Monday, July 31, 2006


Abbductoion South Korean victim tried getting out of North Korea, in vain , and prisoned.
I don't know why there is no English version.


U.S. treasury official says U.N. resolution legally binding

He also said China, long one of the North’s closest allies but one of the nations that voted to pass the U.N. resolution, has taken "responsible action" in responding to Pyongyang’s alleged illicit activities Jul.28,200Hankyoreh

* The U.S. Army and Air Force are stretched thin because of
Afghanistan. All U.S. forces elsewhere must be prepared to respond to contingencies now unseen. Some U.S. troops from Korea have already served in Iraq and more are likely to deploy there as that conflict goes on.

* The South Koreans are able to defend themselves with minimal help from the U.S. if North Korea attacks. "They are very capable," said Admiral William Fallon, commander of U.S. forces in the Pacific, "I believe quite capable of providing for the defense of that country."

* Anti-Americanism is rampant in Korea, starting with President Roh Moo Hyun. An expert at the Congressional Research Service (CRS), Larry Niksch, reported last week: "Polls have shown majorities or substantial pluralities of South Koreans in favor of the withdrawal of U.S. forces."

* At the same time, Seoul's posture toward North Korea borders on appeasement, compared with the hard line of the U.S. South Korea is tilting toward China, the potential rival of the U.S. in Asia. And South Koreans are ever more critical of Japan, the foremost ally of the U.S. in Asia.

* With U.S. military spending going through the sky because of Iraq, the $11 billion the U.S. had planned to spend on upgrading bases in Korea could be better spent elsewhere, notably on Guam, the U.S. island territory in the western Pacific that is becoming a vital U.S. military base.

The coming pullout of U.S. troops will be the culmination of a gradual slide that started after the end of the 1950-1953 Korean War. When the shooting stopped 53 years ago this month, the U.S. had 326,800 troops in Korea. By 1960, that had dropped to 55,800. It fell again, to 52,000, when more soldiers were needed in the Vietnam war.Richard Halloran
Fri Jul 28

"No reductions have been announced below 25, 000."

Sunday, July 30, 2006

S Korea/Presindent Roh/anti-ameriacanism

Roh's collection of sayings

"What is wrong with anti-Ameriacanism?what is dismerit?there was no s pecialist who could answer my question.""the little brother always hold the big brother's bag,but one day,the little brother said to the big brother,"hold your owon bag since it is yours",the big brother was surprised but looking at the little brother in the face ,he hold his own bag without complaining.It is just that everyone thought anti-Amricanism do more harm than good.

You have to pay what you should pay to USA but you should not pay easily,you have to inflict pain in USA when you pay it

What is more
The blue house declared the policiy to reject coverage cooperation with Chosun liebo and Yonhan daily.saying that they crossed the line in their expression of criticism againt the geovenment

「反米ではいけない理由とは何ですか? どんな不利益があるのですか?」と尋ねた。会談した後は側近たちに向かって、「わたしの疑問にきちんと答えられた専門家は1人もいなかった」と話した。そして、こう言ったという。「弟はいつも兄のカバン持ちをしていた。ところがある日、弟が兄に向かって“自分のカバンなんだから自分で持てよ”といった。すると、兄はしばらくボーっとしていたが、弟の顔を見て何も言わずにカバンを持ったそうだ。みんな長い間、“反米は損をする”と考えていただけに過ぎないのだ」



(YONHAP NEWS) - 7月29日

Friday, July 28, 2006


A grandson of Class A-war criminal and former Prime Minister Koki Hirota expressed opposition Thursday to Yasukuni Shrine's inclusion in the late 1970s of the late prime minister on the list of people honored there
There was no contact from Yasukuni in advance" of Hirota's enshrinement, said Kotaro Hirota, 67. "If asked, (I would) have rejected it," he added, in a rare move for a member of the family of a Class A-war criminal to voice objection to the enshrinement at the controversial Tokyo shrin
Among the 14 enshrined Class-A war criminals, Koki Hirota was the only civilian of the seven executed. He became prime minister shortly after the Feb. 26th Incident in 1936, a military rebellion in Tokyo in which several political figures were killed and the capital was seized.

Hirota left the post of prime minister about a year later due to increasing political intervention from the Japanese military, and served as foreign minister during the Sino-Japanese war.

During the Tokyo war criminal trials against prewar and wartime political and military leaders, some judges claimed Hirota was not guilty, but he was executed in 1948 along with wartime Prime Minister Gen. Hideki Tojo and others.

He said that the family temple is in Fukuoka Prefecture and his grandfather's grave is at a temple in Kamakura, Kanagawa Prefecture, where he goes to pay his respects.

He said Yasukuni Shrine is a place where "military personnel and war dead are honored" and that his grandfather was neither.kyodo


South Korea

Teachers' Union Headed Over the Cliff

The Busan Chapter of the Korea Teachers and Educational Workers Union excerpted a North Korean history textbook verbatim for a booklet used in a seminar for members in October last year. The textbook glorifies Kim Il-sung's anti-Japanese activities, describes the Korean War as the North’s struggle to liberate the fatherland, and praises Kim Jong-il's Songun or military-first policy. It is replete with flourishes like, "The hero Gen. Kim Il-sung, revered and fervently awaited by his Korean brethren, emerged in a commanding manner," and "The people of North Korea are the happy few at last liberated from taxation for the first time in the world." The Busan chapter of the teachers' union, as it happens, also incited controversy with anti-globalization video teaching materials for the APEC summit last November that lampooned attending heads of state.chosun liebo

They stated in the declaration, 밡orth Korea뭩 possession of nuclear weapons and recent missile tests are yet another reminder of how futile the Sunshine Policy is. There is a need for a review of the North Korean policy, including South-North dialogue, economic cooperation and responses to Pyongyang뭩 human rights issues.�

The statement was followed by the demand for the abolition of the Sunshine Policy, a policy preserved since the Kim Dae-jung administration, and the 밣eace and Prosperity Policy.�Instead, the declaration urged the government to apply more pressure on the North through international cooperation.

The statement continued to point out, 밒t is the South Korean government that invited isolation from the international community by reaching unreasonable conclusions on Pyongyang. The South Korean government blindly offered carrots despite North Korea뭩 refusal to change. The South Korean government should enhance international cooperation so that other nations such as the U.S. and Japan can understand the South Korea뭩 position.�donga


Wednesday, July 26, 2006

Hiroshima again

See also Saturday, May 23, 2015 Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Big Historical Lie Monday, June 01, 2015 'Mythology' of 1945 A-bombs the US realism on the decision to use the atomic bomb
Did the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bring World War Two to an end?(Comfort Women and other lies about Japan)

Atomic bombing of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945. The picture was taken from one of the B-29 Superfortresses used in the attack
See also How Henry Stimson bombed Hiroshima, and Nagasaki too
by Stu Rosenblatt

原爆投下と終戦◇Atomic Bombings 1945

Hiroshima: the 'White Man's Bomb' revisited魚拓

Just looking at the reaction of Smithsonian museum is good enough to convince me that
this is the sensitive issue.
I found another discussion about Hiroshima going on at Asian page .It seems some commenter got emotional.
Some argue that Japan would not have surrendered without atomic bombs, citing.
The view from Taiwan
Others, such as Chaimaru, seem to argue that Truman could have acted otherwise, citing Hasegawa
But he also notes
Japan started the war, Japan committed war crimes Japan had also a plan to make atomic bombs and Japan should have surrendered earlier. There is no question about it
I don’t see any point in demanding apology or compensation however the mock tribunal trial reasoned and judged. and I don’t think Japanese people want apology or compensations at all..

