you join the U.S. military?
Jeppson: I was about 19 years old. There was a world war going on, so I enlisted in the Air Force, hoping I could be a pilot.
Mainichi: You wanted to be a pilot?
J: Well yes. Actually that was not my career objective. I wanted to be a physicist. And I ended up becoming a physicist but flying in World War II was a small section of life so I enlisted in the Air Force to become a flyer, but I ended up becoming more of a physicist.
Mainichi: What kind of role did you take during the Hiroshima mission?
J: Well, I was trained for that role -- at Harvard and MIT in electronics, (and) at MIT in radar engineering -- and there were four small radars built into these bombs. There was an antenna for one of them, and there were four of them. They were very simple -- all they detected was firing an electronic signal to the ground which bounced back up and measured the time delay, and that measured the height of this bomb as it was falling above ground.
So my role -- six of us ended up from the Harvard and MIT electronic schools, Air Force schools. We were hired by Los Alamos to work with the Air Force on the fusing -- the radar fusing and all other stuff that was built in the bomb.
I was a weapon test officer and we worked with Los Alamos in the Air Force. I was in the Air Force during the evolution of the electronics fusing system of the bomb. And then I was chosen to fly the Hiroshima mission and it was still experimental, so I was to test the electronics on the bomb during the flight to Hiroshima. If there was a problem with the electronics, I reported the problem to this man (and) he told the pilot of the airplane to take the bomb back. In fact, I was instructed to tell him to take the bomb back to (the Pacific island of) Tinian if it wasn't working right.
Mainichi: When were you informed you would be assigned to be part of the Hiroshima mission?
J: Well, that's a very good question. There were six of us who went through this training program at Harvard and MIT. At that time, we didn't know we were going to be assigned this program. But the six of us -- when we got to this program and went over to the airbase in Utah -- we were all trained to do the same job.
Of those six -- I think it was the day before -- we had a lieutenant, the first lieutenant in the Air Force assigned to oversee our little group of six. It turns out he was a security man, and he was to monitor our group to make sure we didn't make any mistakes. He didn't know electronics or anything, but it was a security matter.
The day before the mission, this security man said OK, we've narrowed it down to two of you. We'll flip a coin and figure out which one of you is going to fly the Hiroshima mission. And so, he flipped a coin, and they said, "Jeppson, you're flying on a security mission."
Mainichi: Like that?
J: Yeah.
Molly: Just like that.
J: He said it's got to be one of you two people. Anyway I ended up on the airplane. Not that I wanted to be. August 5. The day before Hiroshima.
Mainichi: Just a day before Hiroshima?
J: Several of us were trained to do this job. But --
M: But you were chosen.
Mainichi: Just a day before the bombing.
J: Yes. Now if I'd been sick, the other guy would have got on.
M: It was just luck. He (Jeppson) took a separate flight with (J. Robert) Oppenheimer (Scientific Director of the "Manhattan Project" to develop the first atom bomb) one time down to Southern California and Los Alamos. On the plane, he talked to Oppenheimer about how he wanted to be a physicist and everything. So I think Oppenheimer had something to do with him being chosen for this particular flight.
J: Whether or not they flipped the coin, evidently --
M: That's what they told him -- that they flipped the coin -- but he doesn't know.
J: But four of the six people that were trained this way lived in this tent. They wanted us separate from the 509th (composite group), where there were 1,500 people, and we were not supposed to talk to the other crew members anywhere, anytime about what we were doing.
M: They were in the middle of the airfield, which was a long way out. There was barbwire around the whole thing, and they were in a building there and they were not allowed to talk to anybody else on the air base, because they were working on this. Nobody else knew about it.
J: This was in Utah.
Mainichi: When did you move to Tinian Island?
J: In June, 1945.
Mainichi: At that time you were trained?
J: We were all trained and ready to go. Yes. Flying missions just like Hiroshima.
Mainichi: During that time, did you want to be chosen as a crew member of Enola Gay?
J: I've never heard that question before; that's a good one. I knew this was to be a uranium bomb -- a super bomb.
M: Because he was a physicist and he looked in the library at Los Alamos and figured it out. But he didn't say a word to anybody because they would have gotten after him and kicked him out. So he just kept it in his head.
Mainichi: You knew that this would be a nuclear bomb?
J: Most people in the 509th knew it was going to be a super powerful weapon, but they weren't supposed to know it was uranium. I'd figured out that it was a uranium bomb. People have asked, "Didn't it make you nervous -- having worked with one of these on the Hiroshima flight?" The answer is, "No, it's just the same kind of flight we'd done before."
M: It was just a job.
Mainichi: So all of your crew members felt so, too -- that the Hiroshima mission would be just the same kind of mission?
J: No. (They knew) that it would be a super powerful explosive, but not that it would be a nuclear explosive. Nobody had heard about nuclear. But I knew it.
Mainichi: You knew it because you were a physicist?
J: Yes. This man certainly knew it -- (weaponeer William Sterling) Parsons, who flew on the mission. He was in charge of this bomb. And my boss, of course, knew it. And this man was an official historian of the Manhattan Project, so he was out there to kind of oversee it, and he had the exclusive right to the story.
M: But nobody told anybody else.
J: He didn't know it was a nuclear explosive. I don't believe he did. But I'm not sure.
Mainichi: In this tent, nobody talked about uranium bombings?
J: Not uranium. They talked about the bomb and the electronics. But remember we had this Air Force guy overseeing us and if we'd been talking about Uranium 235, even he wasn't supposed to know what it was, but he would have found out that we were not authorized to talk about it. Security was incredibly tight.
Mainichi: But of course (Enola Gay pilot) Mr. (Paul) Tibbets knew?
J: Tibbets knew.
Mainichi: How about Robert Lewis, co-pilot?
J: No, he didn't know.
Mainichi: He didn't know this was a uranium bomb?
J: No, he wouldn't know that.
M: Nobody knew, really.
J: He knew it was going to be a super powerful bomb, but he didn't know it was going to be nuclear.
Mainichi: How about the bombardier?
J: (Thomas) Ferebee? He didn't know. He knew it had to be a very powerful bomb; otherwise he wouldn't have detonated it up high above the ground. If it had been detonated -- let's say the plane was flying at a low altitude like all of these hundreds of B-29s -- it would have destroyed the B-29 because they normally flew at six or seven thousand feet. This one flew at 30,000 feet. So the blast was like a shockwave -- it was a shockwave, but it didn't damage the airplane.
If it had been lower down, where they normally flew missions like this, the plane would not have survived.
Mainichi: There was a very famous photo of a big mushroom cloud. Who took the photo from the Enola Gay?
J: There was one gunner on the plane, the tail gunner. Why they left a tail gunner and took all the rest of the guns off, I don't know. But somebody gave him a camera, and he took the picture that you see.
M: After they dropped the bomb, Colonel Tibbets said he turned the plane really fast because he had to turn around and get away.
J: He didn't want to be above the bomb when the cloud came up.
Mainichi: So he had to --
J: Yeah. Get out of the way. So by the time the explosion took place, I think the airplane was 11 miles away, but I don't know for sure.
Mainichi: So your mission to Hiroshima involved only one airplane, the Enola Gay, not several?
J: Well, actually there were three that went to Hiroshima. First of all, early in the morning, they sent three weather reconnaissance planes to check out three different targets -- Hiroshima being one, Kokura, was another one, and Nagasaki was the third one. The weather planes reported that Hiroshima was open for bombing and then there were three active planes that flew over Hiroshima.
They were flying alongside, together at 30,000 feet. The third one was a photo monitor. This is an interesting story. The man that had the gear -- a nice camera to take pictures of this event -- he forgot his parachute, and they wouldn't let him on the airplane. They wouldn't let him on the third airplane. So he just flew with no assignment.
M: And no pictures. There were no other pictures of the bomb going off.
J: Except the one the tail gunner took.
Mainichi: He (the photographer) failed to take photos?
M: He failed.
J: He failed. Yeah. His part of the mission didn't work. And he was very agitated because he said "I don't need a parachute; what good is a parachute when you're at 30,000 feet?" If the plane blew up at 30,000 feet, even with a parachute, you don't survive.
M: But you were the only one who put on a parachute in your plane; nobody else did.
J: All of the crew, when they got onboard the airplane, the nine members, and (radar specialist Jacob) Beser, dumped their parachutes in a pile -- they are nice comfortable things -- so Captain Parsons sat on the pile of the parachutes. He was right behind me, and I was monitoring the electronics, and I was to tell him if there was something wrong, but here is this big-time guy sitting on a pile of parachutes -- that's OK.
Mainichi: Who pushed the button of the bomb?
J: The bombardier over the bomb bay, Ferebee.
M: He's dead.
Mainichi: Just before the bombing, you were informed that you are going to be a member of Enola Gay. So you were told about the mission Aug. 4?
J: Probably either the 4th or 5th. I am not really sure.
Mainichi: How did you feel?
J: I've faced that question before, and I don't recall anything about it, other than it was to be a mission identical (to other missions) -- and I'd never flown on combat missions in Germany or in Japan or in any place.
Mainichi: Never?
J: No, I've never flown any combat missions. I only flew one. Only one.
Interview with Enola Gay crew member Morris Jeppson (Pt. 2)
Morris Jeppson is pictured in an interview with the Mainichi at his home in Las Vegas. (Mainichi)
The following are excerpts from a recent Mainichi interview with Morris Jeppson, 87, one of two surviving members of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress bomber that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. The interview was conducted at Jeppson's home in Las Vegas. (Interviewed by Takayasu Ogura, Mainichi New York Correspondent)
Mainichi: Just before the bombing, on Tinian Island, what were the crew members talking about?
Jeppson: There were a few of us that lived in this tent. There were special secure areas where we set up the test equipment so there could be more bombs if necessary. But we were not allowed to communicate with people. The rest of the Air Force had all these B-29s. We didn't communicate. The 509th had their own barracks.
However the crews and the people that worked in the 509th and that had the 15 airplanes, they were exposed to the people with the regular Air Force flying B-29s. So there was a lot of kind of bad publicity of "What are you guys doing here? We are doing the job of 400 B-29s here and 400 on Guam" "What are you guys up to?" And it was a kind of a bad feeling between the regular Air Force out there and the 509th group. But they were only there for a couple of months.
Mainichi: What kind of feeling did you have right after dropping the bomb?
J: Just after -- well, first of all -- [takes out pictures].
Col. Tibbets, who later became Gen., Col. Tibbets, the pilot, this fellow in the picture, came on the intercom and said, "You all know that we are supposed to be carrying a super bomb. But what you have just witnessed is the first atomic bomb used in warfare.
It was a few minutes after the bomb was dropped, he turned the airplane then headed for home.
Mainichi: Are these pictures inside the Enola Gay?
J: Yeah, we were still at 30,000 feet with 5 hours to go before we get back to Tinian.
He said that was the first atomic bomb.
Mainichi: What did you feel when you listened to that?
J: Well, I can tell you several feelings. On the trip to Hiroshima, the plane flew at a lower altitude like 7,000-8,000 feet. The reason for that is these bomb plugs here are significant. In the bomb when it was loaded into the B-29 back at Tinian Island, there were three green plugs. This is actually one of them that was in it. And I got to keep that one and later sold it. But anyway, I got to keep it. But there were three of those plugged into the skin of the Hiroshima bomb. The purpose of those three was to disconnect the thing that fired the explosive in this one from the fusing system. So that I can test the fusing system on the way to Hiroshima everything from batteries to time clocks and radar sets and so on.