I agree. This issue should not be used to accuse someone, some nation, but it should be studied for the future leaders who might face the decision.
Which view above is correct? Maybe both of them are right maybe not.
The following is an excerpt from Prompt and Utter Destruction: President Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan
I think this book is fair and balanced.I am sure you want to read the whole book.

page4 He[Truman} declared that the two available atomic bombs should be dropped on Japanese cities because "an invasion would cost at a minimum one quarter of a million casualties, and might cost as much as a million, on the American side alone "The president added that "a quarter of a million of the flower of young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities. Truman's statement brought the meeting to a close; none of the cabinet members or military officials present expressed a dissenting view......

p5 The meeting described never took place. T he quotation are authentic, but the context is not. With the exception of two notations from Truman's diary, the the statement quoted were made after the war to explain why the bomb was dropped. Those statements and many others expressing the same views created a widely held myth about the decision to use atomic bombs against Japan----the belief that Truman had to choose between, on the one hand, authorizing attacks on Japanese cities with atomic bombs, or, on the other hand ordering an invasion.

p5 I fact, however, Truman never face a categorical choice between the bomb and an invasion that would cost hundreds of thousands of American lives. T he prevailing perception about the alternative available to the president, which has become an article of faith among so many Americans,vastly oversimplifies the situation in the summer of 1945 as the Truman administration weighed its option for bringing the Pacific war to an end . The historical evidence makes clear that the popular view about the use of the bomb is a mythological construct for the following reason:(1)there were other options available for ending the war within a reasonably short time without the bomb and without invasion;(2)Truman and his key advisers believed that Japan was so weak that the war could end before an invasion began, that is, they did not regard an invasion inevitable;(3)even in the worst case ,if an invasion of Japan proved to be necessary, military planners in the summers of 1945 projected the number of the lives lost ar far fewer than the hundreds of thousands that Truman and his advisers claimed after the war.

p28 LeMay followed the attack by firebombing other major cities as well as returning to Tokyo with more raids. Although the Army Air Forces maintained an official position that they had not adopted a policy of area bombing that targeted civilian populations, the fire bombings of Japanese cities clearly demonstrated that attacks on the noncombatants were neither unplanned nor operationally inadvertent. They were intended to shorten the way by destroying not only the factories that gave the Japanese that means to continue fighting but also to sabotage morale that gave them the will to continue fighting

p30 The recognition that Japan was on the verge of defeat did not mean however, that it was on the verge of surrender.

p33 By the end of June 1945,it had been apparent for some time to both American and Japanese leaders that the outcome of the war would be certain defeat fro Japan

p37The June 18 meeting was a critical step in planning fro future actions o force a Japanese surrender and in highlighting the opinions, and assumptions and, concerns of key American policy makers.....The president and his top lieutenants recognized that Japan was nearing collapse, but they remained uncertain of the best way to achieve an early surrender.

p38 Thus in committee's opinion, t he phase of he invasion of Japan would cost about 46,000 American deaths and other 174,000 wounded and missing.

Marchall was convinced that the invasion of Kyusyu, rather than sole reliance on bombing and the blockade, was the best way to achieve an early Japanese surrender.

p39 MacArther who was anxious to lead the invasion of Kyusyu,,wired back that the estimate was "purely academic" and that he anticipated a smaller number of casualties.

p41The second possible alternative to an invasion stirred little debate among U.S. military planners or policymakers. This alternative was to wait fro the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan.

Soviet entry into the war would be advantageous for the war effort, but the benefits would come at a cost from a diplomatic perspective. It would expand Soviet presence, power, and influence in China and other parts of Asia, which was not a welcome prospect at a time when tensions between the United State and Soviet Union were increasing over contentious issues in Europe

p42 Another possible alternative to an invasion received the attention and support within the Truman administration. It was mitigate the American demand for unconditional surrender by allowing the Japanese to retain the institution of the emperor

In the spring of 1945, a growing number of American policy makers favored a modification or clarification of the unconditional surrender policy because they feared it prolong the war.

page 45 Stimson, despite his support for offering Japan the opportunity to keep the emperor, opposed an immediate statement to that effect for fear of strengthening the position of the militants.
Military leaders seems even more concerned about how moderating unconditional surrender might affect public support for the war in the United State.

p47He[Truman] was torn between differing views. On the one hand, virtually all of his key advisers backed the modification of unconditional surrender .....On the other hand ,such action carried substantial risks---it could strengthen the position of the Japanese militarists, undermine morale at home and create significant political hazards for the president.

p50 There was, however , a fourth alternative that might ease the president's dilemma---the atomic bomb. If the bomb worked it provided a possible means to speed the end of the war without an invasion and without taking risks that reduced the appeal of the other options.

p61 The atomic attack on Hiroshima would not be confined to military
targets any more than the firebombings of other cities had been. Truman's dairy notation is attributable ,as historian Barton J Bernstein has suggest, only to self-deception.

Five fundamental considerations all of which grew out of circumstances that existed in the summer of 1945, moved Truman to use the bombs immediately , without great deal of thought and without consulting with his advisers about the advantages and potential disadvantages of the new weapons;(1)the commitment to ending the war successfully at the earliest possible moment:(2)the need to justify the effort and expense of building the atomic bomb;(3)the hope of achieving diplomatic gains in the growing rivalry with the Soviet Union;(4)the lack of incentives not to use atomic weapons;and (5)hatred of the Japanese and a desire for vengeance.

by the late 1980's specialist who studied the available evidence reached a broad, though hardly unanimous, consensus on some key issues surrounding the use of the bomb. One point of agreement was that Truman and his advisers were well aware of alternatives to the bomb that seemed likely but not certain, to end the war within a relatively short time. Another was that an invasion of Japan would probably not have been necessary to achieve victory.A third point of general agreement in the scholary literature on the decision to use the bomb was that the postwar claims that the bomb prevented hundreds of thousands of Americans combat death could not be sustained with the available evidence. Most of students of the subject also concurred that political considerations figured in the deliberations about the implications of the bombs and the end of the war with Japan. On all of those poionts, the scholarly consensus rejected the traditional view that bomb was the only alternative to an invasion of Japan that would cost a huge number of Americans lives, At the same time, most scholars supported the claim of Truman and his advisers that the primary motivation fro dropping atomic bombs o Hiroshima and Nagasaki was to end the war at the earliest possible moment----that is , for military reason.

p107In early 1995,the Smithsonian bowed to enormous and irresistable political pressure and drastically scaled back the planned exhibit.....The "fact" that the exhibit reported when it opened in June 1995 were largely innocuous descriptions of the plane and its resotratoin.but some statements were disputable asserstions about the use of the bomb,assersions that were highly interpretive.One label,for example, declared that the use of atomic bombs "made unnecesary the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands." and that "such invasion would have led to very heaby casualities among Americans,Allied and Japanese armed forces,and Japanese civilians.

p108The most important issues that cannot be fully settled becauss they require speculation and extrapolation from available evidence include (1) how long the war would have continued if the bomb had not been used;(2)how many casuality American forces would have suffered if the bomb had no been dropped;(3)whether an invasion would have been necessary without the use of the bomb;invasion would have been necessary without the use of the bomb;(4)the number of American lives and casualities an invasion would have exacted had it proved necessary;(5)whether Japan would have responded favourly to an American officer to allow the emperor to remain on the throne before Hiroshima, or whether any of the other would have prolonged the war:and (6)whether any of the other alternatives to the use of the bomb would have ended the war as quickly on a basis satisfactory to the United States.


I think the book shows some good points the future leader must take into account and what she should not take into account.
Here are some points I can think of .
To make the enemy surrender as quick as possible is not the good justification for using atomic bombs.
To make the enemy surrender based on fancy calculations about the casualities on our side is not a good justification for using atomic bombs.
If these justify the use of atomic bombs, it is better to nuke North Korean to save
a million of North koreans who are starving now.But other considerations must be taken into account.
In particular,the future leader must take the innocent lives that must be sacrificed seriously.
And the future leader should not take into his own popularity when the alternative is the atomic bombs.
The future leaders should give several warnings to see if they moves toward conciliation.Only after possible alternatives failed, probably she is justfied in using it.

BTW there was a warning in the form of leaflet before nuking Nagasaki but it seems there was no warning I am not sure.If somebody knows,let me know.

The Nagasaki Principle/Japan probe

And for youre reference,Documents on the decision to use the atomic bomb

Would Japan have surrendered before November 1 on the basis of the atomic bomb alone, without the Soviet entry into the war?
The two bombs alone would most likely not have prompted the Japanese to surrender, so long as they still had hope hat Moscow would mediate peace.....Anami's warning that the United States might have 100 atomic bombs and that the next target might be Tokyo had no discernible impact on he debate. Even after Nagasaki bomb, Japan would most likely have still waited for Moscow's answer to the Konoe mission......
{Frank] emphasizes especially the importance of Hirohito's statement....
The Imperial Rescript on August 15 does refer to the use of the "cruel new bomb. as one of the reasons for the termination of the war, with no mention of Soviet entry into the war. .....In contemporary records from August 6 to August 15 two sources (the imperial Rescript on August 15 and Suzuki's statement at the August 13 cabinet meeting) refer only to the impact of the atomic bomb, three sources only to Soviet entry(Konoe on August 9. Suzuki's statement to his doctor on August 13, and the Imperial rescript to Soldiers and Officers on August 17), and seven sources both to the atomic boom and Soviet Involvement. Contemporary evidence does not support Frank's contention.
page 295 Racing the enemy Hasegawa

Enola Gay: Was Using the Bomb Necessary?
by Gar Alperovitz

Tomorrow's opening by the Smithsonian Institution of an exhibit featuring the Enola Gay, the B-29 Superfortress that dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945, has occasioned the protest of hundreds of prominent scholars, writers and religious leaders. The reason is that the plane is being put forward with no mention of the huge number of civilians killed at Hiroshima (and subsequently at Nagasaki), and no acknowledgment of the ongoing domestic and worldwide controversy over the use of the atomic bomb. Instead, Air and Space Museum Director General John ''Jack'' Dailey has put the emphasis elsewhere -- on the plane ``in all of its glory as a magnificent technological achievement.''

News of the century

In 1999, a distinguished group of journalists deemed the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki the most important news event of the 20th century. A recent poll found that more Americans age 30-39 disapprove than approve of the bombings by a margin of 50 percent to 45 percent -- with almost as many (49 percent to 46 percent) also disapproving in the 18-29 age group. One of the main reasons why controversy still persists after almost 60 years is that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is very little evidence that top U.S. military leaders at the time believed that the atomic bomb was needed to end the war without a costly invasion. Indeed, quite the opposite appears to be true.

Adm. William D. Leahy, President Truman's chief of staff and the man who presided over meetings of both the U.S. chiefs of staff and the combined U.S.-British chiefs of staff, minced few words. Seven weeks before Hiroshima, his diary shows that he believed that the war could be ended in a manner that achieved all U.S. security aims.

`This barbarous weapon'

In his memoirs, the conservative admiral wrote: ``[T]he use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender. . . . [I]n being the first to use it, we . . . adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.''

Among the many other top World War II leaders who are on record as stating that the bomb was unnecessary are the commanding general of the U.S. Army Air Forces, Henry H. ''Hap'' Arnold; Fleet Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet; Adm. William F. Halsey Jr., commander of the U.S. Third Fleet; and the famous ''hawk'' who commanded the 21st Bomber Command, Maj. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall privately proposed that the bombs be dropped first on a military target such as a large naval base -- then, if that didn't work, that civilians be warned to leave before a city were targeted.

In his memoirs, President -- and former general -- Dwight D. Eisenhower reported the following reaction when Secretary of War Henry Stimson informed him that the atomic bomb would be used: ''During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression, and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.'' In a 1963 interview, he put it bluntly: ``[I] it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing.''

Notwithstanding these and many related facts, writers who defend the atomic bombings claim that a fanatical Japanese military leadership would have fought on, no matter what. It is, of course, impossible ever to fully resolve the historical dispute, because the bombs were, in fact, used. However, the evidence that we have strongly indicates that the Japanese emperor would likely have ended the war without the use of the atomic bomb -- just as so many U.S. military leaders believed.

Top U.S. leaders were advised as early as April 1945 -- four months before the bombing -- that a combination of the forthcoming declaration of war by the Soviet Union (which occurred almost simultaneously with the bombings) plus a clarification of the surrender terms for the emperor would almost certainly have brought an end to the fighting. With three months still to go before the November invasion could begin, the bomb could have been used if the shock of the Red Army attack failed to produce the expected results. When the Japanese Army general staff issued a statement on surrender, it explained that the existence of the nation was threatened ''as a result of Russia's entrance into the war.'' No mention was made of the atomic bomb.

International law

There are also ongoing questions of morality and international law involved in the Truman administration's decision to sacrifice large numbers of civilians. Former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who during World War II helped plan the bombing of Japanese cities as an aide to LeMay, recently observed that he and LeMay ''were behaving like war criminals.'' A prosecutor, McNamara says, would have argued that directly targeting cities was not proportional to our war aims, thus prohibited under international law. He quotes LeMay as stating explicitly: ``If we lose the war, we'll be tried as war criminals.''

An additional reason why the bombing is still controversial is that it was done in a way that minimized the possibility of what later came to be called ''arms-control'' measures. Instead of initiating some kind of ''confidence-building'' negotiation in advance with the Soviets (as many had advised at the time), a major goal was to demonstrate what Stimson called the ''master card'' of American diplomacy in as dramatic a way as possible.

The role of force

Obviously, the issues surrounding Hiroshima still bear on the role of force in foreign policy and on the possible future use of nuclear weapons. The Clinton administration explicitly threatened the possible use of nuclear weapons in Korea, and the Bush administration's policies in general -- to say nothing of its new more-aggressive nuclear posture -- open the clear possibility that such weapons will be used in questionable ways.

In light of these many considerations, however one judges the numerous still-debated issues concerning the bombing of Hiroshima, the Smithsonian as one of the nation's premier educational institutions had, and still has, an obligation to present all sides and all important aspects of the continuing controversy.

The Myth of Hiroshima

An atomic bomb was dropped without warning on the center of the Japanese city of Hiroshima.

One hundred and forty thousand humans were killed, more than 95% of them women, children and other noncombatants.

At least half of the victims died of radiation poisoning over the next few months.

Three days after Hiroshima was obliterated, the city of Nagasaki suffered a similar fate.

The magnitude of death was enormous. On August 14, 1945 - five days after the Nagasaki bombing - Radio Tokyo announced that the Japanese emperor had accepted the American terms for surrender.

To many Americans at the time, and still for many today, it seemed clear that the atomic bomb had ended the war, even "saving" a million lives that might have been lost if the Americans had been required to invade mainland Japan.

This powerful narrative took root quickly and is now deeply embedded in our historical sense of who we are as a nation justifying the greatest terroist attack, at this time, in human history.

In the mid-1990's, on the 50th anniversary of this terrorist attack, this narrative was reinforced in an exhibit at the Smithsonian Institution on the Enola Gay, the plane that dropped the first atomic bomb. The exhibit, the subject of a bruising political battle, presented to nearly 4 million Americans an officially sanctioned opinion of the atomic bombings that again portrayed them as a necessary act.

Although patriotically correct, the exhibit and the narrative on which it was based were historically inaccurate. For one thing, the Smithsonian downplayed the casualties, saying only that the atomic bombs "caused many tens of thousands of deaths" and that Hiroshima was "a definite military target."

Americans were also told that use of the atomic bombs "led to the immediate surrender of Japan and made unnecessary the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands."

The United Soviet Socialist Republic's entry into the Pacific war on August 8, two days after the Hiroshima atomic bombing, caused Japan's capitulation.

The Enola Gay exhibit also repeated such outright lies as the assertion that "special leaflets were dropped on Japanese cities" warning civilians to evacuate. The fact is that atomic bomb warning leaflets were dropped on Japanese cities, but only after Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been destroyed.

The hard truth is that the atomic bombing were unnecessary. A million lives were not saved. McGeorge Bundy, the man who first popularized this figure, later confessed that he had pulled it out of thin air in order to justify the bombings in a 1947 Harper's magazine essay he had ghostwritten for Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson.

The bomb was dropped, as J. Robert Oppenheimer, scientific director of the Manhattan Project, said in November 1945, on "an essentially defeated enemy."

Harry S. Truman used the atomic bombing primarily to prevent the Soviets from sharing in the occupation of Japan. Harry S. Truman used the atomic bomb on August 6. Harry S. Truman returned from the Potsdam Conference on August 3 believing that the Japanese were looking for peace.

Unpleasant historical facts were censored from the 1995 Smithsonian exhibit, an action that should trouble every American.

An officially sanctioned government opinion distorts history, democracy is threatened and the truth of reality is corrupted.

Today, in the post-9/ll era, it is critically important that Americans face the truth about the atomic bomb.

Mr. I. Michael Heyman
The Smithsonian Institution
Washington, D.C. 20560

July 31, 1995

Dear Secretary Heyman:

Testifying before a House subcommittee on March 10, 1995, you promised that when you finally unveiled the Enola Gay exhibit, "I am just going to report the facts."[1]

Unfortunately, the Enola Gay exhibit contains a text which goes far beyond the facts. The critical label at the heart of the exhibit makes the following assertions:

* The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki "destroyed much of the two cities and caused many tens of thousands of deaths." This substantially understates the widely accepted figure that at least 200,000 men, women and children were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. (Official Japanese records calculate a figure of more than 200,000 deaths--the vast majority of victims being women, children and elderly men.)[2]

* "However," claims the Smithsonian, "the use of the bombs led to the immediate surrender of Japan and made unnecessary the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands." Presented as fact, this sentence is actually a highly contentious interpretation. For example, an April 30, 1946 study by the War Department's Military Intelligence Division concluded, "The war would almost certainly have terminated when Russia entered the war against Japan."[3] (The Soviet entry into the war on August 8th is not even mentioned in the exhibit as a major factor in the Japanese surrender.) And it is also a fact that even after Hiroshima and Nagasaki were destroyed, the Japanese still insisted that Emperor Hirohito be allowed to remain emperor as a condition of surrender. Only when that assurance was given did the Japanese agree to surrender. This was precisely the clarification of surrender terms that many of Truman's own top advisors had urged on him in the months prior to Hiroshima. This, too, is a widely known fact.[4]

* The Smithsonian's label also takes the highly partisan view that, "It was thought highly unlikely that Japan, while in a very weakened military condition, would have surrendered unconditionally without such an invasion." Nowhere in the exhibit is this interpretation balanced by other views. Visitors to the exhibit will not learn that many U.S. leaders--including Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower[5], Admiral William D. Leahy[6], War Secretary Henry L. Stimson[7], Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew[8] and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy[9]--thought it highly probable that the Japanese would surrender well before the earliest possible invasion, scheduled for November 1945. It is spurious to assert as fact that obliterating Hiroshima in August was needed to obviate an invasion in November. This is interpretation--the very thing you said would be banned from the exhibit.