So in order to do that, a very important point, so at a low altitude, I was able to test the circuit of the bomb, but the bomb has to be dropped from a high altitude at 30,000 feet. So about half an hour before Hiroshima, I climbed into the bomb bay and I put three of these red coated plugs, took out the green ones, which were for testing plugs, and these we call firing plugs, that hooked the fusing system to unable this to detonate when it's say 1,800 feet above the ground. So those plugs were critical -- it allowed you to test on the way to Hiroshima, but also allowed once you switched the plugs, the bomb to do what it was supposed to do.
J: We are all still inside of the Enola Gay, moving from let's say 7,000 feet. Okay, at 7,000 feet, if you ask me my impressions, one impression is when I pull out those plugs, and put in the firing plugs, this bomb is live. And I already know it's going to be equivalent of tens of thousands of tons of TNT and I have had my hand on this thing. Well, that's very interesting but not a fright or anything because it will blow us up? I don't know anyway. So I had a feeling -- well this thing, it's now armed, and supposed to work. And then flying over Hiroshima or toward Hiroshima, Ferebee announced he said he is on the bomb-run, he flips open the bomb bay doors and then at a right point, an aiming point, the plane jumps up because it's released five tones of weight. And it's gone ...
Mainichi: It was very heavy?
J: Five tons, 10,000 pounds. The plane jumps up because it lost -- I don't know -- 10 percent of its weight or something. Maybe more.
So the bomb is gone, and it's a freefall. And it only takes 43 seconds to go from 30,000 feet to the point where it supposed to explode high above Hiroshima. Okay. I count 43 seconds in my head, I didn't have a watch to count them with. So I count the 43, and the one point in this mission when I was scared -- at 43, nothing happened. There was supposed to be a flash at 43. Well, I counted too fast because 2 or 3 seconds later, the flash comes in through this window, I'm sitting back here. The flash comes through the window. I couldn't see the explosion because I'm back here with no window. The flash comes through the window, so I knew I fast-counted. But I also knew that it had detonated above ground. Well, I pretty much knew that. And then approximately a few minutes later, there is a shockwave. It shakes the plane. The crew, and most of them had been in combat missions, said "Flak" -- being the explosion nearby from an anti-aircraft. So everybody thought it was an anti-aircraft saying -- but I knew the shockwave had to come from the explosion.
But it's real proof for me and very important, I wanted a reassurance that this thing will work. So there came another shockwave. That surprised everybody. "What is that shockwave?" It was smaller, and being trained in physics I knew what it was. It was a reflection of the primary shockwave from the ground back to the airplane.
Mainichi: Agh like that.
J: Exactly. You know exactly what I'm talking about. So I could estimate the time between the shockwaves would tell me just about how high above ground the explosion had taken place. To me, that proved that the radar system had worked, the electronic fusing system had worked, my job had worked, therefore, I can relax -- my job was done. My job forever was done.
Mainichi: So at that moment, you felt very relaxed because you succeeded in your mission.
J: Yeah. Until I knew that the bomb had done what it was supposed to do -- exploded at the right altitude and it would look like it's big. My role was totally over from that point on -- getting home because these planes after dropping a big bomb like that, didn't have much reserve gas. So that's why they built a reserve, emergency station on Iwo Jima as a way back.
Mainichi: You went back to Iwo Jima?
J: No, we flew over Iwo Jima. They figured there is enough gas to get all the way back to Tinian. But if there had been a problem, we'd have stopped on Iwo Jima.
Mainichi: Were you able to imagine at that time how enormous the ...
J: Yes. That was, that was a difficult thing. And that's what I've written up in lots of places, how bad that was. Because we got to get a look at this window -- we can see -- I hate to talk about it to even somebody that grew up in Japan. You can see the cloud and the fire spreading out from what was obviously the target. And that meant lots of people are dying, lots of destruction. And that's not a happy thing. But the good thing about it is only two weeks later, Emperor Hirohito said let's end this, and it ended. That's the good thing.
Mainichi: When did you get the information on the result of Hiroshima?
J: Of course, reconnaissance planes went over immediately afterwards. It took more than a day before the clouds had cleared up enough you could even see Hiroshima. I am out of the picture. This was not the Air Force at work. There was even -- what they call -- some kind of mission after a mission. Everybody involved gets together and discusses it trying to evaluate how effective it was. And I wasn't invited to that, so I went back to my tent. And at this point, the work we did was still very classified. People would know I was on that airplane, but they didn't know what I did. And that didn't come out for 50 years.
Mainichi: Before dropping the bomb, did you imagine the extent of the damage was going to be enormous?
J: Yes.
Mainichi: You could imagine that?
J: Yes. And the reason I could is I had read in a book I discovered on the trip to Los Alamos -- we had to go to Los Alamos once in a while for technical conferences. The tech area where the fusing system was in a secure area of Los Alamos, was in the same tech area where the nuclear physics people were. And it turns out there was a library that was used by anybody in the tech area. So I had a badge, but couldn't go in where nuclear physics people were, but I can go to the library. I went into the library and found this physics book, a text book, which have been removed from all libraries by the FBI because it reported on the research done in Germany in 1938, the research work on the fusion of uranium, and the uranium splitting up into smaller pieces, and losing weight and the weight had been converted by Einstein's theory to energy. The speculation in that book says this energy could be used for weapons or for nuclear power someday, maybe. That's when I surmised.
Mainichi: You could imagine about 105,000 people can die?
J: Yeah. If this bomb was used on a city, I could imagine that there was going to be a lot of loss of life and a lot of destruction. But the destruction were these planes flying everyday from Marianas, the destruction everyday was bigger than that. The only reason for being sympathetic at all to this mission was the hope it would stop this. And it did.