* In yet another label, the Smithsonian asserts as fact that "Special leaflets were then dropped on Japanese cities three days before a bombing raid to warn civilians to evacuate." The very next sentence refers to the bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, implying that the civilian inhabitants of Hiroshima were given a warning. In fact, no evidence has ever been uncovered that leaflets warning of atomic attack were dropped on Hiroshima. Indeed, the decision of the Interim Committee was "that we could not give the Japanese any warning."[10]

* In a 16 minute video film in which the crew of the Enola Gay are allowed to speak at length about why they believe the atomic bombings were justified, pilot Col. Paul Tibbits asserts that Hiroshima was "definitely a military objective." Nowhere in the exhibit is this false assertion balanced by contrary information. Hiroshima was chosen as a target precisely because it had been very low on the previous spring's campaign of conventional bombing, and therefore was a pristine target on which to measure the destructive powers of the atomic bomb.[11] Defining Hiroshima as a "military" target is analogous to calling San Francisco a "military" target because it has a port and contains the Presidio. James Conant, a member of the Interim Committee that advised President Truman, defined the target for the bomb as a "vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses."[12] There were indeed military factories in Hiroshima, but they lay on the outskirts of the city. Nevertheless, the Enola Gay bombardier's instructions were to target the bomb on the center of this civilian city.

The few words in the exhibit that attempt to provide some historical context for viewing the Enola Gay amount to a highly unbalanced and one-sided presentation of a largely discredited post-war justification of the atomic bombings.

Such errors of fact and such tendentious interpretation in the exhibit are no doubt partly the result of your decision earlier this year to take this exhibit out of the hands of professional curators and your own board of historical advisors. Accepting your stated concerns for accuracy, we trust that you will therefore adjust the exhibit, either to eliminate the highly contentious interpretations, or at the very least, balance them with other interpretations that can be easily drawn from the attached footnotes.


The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

A Collection of Primary Sources

What Recent Scholarship Concludes About Hiroshima

I told him I was busy considering our conduct of the war, against Japan and I told him how I was trying to hold the Air Force down to to precision bombing but that with the Japanese method of scattering its manufacture it was rather difficult to prevent the area bombing. I told him I was anxious about this feature of the war for two reason ;first , I didn't want to have the Untited States get the reputation in outdoing Hitler in atrocities. Second, I was little fearful we could get ready the airforce might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that a new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strengh . He laughed and said he understood.Memorandum of Conference with the President, June 6, 1945, Top Secret
Source: Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, Henry Lewis Stimson Papers (microfilm at Library of Congress)


Fugu plan

Fugu plan/wiki
Chiune Sugihara

Tuesday, July 25, 2006

East Asia

Korean liberator









July 26, 2006 ㅡ BEIJING - Three North Korean defectors left for the United States on Sunday, sources here said Monday. In May, four North Koreans made their way into a South Korean diplomatic mission in Shenyang, a northeastern industrial city. Shortly thereafter, they scaled a wall to enter the adjoining U.S. diplomatic premises and sought asylum in the United States.
Two of the defectors who asked for asylum in the United States are men and the third is a woman. All are in their 20s or 30s, but have not been more precisely identified.JoongAng daily

What is not in Egnlish version is that these two men were using the physical force to
the Korean officials who were trying to stop their climibing the wall of the embassy..In other words, does that mean that South Korean officials trying to stop North Koreans defecting?


And it seems Korean version has not put up the article yet at all.
Korean version tranlated in Japanese

Monday, July 24, 2006


apan cancels all Ethiopia’s commercial debts ( July 22,2006 )

The government of Japan has cancelled 100 per cent of Ethiopia’s outstanding debt amounting to 14.4 million


Sunday, July 23, 2006

North Korea

N. Korean leader Kim has new wife:
SEOUL, July 23 (Yonhap) -- North Korea's reclusive leader Kim Jong-il has taken his former private secretary as his new wife, after his purported former wife died of cancer two years ago, reliable sources said Sunday.

"I heard Kim has lived with a woman named Kim Ok, who served as his secretary, as Ko Yong-hi died two years ago," said a South Korean government source privy to information on the North's ruling family.Yonhap

(BTW Some Japanese blogger point out Chinese letter for Kim Ok is 金玉.If you are curious about what it means in Japanese,just look it up.)


















Duus p189 “On November 17 the entire Korean cabinet was to be invited to lunch at the Japanese legation. If discussions went well at lunch and the ministers agreed to the treaty, an audience would be arranged with the monarch; if not, the ministers would solicit the emperor’s decision….Hayashi asked General Hasegawa Yoshimichi…to post troops along the route, ostensibly as a ‘protective guard.’ And since there was danger of popular demonstrations or disturbances…armed Japenese troops were to be posted around the palace…the king’s ministers were unable to reach a decision during lunch discussions. Deeply divided, they wanted the monarch to make the final decision. At about three in the afternoon, accompanied by Hayashi, the cabinet left the legation for the palace. Kojong, they discovered, was ‘ill.’”….Itō arrives and asks each minister their opinion: “Han Kyu-sol [sic] who appeared to Hayashi to be in a state of extreme agitation, was adamant in his opposition…Han rose from his seat and walked unsteadily in the direction of the royal quarters as if he personally intended to stop the monarch from agreeing to the treaty. A few moments later the group heard the sound of women’s screams and running feet in the palace interior…In his excited state Han had blundered into the women’s chambers…he fainted dead away. Hayashi learned the cause of the uproar, he muttered, ‘Throw some water on his face to calm him down.’ The discussion continued without the prime minister.”

Duus goes on to describe how the Pak Che-sun was opposed but would go along if Kojong did, Min Yŏng-gi also was generally opposed, while Yi Wan-yong, Yi Kun-t’aek, Yi Ha-yong, Kwon Chong-hyun, and Yi Chi-yong were all for the treaty (the “5 traitors”), it thus gaining majority support. Duus goes on to explain that it is unclear what happens next, the Japanese official account says the emperor finally went along with it, but also notes that there are two alternative accounts based on letters by other foreigners which may suggest otherwise. He also mentions that Lee Tai-jin has claimed that the original text of the treaty doesn’t have the king’s seal or signature on it..froginawel

Emperor Kojong’s Letter

Lew p240 “Kojong’s opposition to the Protectorate Treaty was made public in an imperial letter published on February 1, 1906, in the Korea Daily News (Taehan Maeil Sinbo), in which he stated that he had not consented to the treaty and appealed for the joint protection of the powers.”

Duus p207 “In early 1907 the Tahan maeil sinbo, a Korean-language newspaper edited by [Ernest J.] Bethell, published a letter from teh emperor claiming that the protectorate treaty had been signed under duress—a letter that the emperor then emphatically denied writing.”

The Hague Incident

Lew p240 “Kojong secretly dispatched a delegation to the [Second Hague Peace Conference] to expose the injustice done Korea and to seek redress. Although the conference refused to seat the Korean delegates or accept their petition, the world-wide publicity the Korean question consequently received created considerable international furor.”

Dudden p7 “…Emperor Kojong of Korea sent three representatives on his behalf to the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague…Although the three young men appealed to diplomats from countries that had long-standing relations with Korea, none except the Russian envoy gave them more than a passing notice. Not coincidentally, of course, Japan’s shocking military victory against Russia two years earlier made St. Petersburg eager to support any protest of Japan.” p9 “the international deaf ear to the Koreans—allowed Japanese officials to broaden control of the country…”

Duus p208 “After making their way across Russia to Europe, they arrived in teh Hague, only to be refused the right of diplomatic representation. Since Korea was a protectorate, they were told, it was not possible to recognize their credentials. The Japanese authorities…suspected that the mission was financed by ‘dividends’ paid into the royal treasury by the Korean-American Electric Company, a Bostwick and Collbran enterprise…”

After securing the US consent, Japan moved fast and made Korea a Japanese protectorate. Unaware of the secret Taft-Katsura agreement, King Kojong sent Homer Hulbert, an American friend and advisor to the Korean court, to Washington to seek US aid under the Chemulpo Treaty.

He was chosen by Emperor Kojong to try and persuade President Roosevelt to come to Korea’s assistance in 1905 - which he failed at, not because of his faults, but because the President had deemed Korea not worth saving because Korea could not or would not defend itself.
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance
The initial alliance had been concluded in 1902 and was to run for five years and be renewable. It was directed against the presumed menace posed to each power by Russia. Accordingly, it was renewed in 1905 to account for the changed conditions consequent upon Japan’s war with and defeat of Russia which had erupted in 1904. See, also, the Summary reference document:/FONT>

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902 (Main Points)
Article 1. The High Contracting parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by aggressive tendencies in either country. having in view, however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, whilst Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree, politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting parties recognize that it will be admissable for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting parties for the protection of the lives and properties of its subjects.

Article 2. Declaration of neutrality if either signatory becomes involved in war through Article 1.

Article 3. Promise of support if either signatory becomes involved in war with more than one Power.

Article 4. Signatories promise not to enter into separate agreements with other Powers to the prejudice of this alliance.

Article 5. The signatories promise to communicate frankly and fully with each other when any of the interests affected by this treaty are in jeopardy.

Article 6. Treaty to remain in force for five years and then at one years’ notice, unless notice was given at the end of the fourth year.

The Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905 (Main Points)
The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th of January 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object:

The consolidation and maintenance of general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India;

The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China;

The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties [viz., Britain and Japan] in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

Article I
It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement [i.e., items a, b, c above] are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and consider in common the measures whhich should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

Article II
If, by reason of an unprovoked attack or aggressive action, whenever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Article III
Japan possessing paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Article IV
Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

Article V
The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

Article VI
As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

Article VII
The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the military and naval authorities of the Contracting Parties who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

Article VIII
The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that dateThe Anglo-Japanese Alliance

Saturday, July 22, 2006

South and North Korea

During inter-Korean talks held July 13 in Busan, the North Korean delegation told unification minister Lee Jong-seok that authorities in North Korea "will have no choice but to feed the people with military rations" if the South does not give it rice aid, an unnamed government source said Friday

"If the South doesn’t give us rice, we'll have no choice but to use them to feed the starving people," he was quoted as saying. He is also said to have said it is the South’s fault that the North Korean people are "starving."

"We never said we weren’t going to provide rice aid, we said we would stop discussions about aid until the North has changed its attitude about [its missile program] and the six-party talks," said another key government figure. "If it is so desperate about food, it should give up its hard-line approach to the outside world and return to the six-party talks." Jul.22,2006 Hankyoreh


◆U.S. may sanction countries not complying on N. Korea resolution
The United States is considering the option of imposing sanctions under its own laws on countries that fail to comply with a U.N. Security Council resolution against North Korea, a senior U.S. administration official said Friday

The official said the United States also wants to step up international cooperation to cut off funds and interdict WMD-related transfers, including enhancing inspections of North Korean vessels
As Washington considers the resolution as a binding action by the U.N. Security Council, the envisioned measures would create an international network effectively authorized by the United Nations to contain North Korea's WMD development.
But the resolution does not require member states to impose sanctions, and uncertainties remain over whether such key players such as China and South Korea would actively get involved in the U.S. initiatives.WASHINGTON, July 21 KYODO


Friday, July 21, 2006

Vitalsexual men

Who is the Vitalsexual Man?

The Vitalsexual male is a new type of man over 40 for whom love and sexuality, not only sex itself is importantbayer

New Asian data presented identifies the Asian Vitalsexual man. A study conducted in 5,010 men from Australia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan via telephone CATI and internet survey, identified that 42% of men over 40 across Asia are Vitalsexual. A Vitalsexual man is a man over 40 who thinks that sex is important, wants to satisfy their partner, looks for spontaneity and would seek treatment if they had ED.

The numbers of Vitalsexual men vary across Asia, where:
63% of men over 40 are Vitalsexual in Taiwan
50% of men over 40 are Vitalsexual in Australia
39% of men over 40 are Vitalsexual in Malaysia
37% of men over 40 are Vitalsexual in Singapore
Only 26% of men over 40 are Vitalsexual in Koreabayer

Via chosun liebo
It seems Japanese were not the subject of the survey----I wonder why?
Well here is one possible answer.
Japanese have least active sex life in the world, Durex survey reveals

Thursday, November 10, 2005 at 07:37 EST

TOKYO — Japanese have the least active sex life in the world, performing an average 45 times a year, while Greeks are the most energetic with 138 romps a year, according to an annual survey by major condom maker Durex.crisscross


(Here Koreans are not subject of the survey)


I have a found an interesting news on Chosun libo, so I looked for English version,but I couldn't find it so here is my poor translation.
At the end of Anti-Japan-ism----the isolation of Korea

I got an email from a certain Japanese professor the other day. .....In it he said they would have a forum next August,the particicipants would be the group of which he was a member and Chinese elites who major in Amreican study......Abe and Shiozaki will also participate.
Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe, known as hawkish in Korea,is a front-runner of the prime minister and Senior Vice Minister Shiozaki is a member of "the NAIS which is in agreement with Abe in opinion.Two influencial politicians who are not supposed to be so friendly toward China will be having non-governmental diplomacy with China.
 The professor wrote that he was worried.It does not mean he is worried about Chinese people rejecting to meet Abe.Japan and Chia are in the stage of reconciliation behind the scene....while Korea is still in the muddle of confliction.
..... he is worried about Korea's isolation朝鮮日報: 2006/07/21

And here is another news which is not available in English.

An Ameriacan official said on 19th,"Korea was excluded from the talk about UN decision, she asked for it.This officail also insisted, "USA had been looking for the way Korea,USA,and Japan can corrporate together long before North Korea launched the missiles,but Korea refused to talk with Japan, that is why Korea-USA-Japan talks was not possible".This official also said,"Korea had not complained for the exclusion until this time,and Japanese Prime Minister visiting Yakusni is differnt issue from diplomacy, but Korea rejected talks because of that, Korea was excluded completerl from international decisioni making.....The sanctoin by UN will not affect the South economic support for North Korea,but the use of the fund
should be inspected...... 朝鮮日報 2006/07/

On the other hand,I have found the English version of the new about Kaesong.

Seoul Pushes Ahead With Kaesong Financing Plans

Seoul is to boost support for companies operating in the joint-Korean Kaesong Industrial Complex, despite suspicions from Washington that funds going into the North Korean border town were used to help Pyongyang develop missiles.July.21,2006 20Chosun libo

I looked at Korean version but it seems the two article above is not available.(but I am not sure)
See also
USA should pruchase products from kaesan
I wonder if there is some specific reason.

original text












 一方、マンスフィールド財団のゴードン・フレーク研究所長は記者に対し、「韓国は韓米日3カ国による協議は行わないとの立場を崩しておらず、米国側の関係者に会うたびに日本を非難しているが、米国政府内では韓国と日本を同じ官僚が担当しており、韓国がいくら日本を非難しても、米国は今後も日本との同盟を前面に打ち出し、北朝鮮を圧迫していくだろう」と語った。 2006/07/21朝鮮日報


Roh aide calls Japan's reaction to missiles ‘truly evil'

July 22, 2006 ㅡ The Blue House chief of staff, Lee Byung-wan, slammed Japan yesterday, calling its reaction to North Korea's missile launches "truly evil."Joonang daily

悪の帝国ー日本、日本はtruely evilで、北朝鮮はtruly friendlyてか?

Fri Jul 21, 3:14 PM ET

BEIJING (AFP) - Japan and China agreed that all six nations party to talks on

The Japanese and Chinese foreign ministers would also hold bilateral talks on the sidelines of the ARF meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Japan's foreign ministry said Friday, according to Kyodo.


He recounted a comment he attributed to Taro Aso, Japan's foreign minister, to the effect that Mr. Aso was "thankful to Kim Jong-il" for launching the missiles.