Mainichi: You think your mission ...
J: Was to stop the war. And now you ask about "Did I realize it could be as big as it was?" I can do a little arithmetic and I had to do some guessing. But I guess that the efficiency of this type of weapon had to be very low. It could have been much more efficient and it could have been five times as big. But it wasn't. That's one of the reasons -- only one of these was ever used. It's not as efficient as the plutonium bomb, which was Nagasaki.
Mainichi: This year in April President Obama made a speech in the Czech Republic. That said that the U.S. has a moral responsibility to the fact that it used the atomic bomb.
J: I don't believe in Barack Obama. I think he ... is on the wrong track. The U.S. weapons, nuclear weapons, I think have forced all nuclear war. The fact that we had them in the U.S. and that enabled Japan not to have them. Now we have Japan under threat both from North Korea and China. And North Korea is a renegade state. You can't trust them. They are not going to do what Obama would like to have happened. And China is already there, so they are not going to do that ever in our life time. So I think it's naive what's going on in the world today. There's Iran and think of Pakistan, Pakistan already has the weapon. If they see people who wanted to use them, they would. They would have deterred enough, they wouldn't use them. Okay, so, it's not a safe world. And so Obama is moving against nuclear power and against nuclear weapons. Now if he succeeds, here is Japan, it's defenseless. All these years, depending on the U.S. to step in if there was a real problem that threatens Japan.
So I've always endorsed Japan's position of let's not go for nuclear weapons. But I don't believe that anymore. Japan is already -- I brought something I wanted to give to you, but I'll get it later.
As you can tell from something I wrote about -- a big dirty bomb. It's already out there -- they could be used -- the threat is there that they could be used and we don't know how to stop it. Obama is not going to stop it. The only thing that worked before now is deterrent. So if Obama gets us out of nuclear weapons, and Japan is sitting there with no nuclear weapons, Japan is at the mercy of North Korea and China, we are defenseless against North Korea and China and Iran. We already have a weapon and I trust they'll keep them under control. But Japan is heavily into the nuclear power industry, more than the biggest nuclear power in the whole world. When you generate nuclear power, I'm kind of on the fringe of that. You manufacture plutonium -- that's the Nagasaki-type bomb. So that's why North Korea wants it, Iran wants it, China has it, Pakistan has it. I think Japan with super technology could very, very quickly produce nuclear weapons and be prepared to use them if they had to.
Now that's what I am going to ask you -- that's my point of view for where Japan should go. Now I need to ask you -- how do you think Japan would be over the long range, of being a protectorate of nuclear weaponry? Would it not use it unless there is a good reason to use it? For me, I'd like to be reassured that Japan is a democracy and a world power and will protect what it has -- nuclear power and nuclear weapons if it can get nuclear weapons. Getting nuclear weapons would hold off North Korea for sure -- that would stop North Korea from ever using them -- that would involve Japan. I think it might be a deterrent to hold back China.
Mainichi: You said Obama's policy -- no nuclear weapons around the world, could be a little bit naive -- but this could be one of the dreams of human beings.
J: Yes.
Mainichi: But maybe we want to step forward and talk with North Korea, Beijing, Iran?
J: Yes. That would be a wonderful first step. And that would be a talk directed toward -- okay if you all are going to start cutting back, like Obama said he would like to do, and we've been trying to do that in this country all along against Russia. If those guys don't cut back, we have no choice but to get prepared to defend ourselves.
Mainichi: What do you think about this point? This is the first remark by the U.S. president -- using the atomic bomb -- the U.S. has a moral responsibility to act because only the U.S. has used the atomic bomb.
J: Yes.
Mainichi: What do you think about his remark, "moral responsibility"?
J: I think that is naive also. Suppose that question had been answered in 1945 -- in 1945, it's getting ready to the point where those weapons could be used. Okay. Here is President Truman sitting up here and he says we've got this weapon and already in the mill. Is this a giant invasion of Japan? You know, I don't know if you learned this in history, I hope you did. Japan is getting prepared to defend itself against this invasion. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are nothing compared to the loss of life and property -- not only American armed forces but Japanese military and civilians because the invasion was going to be larger than the invasion of Normandie. And the history book unearthed all this information -- the army, as I understand it, was being withdrawn from China to Japan for defensive purposes. And those armies were upwards of about a million -- well-experienced military people. So the invasion is going to be -- I'll tell you, this is a private opinion, I haven't heard it from anybody else, but I think the reason Truman made a decision to use these weapons and you can quote me on this -- I think it needs to be sent because I think it's partially an answer to what you have here.
Mainichi: So Obama's remark of "moral responsibility" ...
J: Is naive in today's world.
Mainichi: Maybe back then in 1945 Obama could not say such kind of things ...
J: No because I didn't finish what I was going to say. Truman faced this problem. I think his decision -- he had two choices. One is to hold off on the nuclear weapon and I'm sure it would do a lot of soul searching to do that. He said I'll do the invasion. And he had been briefed -- there was another invasion of Europe. I don't know what your history book told you, but it's called Dunkirk. Dunkirk failed. It was terrible in the news. You weren't even alive there. They had to withdraw all those armed forces from Dunkirk in Europe because the invasion failed. I think Truman saw, he got all the reports for the preparations to defend Japan. This is defending the homeland now. The Japanese are going to defend strongly. So I think Truman thought, well, if we go ahead with this invasion we are facing, the invasion will probably fail. So then he made a decision. I think.
Mainichi: So you think for the U.S. the only choice in order to stop the war was the bombing by using a new type of weapon.
J: Yes. To do it quickly. And it was going to cost a lot of lives and lots of destruction, a lot of heartache. But the invasion would have been far, far, worse.
Mainichi: Did you know the remark of "moral responsibility" before I met you today?