Thursday July 20, 10:04 AM
Japan ranks 2nd worst among OECD nations in relative poverty
(Kyodo) _ Japan ranked second worst among advanced economies in 2000 in terms of the relative poverty rate partly because non-regular workers with low wages increased amid the prolonged economic slump, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development said Thursdayahoo


1481 document(k)東国輿地勝覧


于山島 鬱陵島
一云武陵 一云羽陵 二島在県正東海中 三峯及業掌空 南峯梢卑 風日清明則峯頭樹木 及山根沙渚 歴歴可見風便則二日可到 一説干山鬱陵 本一島 地方百里

무릉(武陵)이라고도 하고, 우릉(羽陵)이라고도 한다. 두 섬이 고을 바로 동쪽 바다 가운데 있다. 세 봉우리가 곧게 솟아 하늘에 닿았는데 남쪽 봉우리가 약간 낮다. 바람과 날씨가 청명하면 봉우리 머리의 수목과 산 밑의 모래톱을 역력히 볼 수 있으며 순풍이면 이틀에 갈 수 있다. 일설에는 우산ㆍ울릉이 원래 한 섬으로서 지방이 백 리라고 한다.

are also called both Muleung and U-leung. The two islands are in the middle of the sea due east of the administrative seat. Three peaks shoot straight up to the sky, and the southern peak is a little lower. When it is windy and the weather is clear, you can clearly see the trees on the peaks of the mountains and the sand at their feet. You can travel there in two days with a fair wind. It is said that Usan and Ulleung were originally one island with an area of 100 ri.Gerry at occidentalism

a veiw from Ulleungdo
그런데 홍보를 위해서는 까다로운 논리도 중요하지만 시각에 호소하는 것이 훨씬 효과적일 수도 있다. 예를 들어 울릉도에서 독도가 보인다는 얘기는 자주 들었으나 막상 한국인들에게 울릉도에서 찍은 독도 사진을 본 적이 있느냐고 물어보면 대부분은 “본 적이 없다”고 대답한다. 옛 문헌에 ‘날씨가 맑으면’ 울릉도에서 독도가 보인다고 나와 있다. 현재 울릉도에서 독도를 육안으로 볼 수 있을 만큼 맑은 날씨는 1년에 60일 정도라고 한다. 그렇다면 울릉도에서 직접 독도를 바라보는 것 자체가 그리 쉬운 일은 아니다. 그런데 인터넷으로 검색을 하다 울릉도에서 독도가 보이는 사진 한 장을 발견했다. 이거야말로 굉장히 귀중한 자료라고 생각한다. 한국은 이런 사진의 존재를 정확히 알아야 한다. 그리고 한·일 양국 국민에게 보여주기 위한 홍보용 사진으로, 보다 선명하게 울릉도에서 본 독도를 찍어서 독도 관련 인터넷 사이트, 책자, 포스터, 서적과 신문 등에 게재해야 한다. 이것을 일본인들이 잘 보게끔 대대적인 홍보활동을 벌여야 한다.

For publicity, complex reasoning is important, but something that appeals to the senses is much more effective. For example, you frequently hear talk of Dokdo being visible from Ulleungdo, but if you ask Koreans if they have seen a picture of Dokdo taken from Ulleungdo, most answer that they haven’t seen one. Old documents say that Dokdo can be seen from Ulleungdo “if the weather is clear.” It is said that today there are only about sixty days a year that are clear enough to see Dokdo with the naked eye, so just being able to directly see Dokdo, in itself, is not very easy. However, I have searched the Internet and found one picture that shows Ulleungdo from Dokdo. I think this is, indeed, a precious piece of information. Korea needs to definitely know that this kind of picture exists. Also, for publicity purposes, better photos of Dokdo need to be taken and shown on relevant Internet sites and posters and in pamplets, books, and newspapers so that both Koreans and Japanese can see them. We have to conduct a massive publicity campaign to make Japanese see this.월간 넥스트 87Gerry/occidentalism

Japan/A criminal

The notebook suggests that Emperor Showa made the remarks in April 1988. "Class-A war criminals have been enshrined. Even Matsuoka and Shiratori (have been enshrined). I've heard that Tsukuba dealt cautiously with the matter, but ..." part of the note reads.

"I wonder what the current chief priest, who is the son of Matsudaira, thinks about it. I think Matsudaira (senior) had a strong belief in peace," the note says. "That's why I haven't paid a visit to the shrine since then. That's my belief."

Matsuoka and Shiratori are believed to refer to former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and former Ambassador to Italy Toshio Shiratori, both Class-A war criminals. Both of them died in jail.

Tsukuba apparently refers to the late Fujimaro Tsukuba, former chief priest of Yasukuni Shrine who decided not to enshrine Class-A war criminals. Matsudaira and his son are apparently former Imperial Household Minister Yoshitami Matsudaira and former Yasukuni Shrine chief priest Nagayoshi Matsudaira, who enshrined the Class-A war criminals. Both are now deceased.

A member of Tomita's bereaved family said he often talked with Emperor Showa at the Imperial Palace while he was head of the Imperial Household Agency and took note of their conversations. The family member added that Tomita told his family about the remarks that Emperor Showa made about the enshrinement of Class-A war criminals at Yasukuni ShrineJuly 20, 2006 mainichi


Korea/the U.S.

Chosun liibo/July.18,2006
U.S. 'Wants Shot of Wartime Command Sooner


1899 newspaper (K)

In the sea east of Uljin is an island called Ulleung. Among its six, small neighboring islands, Usando/Jukdo is the largest, which is why the Ulleungdo in the Daehanjiji was once called Usan-guk (the Country of Usan).Gerry at occidentalism

Thursday, July 20, 2006


Originally Posted by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
AG 091(29 JanUARY 46) GS (29 January 1946)

(SCAPIN - 677)

THROUGH : Central Liaison office, Tokyo
SUBJECT : Governmental and Administrative Separation of
: Certain Outlying Areas from Japan.

1. The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to cease
exercising or attempting to exercise, governmental or adminis-
trative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any
government officials and employees or any other persons within
such areas.

2. Except as authorized by this Headquarters, the Imperial
Japanese Government will not communicate with government officials
and employees or with any other persons outside of Japan for any
purposes other than the routine operation of authorized shipping,
communications and weather services.

3. For the purpose of this directive, Japan is defined to
include the four main islands of Japan(Hokkaido, Honshu, Kyushu
and Shikoku) and the approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands,
including the Tsushima Islands and the Ryukyu (Nansei) Islands
north of 30° North Latitude (excluding Kuchinoshima Island); and
excluding (a) Utsuryo(Ullung) Island, Liancourt Rocks( Take Is-
land) and Quelpart (Saishu or Cheju) Island, (b) the Ryukyu
(Nansei) Islands south of 30° North Latitude(including Kuchino-
shima Island), the Izu, Nanpo, Bonin (Ogasawara) and Volcano
(Kazan or Iwo) Island Groups, and all other outlying Pacific Is-
lands including the Daito(Ohigashi or Oagari) Island Group,
and Parece Vela (Okinotori), Marcus (Minami-tori) and Ganges
(Nakano-tori) Islands, and (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands,
the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Aki-
yuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands) and Shikotan Island.

4. Further areas specifically excluded from the governmental
and administrative jurisdiction of the Imperial Japanese Govern-
ment are the following: (a) all Pacific Islands seized or occu-
pied under mandate or otherwise by Japan since the beginning of
the World War in 1914, (b) Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores,
(c) Korea, and (d) Karafuto.

5. The definition of Japan contained in this directive
shall also apply to all future directives, memoranda and
orders from this Headquarters unless otherwise specified

6. Nothing in this directive shall be construed as
an indication of Allied policy relating to the ultimate
determination of the minor islands referred to in Article 8
of the Potsdam Declaration.

7. The Imperial Japanese Government will prepare and
submit to this Headquarters a report of all governmental
agencies in Japan the functions of which pertain to areas
outside of Japan as defined in this directive. Such report
will include a statement of the functions, organization and
personnel of each of the agencies concerned.

8. All records of the agencies referred to in para-
graph 7 above will be preserved and kept available for in-
spection by this Headquarters.


Colonel, AGD.
Asst Adjutant General.

8-C. SCAPIN 1033
Originally Posted by Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

APO 500

22 June 1946
AG 800.217 (22 June 46) NR
(SCAPIN 1033)


THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling.
References : (a) FLTLOSCAP Serial No. 80 of 27 September 1945.
(b) SCAJAP Serial No.42 of 13 October 1945.
(c) SCAJAP Serial No.587 of 3 November 1945.

1. The provisions of references (a) and (b), and paragraphs 1 and 3 of reference (c) in so far as they relate to authorization of Japanese fishing areas, are rescinded.

2. Effective this date and until further notice Japanese fishing whaling and similar operations are authorized within the area bounded as follows : From a point midway between Nosappu Misaki and Kaigara Jima at approximately 43°23′North Latitude, 145°51′East Longitude ; to 43°North Latitude, 146°30′East Longitude : thence to 45°North Latitude, 165°East Longitude : thence south along 165th Meridian to 24°North Latitude ; west along the 24th Parallel to 123°East Longitude ; thence north to 26°North Latitude, 123°East Longitude ; thence to 32°30′North Latitude, 125°East Longitude ; thence to 33°North Latitude, 127°40′ East Latitude ; thence to 40°North Latitude, 135°East Longitude ; to 45°30′ North Latitude, 145°East Longitude rounding Soya Misaki at a distance of three (3) miles from shore ; south along 145th Meridian to a point three (3) miles off the coast of Hokkaido ; thence along a line three (3) miles off the coast of Hokkaido rounding Shiretoko Saki and passing through Nemuro Kaikyo to the starting point midway between Nosappu Misaki and Kaigara Jima.