J: Yeah, but I discounted it. I discount everything Obama does.
Mainichi: What did you feel when you got the information that Obama said about moral responsibility -- just naive?
J: I've already concluded he is naive economically, also recognizing what the real world is out there. Everybody is struggling to get nuclear weapons. Everybody is needing nuclear power. If you get nuclear power with all that's been revealed about weapons, it's just a matter of dollars before you can make it (the weapon). And so to me, he is not going to be able to manage to do what he says he'd like to do.
Mainichi: I know many American people think just like what you said -- in order to stop wars immediately, quickly, they chose the atomic bomb.
J: Yes.
Mainichi: Just after that, the Japanese concurred. Hirohito decided the war is over. But on the Japanese side, there are lots of opinions. Back then, in 1944, the Japanese military lost battles all over the world in the Pacific and China and many other places. They were losing their power. They didn't have energy, oil, they didn't have anything. After the war, an American group that studied military strategy issued a report saying that Japan must have had to surrender in several months even without dropping the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Do you think using the atomic bombs were necessary to end the war?
J: Yes.
Mainichi: These 64 years, your thoughts were --
J: Still convinced. Yes.
(To be continued)
Interview with Enola Gay crew member Morris Jeppson (Pt 3)
Morris Jeppson is pictured in an interview with the Mainichi at his home in Las Vegas. (Mainichi)
The following are excerpts from a recent Mainichi interview with Morris Jeppson, 87, one of two surviving crew members of the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress bomber that dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 1945. The interview, conducted at Jeppson's home in Las Vegas, also contains comments from Jeppson's wife, Molly. (Interviewed by Takayasu Ogura, Mainichi New York Correspondent)
Mainichi: Since the U.S. used the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many countries have developed nuclear weapons -- Russia, China, now India, Pakistan, North Korea and elsewhere. What is your opinion of nuclear weapons? Should they be used in order to end wars?
Jeppson: Not anymore. ... But that doesn't mean it isn't going to happen. Go back to 1942 or '41. Then Germany was actively pursuing the development of atomic bombs. (In Germany's case), the leader of the country, Hitler, said 'we are going to go more conventional.' So, had he put a little more effort behind it, his scientists ... would have been there first. That was always the concern for Los Alamos.
Mainichi: That Germany would have nuclear weapons first?
J: Yes. Had they done that, the whole world would be different. Now if the rest of the world today says we are not going to have nuclear weapons ... then the rest of the world will sit at the mercy of some new dictator that is willing to use all the weapons he can. And if he finds out the rest of the world is disarmed, he gets a free hand.
Mainichi: What is your position on nuclear weapons now?
J: I would like to see a gradual withdrawal of nuclear weapons everywhere, and that's been under way. There's been a big effort to get Iran and North Korea to come along with (disarmament), but it hasn't happened. Pakistan is arming itself. I'm afraid that as much effort as is going in around the world to try to (reduce) them to lower and lower levels, there is going to be somebody that is going to say, "No, I'm not going along with it."
Mainichi: So you think people have to step forward and aim for a non-nuclear world gradually?
J: I don't think you can do it now because there are too many countries. France and England have them, Pakistan, India and I'm sure Brazil is coming along. Most of their programs are secret. If there can be a gradual pullback, I would certainly favor that. But I don't think they can be eliminated.
Mainichi: You said you don't think nuclear weapons should be used any more in order to stop wars. But you also said you never regretted using the atomic bomb to stop the war with Japan. Please explain that.
J: Well, I've just explained it. Your history apparently disagrees with it a bit, but if those two weapons hadn't been used, that war wouldn't have ended in two weeks (after they were dropped).
Hirohito stepped forth, but the military, as I understand it, was not ready. The military in Japan wanted to make an invasion costly enough that the Allies, the U.S. would leave Japan alone to make its own destiny. And I would like to believe the destiny that Japan has achieved has been assisted by the way the U.S. handled affairs after the war. So that's about all I can say.
Mainichi: I think what you said is an historic remark, since many in the bomber crews have passed away.
J: Well, of course from the Manhattan Project a lot of people are still alive, but they were manufacturing explosives. And I guess you know that there was apprehension about Los Alamos -- that's one of the reasons why when we as the Air Force went over to Los Alamos, we would stop along the way and change our insignia from the Air Force to Army ordinance, because they didn't want the scientific group at Los Alamos to know that the Air Force was seriously considering using their weapon. And there were a lot of scientists at Los Alamos who took that same opinion of "moral responsibility."
Mainichi: President Obama plans to visit Japan next November, and may visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki. How would you feel if he visits Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
J: Badly, probably.
Mainichi: Why?
J: Well, you could go visit any bombed-out city, of which there were many around the world, in Japan and in Germany. War is bad. It kills people. It destroys property. So it's a matter of saying: Was it necessary? What were the choices you had? If you had made these choices, how much worse would it have been, or better?
Mainichi: If you have a chance to meet Obama, would you advise him not to go to Hiroshima and Nagasaki?
J: I would say that's his business because he is going to do what he wants to do.
Mainichi: You understand what he said about the moral responsibility of using the atomic bombs. If he visits Hiroshima and Nagasaki, he may apologize to Hiroshima's citizens. If he apologizes, what would you feel?
J: I would be indignant.
M: Yes, because it saved a lot of Japanese lives, too. Because the invasion could have killed thousands and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of the Japanese and Americans, and dropping the bomb ended the war. That saved a lot of people. I think the Japanese should realize that, that it saved a lot of them. You know a lot more people were killed with firebombing ... than were killed at Hiroshima. So if you think about that, that bomb was really not so bad. It was just part of the war, right? I mean, that the way we feel about it.
J: No, I think the statement that you quoted from Obama's speech is ... saying that the U.S. is guilty of using those weapons.
Mainichi: Moral responsibility?
J: That's called guilt. Isn't that guilt?
Mainichi: You think the U.S. President should not make such remarks?
J: Definitely not, no.
Mainichi: If you are invited by the citizens groups in Hiroshima or other relevant people, would you like to visit Hiroshima?
J: No.
Mainichi: You've never been to Hiroshima? Will you ever go?
J: No, I'm too old. I wouldn't want to.
Mainichi: You said you have visited Japan.
J: Yes, several cities.
Mainichi: At that time, six years ago in 2003, did you think about visiting Hiroshima?
J: No.
Mainichi: Why not?
M: Why? Why should we go?
Mainichi: Because you have a relationship with Hiroshima from the bombing, so perhaps you would want to know the situation in Hiroshima now?
J: Well, I read about that, so I don't have to go there to see it. ... But I'm not interested in going to Normandy either. War is war. It's past. We don't like wars.
Mainichi: Do you want to forget?
J: I'm not really forgetting. You've listened to me talk.
Mainichi: If it was possible, would you want to forget the experience of the war?
J: I don't think that's exactly the way I'd put it. It's a part of history that was a war. It was uncomfortable, and it's in the past and there are other things to be done in the world; preventing war being a good example.
M: I don't think he really liked dropping the bomb. Any kind of bombs.
J: Gosh. Nobody does. Nobody likes to do that.
M: He's a peaceful man.
Mainichi: On Aug. 6, 1945 you thought that dropping an atomic bomb was the only choice to end the war?
J: Yes that's right. Well at that point, we knew there was an invasion underway.
M: Well the emperor didn't want to end the war, you know.
J: Well, he made the decision. It's like Truman making his decision. Truman felt he had to make it, and Hirohito obviously felt he had to make (his decision). As I understand it was against the advice of his military supporters. Is that right? Is that the way you understand it?
Mainichi: Even on Aug. 15, some groups inside the Army didn't want to surrender. But everyone at the ministerial level wanted to surrender.
J: But they couldn't make the decision. And I remember the history of this -- the Japanese leaders were warned strongly that major destruction was coming if (a surrender) wasn't signed. And they could have made the decision. So if there is any blame of moral responsibility, it would be with the inability of the Japanese leaders to make up their minds. Because they knew for sure the invasion was going to take place. That's really probably the most significant point here. The invasion was going to be very, very difficult for Japan and knowing that it was coming, the Japanese leaders should have been strong enough ... to have surrendered. Then (the bomb) wouldn't have been dropped.
Mainichi: Stopping the war was the most important thing?
J: The most important.
Let's ask this question: Suppose Truman had decided, "Oh we can't do this atomic bombing thing." (The bomb) was demonstrated down at Alamogordo, though, (so the world would know) it's possible to make big explosions even if there had been no Hiroshima and Nagasaki. So all of the world would be clamoring to make big nuclear weapons, probably more so than they are now. So what would the world be like -- with everybody be clamoring to get something like they tested down at Alamogordo. I don't like to sound that, either.
Mainichi: You knew it was an atomic bomb even though very few people knew about it. At that time, did you know about the effects of atomic radiation?
J: Radiation? I don't think I knew that there was such a problem. I was pretty young.
M: All these people were young. They really didn't realize what the radiation would do to people because I know for years afterwards, Dick said, "You know, it's just so sad." I mean, he was really sad about the Japanese people that the bombing had injured. He didn't know at that time. He didn't have any special knowledge.
J: For the most part, I don't think Los Alamos really had much of an understanding of the radiation effects.
Mainichi: You think most of the people didn't know?
J: That's right. That's right. ... I think in general, the people of who were working fairly close (to the bomb project) didn't know (radiation) could be a serious problem. And the American people didn't know anything about it, of course.
Mainichi: In Hiroshima, still now some elderly people and some of their descendants suffer from the effects of radiation. How did you feel about that?
J: The information came too late. I never heard (radiation) as a subject of discussion ... in 1945 as being a byproduct of nuclear weapons. I think everybody thought in terms of blasting fire; a typical weapon.
Mainichi: When did the physicists get information about the radiation in Hiroshima?
J: Well, when a study group from the U.S. went to Hiroshima. That's where they learned that there had been a radiation problem.
M: None of us knew (at the time). People on the plane didn't even know.
Mainichi: So even the American physicists were a little bit surprised with the effect of radiation?
J: Absolutely, yes. It was an unknown factor. I had no idea. Of course, the Hershey report and things like that came out and that was the first knowledge that the people who went in could see there had been radiation burns among survivors.
Mainichi: If President Truman had known about the effects of radiation, do you think his decision to drop the bomb would have been different?
J: That's an interesting question. I don't know how to answer that question.
Mainichi: What have you been doing since the end of the war?
J: Well, I went to graduate school at Berkeley. And then as a graduate student, I worked for the North American aviation on a classified program looking towards nuclear powered aircraft and rockets.
Mainichi: In the military?
J: No, I'm a civilian. I've gone to graduate school. I got out of military as fast as I can get out and then I had a career. ... I worked for a radiation laboratory for two or three years building accelerators for accelerating protons. And I started a company called Applied Radiation in 1954 I think. We built linear accelerators which are used to make radiation for cancer therapy.
M: So he turned to healing.
J: Another aspect of nuclear physics.
Mainichi: I searched Japanese media sources, but I found very few interviews with the bomber crew members. Why? Did the bomber crews hesitate to speak with the Japanese media?
J: Some of them died of course. As far as Paul Tibbets is concerned, he wouldn't spend much time with you because he was strictly military and he had a job to do. He said we did a job and that's it.
Mainichi: In thirty or forty years, when those who experienced World War II have passed away, if the American President or many ordinary Americans decide the U.S. should apologize for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, how would you feel about that?