3. Authorization in paragraph 2 above is subject to the following provisions ;

(a) Japanese vessels will not approach closer than twelve (12) miles to any island within the authorized area which lies south of 30°North Latitude with the exception of Sofu Gan. Personnel from such vessels will not land on islands lying south of 30° North Latitude, except Sofu Gan. nor have contact with any inhabitants thereof.

(b) Japanese vessels or personnel thereof will not approached closer than twelve (12) miles to Takeshima (37°15′ North Latitude, 131°53′ East Longitude) nor have any contact with said island.

4. The present authorization does not established a precedent for any further extension of authorized fishing areas.

5. The present authorization is not an expression of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in any other area.


(SGN'ed by)
Colonel, AGD,
Adjutant General.lexco at Japan forum

1900 document(k)

大韓帝國光武四年(1900) 高宗皇帝勅令第四十一號(Seoul National Univ.奎章閣所藏)

Imperial Ordinance No. 41
.............Ullung Is. has been renamed Ul Is.; Insular Supervisor has been amended to Prefect
第一條.....鬱陵島를鬱島로改稱하고 江原道에 附屬하고島
.............監을郡守로改定하야官制中에 編入하고郡等은五等으로
Article 1..Ullung Is. has been renamed Ul Is.; had become attached to Kangwon Circuit, Insular Supervisor has been amended to Prefect; this shall be reflected it in the Institution of Offices; Prefectural status shall be assigned to level 5.
Ariticle 2..Seat of Prefectural Office shall be in Taeha-dong, as for jurisdiction Prefect shall govern the whole of Ullung Is., Chuk Is., and Sok Is.
.............陵島以外十九字를冊法하고開國五百五年勅令 第三十六
Article 3..In the Official Gazette of the 504th year since the beginning of the State, Month of 8, in references to Prefectural Offices, 19 characters starting from 鬱陵島 shall be legislated; in the Official Gazette of the 505th year since the beginning of the State, in reference to Imperial Ordinance No. 36, Article 5, the 六字 in 江原道二十六郡 shalled be amended to 七字; under Prefecture of Anhyob 安峽郡 shall be added the three characters of 鬱陵島.
............勅.....議政府議政臨時署理贊政內部大臣李乾 夏lexco at Japan forum

Was the Jukdo-Seokdo (竹島石島) reference in the 1900 Imperial Edict referring to Jukdo and another island named “Seokdo”? Or was it referring to Jukdo and the various other islets and rocks surrounding Ulleungdo?

I am not sure, but I have not seen any Korean maps that show a neighboring island of Ulleungdo named “Seokdo,” nor was it mentioned in any Korean document except the 1900 Imperial Edict. Moveover, here is what an 1899 Hwangseong Shinmun article said about Ulleungdo:

In the sea east of Uljin is an island named Ulleung. Of its six, small neighboring islands, Usando and Jukdo (or Usando/Jukdo) are/is the most prominent (崔著者). The Daehanjiji says that Ulleungdo is the old Country of Usan. It has an area of 100 ri. Three peaks stand out (律兀)….

Notice that the article said that Ulleungdo had “six, small neighboring islands,” including “Usando-Jukdo” (于山島竹島 -우산도죽도). If that is true, then why didn’t the 1900 edict mention those other islands? Well, maybe it did. It is possible that the “Seokdo” (石島) in the 1900 Imperial Edict was not referring to a single island named “Seokdo,” but was referring to the “other ‘rock’ islands.” As you mentioned, Korean often does not distinguish between singular and plural.

By the way, in the above 1899 newspaper article the phrase Usando-Jukdo (于山島竹島) could be translated as both “Usando and Jukdo” or as “Usando/Jukdo.” The first translation would mean that Usando and Jukdo were separate islands while the second translation would mean that Usando and Jukdo were just two names for the same island. Korean historical documents and maps suggest that Usando and Jukdo were just two names for the same island. For example, Korean maps show either Usando or Jukdo, but not the two islands together. Moreover, when they appear on Korean maps they each appear in the approximate location of present-day Jukdo, which is a small island approximately 2.2 kilometers off of Ulleungdo’s northeast shore.
Gerry at occidentalism

1751~1753 Japanese document

「隠岐国松島ノ西島ヨリ海上道規凡四十里許リ北方ニ一島アリ名テ竹島ト曰フ 此ノ島日本ニ接シ朝鮮ニ隣シ地形三角ニシテ周囲凡ソ十五里許リ…伯州米子ヨリ竹島マテ海上道規百六十里許アリ 米子ヨリ出雲ヘ出隠岐ノ松島ヲ歴テ竹島ニ至ルナリ 但隠岐ノ福島ヨリ松島マテ海上道規六十里許松島ヨリ竹島マテ四十里許ト云也以上ノ諸説ハ享保九申辰年官府江府ノ叩問ニ依テ米子ノ市人大谷九右衛門村川市兵衛カ貴答ノ上書ニ原ケリ」


오키국(隱岐國) 송도(松島)의 서쪽섬으로부터 바닷길로 40리쯤 떨어진 북방에 한 섬이 있으니 이름을 죽도(竹島, 울릉도)라고 한다. 이 섬은 일본에 접하고 조선에 인접하였는데 지형은 삼각으로 주위는 대충 15리 정도 … 호슈(伯州) 요나고(米子)로부터 죽도까지 바닷길로 160리 정도가 된다. 요나코에서 이즈모로 나와 오키의 후쿠시마(福浦)에서 松島까지는 바닷길로 60리정도, 송도에서 죽도까지는 40리 가량이라고 말하고 있다. 이상의 제설(諸說)은 교호(享保) 9년(1724) 관부(官府, 에도막부)의 하문에 의하여 요나고의 백성 오다니 규에몬(大谷九右衛門) 및무라카와 이치베이에( 村川市兵衛)라고 하는 자의 답서(答書)에 의거한 것이다.


There is an island called Takeshima (Ulleungdo)on a sea route in the northen region that is about 40 ri (里) west of Oki District’s Matsushima (Dokdo/Takeshima). This island bordered Japan and Chosun. It is triangular-sized with a circumference of about 15 ri. … It is about 160 ri from 伯州米子 to Takeshima (Ulleungdo). They say that from 米子 by way of 이즈모, it is about 60 ri from 福浦 to Matsushima (Dokdo/Takeshima) and about 40 ri from Matsushima to Takeshima (Ulleungdo).

The above opinion was given by 米子 residents 大谷九右衛門 and 村川市兵衛 in response to an inquiry by the government in 1724gerry at occidentalism

From Nishi-jima (西島: west island) of Matsushima in Oki-no-kuni (land of Oki) about 40-ri on the sea, there is an island in the north and it is called Takeshima.

This island is close to Japan and close to Chosun, and its shape is triangular, and its circumference is about 15-ri.

Distance from Yonago of Hakusyu to Takeshima is about 160-ri on the sea.

(You have to go) from Yonago to Izumo, and then (you’ll go) by way of Oki’s Matsushima and (you’ll) reach Takeshima.

However, they say that distance from Oki’s Fukushima to Matsushima is about 60-ri on the sea, and distance from Matsushima to Takeshima is about 40-ri.

The various information above were written in the 9th year of Kyoho (1724) after the questioning civillians in Yonago - Kyuemon Oya and Ichibee Murakawa.pacifist at occidentalism

There is an island called Takeshima (Ulleungdo)on a sea route in the northen region that is about 40 ri (里) from west island*1 of Oki District’s Matsushima (Dokdo/Takeshima),This island
bordered Japan and it is in the neighborhood of Chosun. It is triangular-sized with a circumference of about 15 ri. …It is about 160 ri from 伯州米子 to Takeshima (Ulleungdo).
You’ll reach Takeshima from 米子 to Matushima of Ok by way of 出雲.,,, It is about 60 ri from 福浦 of Oki to Matsushima (Dokdo/Takeshima) and about 40 ri from Matsushima to Takeshima (Ulleungdo)ponta

1947/1948document (k)

The book describes Korea’s
“Far East long. 130 degrees E 56 minutes 23 seconds (Gyeongsangbuk-do Ullengudo chukdo)

Takeshima/Dokdo is located at Long. 131 degrees E 52 minutes
It follows that it was also common sense for Koreans that Takeshima/Dokdo is located outside of Korean territory.
I wonder when and where korean common sense has gone.

Takeshima Dokdo t Nakai Yosaburo

The Koreans knew about Liancourt Rocks at least by 1904, although I do not know if the Korean government was aware of it. According to this article,
Shimojo claims that a Japanese named NAKAI Yousaburo (中井養三郎) set up a sea lion hunting business in the Liancourt Rocks. Subsequently, a man named Iwasaki (岩崎) from the Yamaguchi prefecture did the same using hired Korean hands in 1904, and NAKAI, fearing exploitation and also international confrontation since the ownership of the island was not clear in the modern sense, submits a request to the Japanese government to clarify the ownership of the Liancourt Rocks and to give NAKAI the rights to hunting. In response to this request, the Japanese government conducts research and confirms that the Liancourt Rocks was not the territory of any other country and citing Nakai’s hut as proof of occupation of terra nullis, declares it a part of Japan in 1905.