J: I think that one's easy to answer. If it's done once for an apology for something like that, think of all of the other things over history that should be apologized for, applying the same rule. It's just not necessary. War is war. There was a good reason for it, put it into history books or whatever. But nobody down the road has any right to apologize for something that happened in the past.
This question comes up in the U.S. all the time. ... (Like slavery,) it's history. It's all laid out. Why should anybody today apologize for anything that happened 150 years ago? It isn't necessary. It's giving somebody 150 years later a right to make this apology. No, they don't have a right to make an apology.
Mainichi: So you think that even in the future, American presidents should not apologize.
J: No. Never.
Mainichi: But if any American president apologized in the future, you would not like it?
J: I would be indignant. It's a matter of what right does he have to (apologize) for something that all these people fought for and died for on both sides. The Japanese thought (the war) was the right thing and doing good for them. It wasn't the right thing for anybody. But it happened, and you don't apologize for history.
Tuesday, May 05, 2009
Monday, March 30, 2009
Durham Stevens
Durham Stevens
On Steven JoonAng Daily on March 23 2009 tells us
魚拓
Here is an an article at the time on Stevens
Korean Boody Race;Attempt assasination Mr Stevenson not an isolated case March 25 1908 NYT
via 日本の評判
On Steven JoonAng Daily on March 23 2009 tells us
当時の米国紙が「国民はこの人物のように自国を愛するべきだ」と報道するなど、米国社会の共感も得た。
A newspaper at the time was very sympathetic, telling people to love the country as this man.2009.03.23 JoongAng Daily
魚拓
Here is an an article at the time on Stevens
Korean Boody Race;Attempt assasination Mr Stevenson not an isolated case March 25 1908 NYT
via 日本の評判
Monday, January 12, 2009
China's internet 'spin doctors'
China's internet 'spin doctors'
By Michael Bristow
BBC News, Beijing
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7783640.stm
http://s01.megalodon.jp/2009-0113-1050-32/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7783640.stm
Friday, September 05, 2008
Tuesday, August 05, 2008
Fifty cents gang--China’s growing armies of Web commentators
China's 50-cent Twitter censors
More on the 50 cent army
魚拓
They have been called the “Fifty Cent Party,” the “red vests” and the “red vanguard.” But China’s growing armies of Web commentators—instigated, trained and financed by party organizations—have just one mission: to safeguard the interests of the Communist Party by infiltrating and policing a rapidly growing Chinese Internet. They set out to neutralize undesirable public opinion by pushing pro-Party views through chat rooms and Web forums, reporting dangerous content to authorities.
By some estimates, these commentary teams now comprise as many as 280,000 members nationwide, and they show just how serious China’s leaders are about the political challenges posed by the Web. More importantly, they offer tangible clues about China’s next generation of information controls—what President Hu Jintao last month called “a new pattern of public-opinion guidance.”
It was around 2005 that party leaders started getting more creative about how to influence public opinion on the Internet...
More on the 50 cent army
魚拓
Saturday, August 02, 2008
Comfort women exploited by Korean men in In Mongolia
South Koreans’ sex tourism to Mongolia remains widespread. According to an investigative report by The Hankyoreh, Mongolians accused South Korean tourists of spawning a culture of buying sex in their country. In 2002, a South Korean opened the first karaoke bar in Mongolia’s capital city of Ulan Bator and most karaoke bars in Mongolia are owned by South Koreans. The number of karaoke bars in Mongolia has increased to include some 50 bars.via世の中を生暖かく見守るブログ
A 35-year-old South Korean businessman, who is only identified by the surname Park and lives in Mongolia, told The Hankyoreh, “When men visit, their purpose is obvious, so the number of bars has increased significantly.”
A Mongolian tour guide, identified only as Matha, said, “Regardless of age, more than 70 percent of male tourists on group tours buy sex.” The tour guide showed a list of business cards that he had received from South Korean tourists, who included a manager of a well-known securities company and a local government official.
Some South Korean nationals who live in Mongolia say they have seen older men who have a 20-something local woman as a mistress. A female South Korean national in Mongolia, who is only identified by her surname Park, said, “Korean men here have the worst behavior. For instance, a 70-something (Korean) man had a Mongolian woman as a mistress. When she got pregnant, he abandoned her and ran away.”
The South Korean embassy in Mongolia said, “Sex tourism is undermining the image of South Korea and its people.” At the end of 2007, there were some 3,000 South Korean nationals in Mongolia. Last year, the number of South Korean tourists to Mongolia stood at some 40,000 people.
With the practice remaining widespread, the Mongolian government stepped up its crackdown on sex tourism by passing new anti-prostitution laws last year. However, the effect was nothing more than a reduction in a few number of karaoke bars.
Perhaps even worse is there are signs that the crackdown has had an adverse effect on the industry. To avoid the crackdown, prostitution has spread to horseback-riding schools, massage parlours and others. An official at a Mongolian horseback-riding school, which is only identified by the letter “G” and is located an hour’s drive from the city center, said, “When (men who are here as sex tourists) arrive at the airport, they are escorted here. Local women arrive here in a different van. When they move off to the grassland, (the women) are accompanied by the men.”
The increase in sex tourism by South Korean male visitors has been a source of rising anti-Korean sentiment among Mongolians, according to South Korean nationals in the country. A 38-year-old South Korean national, who is only identified by the surname Lee and has lived in Mongolia for three years, said the number of assault cases against Korean people is on the rise.
A 42-year-old local tour guide, who is only identified as Temuchin, said, “Anti-Korean sentiment is high because (Korean men) buy sex from (local) women.”
With the recent emergence of a right-wing organization in Mongolia, the damage to Korean people is growing further.
Erden Birk, the head of the country’s biggest right-wing organization, Daiyar, said, “There have been cases in which four 60-something men spent time with one 20-something woman in a room until morning and others in which tourists go directly to an underground karaoke bar at their hotel as soon as they arrive from the airport, without even unpacking their baggage. If these things continue to happen, it will be difficult to stop the violence.”
Last year, South Korea’s Ministry of Gender Equality and Family revised a passport law and the government is now allowed to ban
people who have been arrested for buying sex from being issued new passports or passport renewals. However, the effect of the ban has so far been negligible. Bae Lim Sook-il, the head of the Incheon Women’s Hotline, said, “Prostitution (in South Korea) isn’t even being punished properly. So the government can’t punish people for soliciting prostitution in foreign countries.”
Lee Na-young, a sociology professor at ChungAng University, said, “The mindset and culture of Korean males, which view females as objects of entertainment, needs to be fundamentally changed.”The Hankyoreh
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Japanese Nationalism
Wednesday, July 30, 2008
Nationalism isn't an issue in Japan
By ROBERT DUJARRIC
Special to The Japan Times
via Japan probe
Nationalism isn't an issue in Japan
By ROBERT DUJARRIC
Special to The Japan Times
As Japan renews its claim on Takeshima (Dokdo to Koreans) and prepares to mark the Aug. 15 anniversary of the end of the Great East Asia War, we can expect more Asians — and some Americans — to warn against the dangers of rising Japanese nationalism. What is striking, however, is the absence of nationalism in Japan compared to its Chinese and Korean neighbors and its American ally.
Regardless of the metric used, Japan scores very low on nationalism. Its investment in its armed forces as a percentage of national income is small, especially for a country living in close range of two potential war zones (the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan).
Moreover, in the past two decades the offensive capabilities of North Korea against Japan, namely its ballistic missiles and nuclear program, have grown significantly.
China, another potential adversary for Japan, clearly has a much stronger military than 20 years ago. But Japan continues to keep its military investment at around 1 percent of national income (perhaps a little more if other expenses are included).
The phenomenal waste in Japanese procurement programs also shows that the military budget is as much a funding mechanism for Japanese businesses as a tool to build up a strong military.
Moreover, when it comes to dealing with the outside world, Japanese diplomats are as unlikely as those of the Holy See to resort to threats of force. There are no John Boltons in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This peaceful, low profile reflects a basic fact often ignored by outsiders: Japanese voters favor candidates who care about bread and butter issues over those whose concern is Japan's greatness and military might.
The origins of this phenomenon are that Japan, unlike other players in the region, tests negative on risk factors for aggressive nationalism.
Nationalism often arises out of a sense of national victimization. A major cause of Chinese and Korean nationalism is a belief that foreigners preyed upon and humiliated their countries. As a result, many Chinese and Koreans want to see no insult to their national dignity go unpunished, however insignificant.
A case in point is South Korea's quixotic campaign to rename the Sea of Japan the East Sea. In Japan's case, however, there is no sense of victimhood. Yes, Japanese either experienced or know about U.S. terror bombings during the war. But, with a few exceptions, this pushes them toward pacifism. It fuels their contempt for the Japanese militarists who led the nation on a war that destroyed the country. It may also make them dislike the alliance with America, but it does not make Japanese long for a new Imperial Japan armed to the teeth ready to conquer lost territories.
Another foundation of nationalism is a belief that one's country has a destiny to lead the world, or at least its region. This helps explain the support of Americans for military intervention and the conquests of Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Though Chinese nationalism lacks the universalistic ambitions of America's, many Chinese think that history gave China a right to regional primacy.
In Japan, however, there is none of the messianic urge found in Western cultures. Nor do Japanese have the same sense of civilizational and historical greatness that is common in China.
There are also domestic factors that energize nationalism. One is fear for the country's territorial integrity and/or a belief that there are still unredeemed provinces. In the Chinese case, anxiety about Tibet, Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan), and Inner Mongolia fuel Han nationalism. Moreover, for most Chinese, Taiwan is a Chinese island that must be brought back into the motherland.
In the Korean case, national division can only encourage nationalism, even though South Koreans are lukewarm toward actual unification. Memories of Japanese aggression in both nations also generate a nationalist reaction in China and Korea. In Japan, however, there is no domestic separatism to be afraid of. And, despite the pro forma Japanese claims on the Northern Territories and Takeshima, few Japanese care about them.
A second domestic issue is nationalism as an alternative tool to confront the government. In autocratic China, nationalism is an indirect way to oppose the ruling party. When demonstrators throw rocks at the U.S. embassy or attack Japanese diplomats, they are also criticizing their rulers for being weak-kneed. Moreover, simply by marching through the streets, or gathering virtually on the Internet, they demonstrate to the Communist Party that the people can mobilize on their own.
Though South Korea is now a liberal democracy, many of its leftwing nationalists came of age when anti-American (or anti-Japanese) nationalism was fused with the fight against the military regime. Japan, however, has been a free society for well half a century, if its citizens are unhappy they simply go to a voting booth rather than seek alternative forms of mobilization.
Japanese society may have problems but nationalism is not one of them.
Robert Dujarric is director of the Institute of Contemporary Japanese Studies at Temple University Japan in Tokyo
via Japan probe
Sunday, July 27, 2008
Global Peace Index
Global Peace Index Rankings
Global Peace Index Rankings
The table below provides the GPI rankings for the 140 countries analysed in 2008 and the 121 countries analysed in 2007, as well as year-on-year comparison. Countries most at peace are ranked first. A lower score indicates a more peaceful country. You can click on a country to see the detail of its peace indicators and drivers.
Global Peace Index 2008
* Compare
* 2007
* 2008
Country
Rank
Score
Iceland Iceland
1
1.176
Denmark Denmark
2
1.333
Norway Norway
3
1.343
New Zealand New Zealand
4
1.350
Japan Japan
5
1.358
Ireland Ireland
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