What I found interesting about the article is that Shimojo says that agriculture was the main industry for Koreans in Ulleungdo, contrary to popular belief, and that fishery had always been dominated by the Japanese. So I guess the Japanese continued to fish (poach) on Ulleungdo even after the Ahn incident. Forestry on Ulleungdo declines by 1903 through over-exploitation, and only then did fishery became the main industry of Ulleungdo with the discovery of fertile fishing grounds for cuttlefish near Ulleungdo, and the unemplyed Koreans were hired by the Japanese fishermen. That does explain why only 3 of the 23 produce of Ulleugdo listed in the Haedongjido (海東地圖) map were marine products.

I do not think it is a coincidence that the word Dokto came into being around 1904, when Iwasaki brought Korean hired hands to the Liancourt Rocks. Does anybody know of any Koreans sources that prove that Koreans used the word Dokto prior to 1904, or whether Koreans cared about the Liancourt Rocks? two cents at occientalism

Management of the Dokdo Fishermen in the vicinity of Ulleungdo knew that sea lions abounded on Dokdo. As I thought the island was Korean territory attached to Ulleungdo , I went to the capital trying to submit a request to the Resident-General. But as suggested by Fishery Bureau Director Maki Bokushkin, I came to question Korea’s ownership of Takeshima. And at the end of my investigation I convinced myself that this island was ownerless through the conclusion of the then Hydrographic Director Admiral Kimotsuki. Accordingly I submitted an application through the Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry and Agriculture-Commerce Ministry for incorporation of this island into Japanese territory and for its lease to me. The Home Ministry had an opinion that the gains would be extremely small while the situation would become grave if the acquisition of a barren islet suspected of being Korean territory at this point of time would amplify the suspicions of various countries that Japan has an ambition to annex Korea. Thus my petition was rejected…..
Thinking I cannot turn back I rushed to the Foreign Affairs Office to discuss the matter with the then Political Affairs Bureau Director Yamaza Enjiro. He said the incorporation was urgent particularly under the present situation, and it is absolutely necessary and advisable to construct observation posts and install wireless or submarine cable and keep watch on the hostile warships. Particularly in terms of diplomacy he told me not to worry about the Home Ministry view. He asked me in high spirits to urge the Home Ministry to refer his application speedily to the Foreign Ministry: In this way Takeshima came under our country’s dominion.Toadface at occidentalism

Petition asking to make Ryanko-to (Liancourt rocks) incorporated (into Japan) and to let it lend

In the west of Oki 85-ri, and in the east-south of Chosun’s Ulleungdo 55-ri, there is an uninhibited island so-called “Ryanko-to” in the distant sea, and it comprises of two rock islets 甲乙 (*it means A & B) with each circumstance of about 15-cho. Two islets stand toward each other and there is a channel between it, and there are 40-50 reefs around them.

The central two islets have steep cliffs on four sides and are rising into the sky. There are a few soil over the top, with weeds on it.

There is no trees on whole islands.

On the seashore at the curvature of the islet there are gravels and looks like beach but there is only one place where one can build a house at the 甲 islet facing the channel.

On the middle of the 甲 islet there is a water pond, which looks brownish.

On the 乙 islet, slightly salty water is dripping down the cliff.
Ships can be safe if they drop anchor at the channel, shifting toward left or right avoiding winds.

This island is located at the route of ships which go back and forth from Japan mainland through Oki islands and Ulleungdo to Chosun 江原 and 咸鏡 districts.

If there is a man who manages the island who lives here, it will be convenient ,for example he can afford firewood, water and foods to ships who lack them, it will add some benefits to Japan’s fishery and trade with 江原 and 咸鏡 districts, which is now on the increase, so the management of this island will be most necessary.

This island is only a rock island rising into the sky in the distant sea, nobody didn’t take a look and they let it be untouched.

However I landed at the island whenever I was going back and forth to Ulleungdo and saw lots of sea lions were living here and thought it was not good to let it be untouched, and have made various plans. In the 36th year of Meiji (1903) I decided, invested capital and built a fishery house, and then moved workers and prepared fishing gear and started sea lion hunting.

At that time they laughed at me saying it’s reckless, of course if somebody started new business on uninhibited island there will be a chance to fail and loose equipments etc,

and I didn’t know how to hunt sea lions,

and its use and market were not sure.

I spent lots of capital in vain and after many efforts I got hunting method,manufacturing method of products, and some inventions this year.

And I could open up the market.

Their skin, after preserving in salt, will be used as subsitution for cowskin which is used in many ways, and oil from their fresh grease is equal to whale oil in quality and in price.

I could confirm that its well-squeezed dregs will be used for glue, meats will be made into powder and mingled with bone and will be used as fertilizer.

That means hunting sea lions at this island is promising.

However there will be no business on the land of this island other than sea lion hunting, I haven’t researched for fishery so I am not sure. But as this is the centre of Sea of Japan, there should be various fish around the island. If sea lion hunting could be continued, and if I could be given a chance to research I think there will be a chanced to find out new promising business in the future.

In short, if someone used lots of capital and completed equipments and started sea lion hunting, the management of this island will be very promising.

However, this island’s belonging is not determined. The other day I met a foreign ship in trouble, such unexpected events can occur but without affirmation of protection, using lots of money into this island would be very dangerous.

Sea lions on the island are not always living here.

Every year in reproductive months, April and May, came here and after reproduction they leave in July-August.

So the hunting will be conducted during the season.

Therefore, if there were not for moderate limiting of hunting and proper reproduction protection, they will soon be vanished.

However, limiting and protection won’t be conducted if there are competitions. Poeple gather at benefitial things like ants gather at aweets. If they knew sea lion hunting will be benefitial, people including one who laughed at me at first will come and compete, and they will exhaust all the sea lions by overhunting. In the end collapse of all the hunters is inevitable.

As I’ve told, I tried various things and now prospects are good as to sea lion hunting at this island,

I want to increase capitals and to put various machines to make various productions and to have fishery equipments to do fishery, while making a limitation about size and count to hunt, and protecting especially females and infants, and making preserves somewhere in the island, and expelling killer whales and sharks who are harmful animals, but as I told before I can’t because of the mentioned risk.

But this is not only my damage but a disadvantage to the nation.

Therefore, in order to assure the safety of business and to complete the management of the island, please incorporate this island swiftly to Japan’s territory and simultaneously lend it to me for next 10 years, I enclose a drawing hereby.

29th September the 37th year of Meiji (1904)
Simane prefecture, 周吉gun, Saigo cho, Nishimachi                                             
Yozaburo Nakai


内務大臣   子爵 芳川 顕正 殿
the Secretary of the Interior, Viscount Sir Norimasa Yoshikawa,

外務大臣 男爵 小村寿太郎 殿
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, baron Sir Jutaro Komura,

農商務大臣 男爵 清浦  圭吾 殿
the Minister of Agricluture and Commerce, baron Sir keigo Kiyoura

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.Pacifist 106 at occiendalism

A brief translation by me. Correct me if I am wrong.
“96 years old former fisherman in Oki island was interviewed by Sankei Shinbun(06/01/2007 Osaka edition) and gave verbal evidence of Japan’s precedent occupation of Takeshima.
Takeshi Yoshiyama(96) recognized himself in the picture which was taken on the Takeshima island in June of 1934. He confirmed that (Japanese fishermen) hired Korean 海女s (woman divers) from Chejudo(済州島) and they were taken by the Choson boatman. He also said that Choson only came to recognize Takeshima as fishing grounds by Japanese.”original: 竹島「先占」を元漁師が証言 領土編入の根拠裏付け ~ 昭和10年前後「済州島の海女雇い、隠岐の仲間と出漁」

韓国が実効支配しているわが国固有の領土、竹島(韓国名・独島)で昭和初期、アシカ漁に従事した島根県隠岐の島町の漁師、吉山武さん(96)が産経新聞のインタビューに応じ、昭和9年6月に竹島で撮影された写真に自身が写っていることを確認、当時の様子を証言した。「雇った済州島の海女を、朝鮮(半島)の船頭が連れてきた。朝鮮は日本によって竹島を漁 場と認識するようになった」という。



隠岐郷土館(隠岐の島町)は、竹島で撮影された写真を関係者から寄贈され、数点展示しているが、写真を見せられた吉山さんは「昭和9年6月 東島の浜にて撮影」とされているものに当時23歳だった自身が写っていることを初めて確認した。この写真には女性4人が写っているが、いずれも「済州島の海女だ」と証言した。



産経新聞(大阪版) 2007年1月6日 3面kaneganesse at occidentalism